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ABSTRACT 
In the light of the internal and regional crises in the 1980s, Jordan found itself under 
pressure, and various ideological and political factors pushed the country towards 
political reform. As a result, Jordan has undergone several transformations, and a 
certain degree of political liberalization has made political participation the main 
objective of the Jordanian political system and its various institutions. This 
development in turn has required participation of all segments of the society, 
including political parties, minorities, and women. This participation demonstrates 
how far the political system has been liberalized. Therefore, nobody can argue that 
there is no political participation in Jordan. However, important questions remain. 
What is the form of this participation? What is its scale? What factors influence 
political participation, and what are its main objectives? 
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to explore the issue of political participation 
in Jordan. In particular, it investigated the impact of party and tribal loyalties on 
political participation in Jordan since 1989. This is undertaken through examining the 
basic forms of political participation, particularly participation in parliamentary 
elections. Accordingly, this study is divided into two main parts. The first part aims 
to shed light on the historical development of Jordanian parliament, electoral laws and 
systems, and political parties' participation and in addition to examine these in 
context of the socio-economic, political, and cultural environment. The second part 
was carried out through a survey involving the distribution of 400 questionnaires to 
five groups of political elite in Jordan. 
It is concluded in this study that despite the fact that political parties in Jordan date 
back to the establishment of the state in 1921, the social relations of kinship and the 
tribe are still dominant and constitute the main motives for Jordanians to participate in 
parliamentary elections. Several factors explain this, but it is argued here that the most 
important is legislations, particularly the emergency laws which have heavily 
restricted political freedoms and activities. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The Purpose of the Study 
The route to healthy, democratic engagement lies through extending the participation 
rights of all citizens. Therefore, political participation has become a key component 
for establishing democracy, and is one of the most important indicators of political 
development in any society. Moreover, political participation is an effective tool 
through which the social and political forces in the society are able to articulate their 
ideas, present their demands and programs, and influence the political decision 
making process. The importance of political participation at the present time stems 
from its role in the achievement of political development, modernization, and reform 
at both the political and socio-economic levels. 
There are three prominent schools of thought in debates explaining how and why 
people participate in political life. These include the social structure school, which 
focuses on socio-economic factors such as the wealth of a nation, its population size, 
and its level of human development; the political culture school focuses on political 
values and attitudes; and the institutional school focuses on how institutional 
affiliations create incentives for political participation and focuses as well on the 
impact of the electoral system on political participation. This study seeks to 
investigate the direct impact of these factors upon the participation of Jordanian 
citizens. 
sty 
I S 
1 
1.1 Objectives of the Study 
The main aim of the study is to explore the reality of political participation in Jordan 
and to determine the main obstacles that prevent real and effective participation in 
political life in general and parliamentary elections in particular. Therefore, this study 
is divided into two main parts. The first part aims to identify the following: 
1. The demographic, social, and political characteristics of Jordanian society. 
2. The political culture associated with the social and political reality. 
3. The main factors and motives shaping individual decisions to participate in 
political life. 
The sources of data for this part of the study include books, articles, and other 
available documents. In some instances secondary sources have been used, including 
material from Jordanian government ministries, its parliament, and newspapers, in 
collecting data and statistical reports concerning elections results and the participation 
of various social and political organizations in parliamentary elections. 
The second part is an empirical study which aims to identify: 
1. The opinions of the study sample concerning the level of political freedoms in 
Jordan, and the effectiveness of political parties in political field. 
2. The main obstacles preventing real and effective participation. 
3. The dimensions of political participation and the main factors that motivate 
Jordanian citizens to participate in political life. 
4. The effect of the current electoral system on political participation and its 
impact on voter turnout. 
2 
1.1.1 Research Questions 
The main questions posed in this study are: 
1. What is the nature of political participation in Jordan? 
2. What are the main obstacles that prevent real and effective participation in 
parliamentary elections? 
3. What are the forms of political participation practised by Jordanian 
citizens? 
4. To what extent do Jordanian citizens become involved in the political 
process? 
5. Does the Jordanian political system facilitate citizen participation in 
political life? 
6. What are the main affiliations that shape Jordanian citizens political 
behaviour? 
7. What are the main factors that motivate Jordanian citizens to participate in 
political life? 
8. Is the performance of Jordanian political parties successful in the political 
field? 
9. Does the design of the current electoral system promote political 
participation in Jordan? 
10. What would be the electoral system in Jordanian society most suitable to 
increase political participation? 
11. What is the level of women's political participation in Jordan? 
3 
1.2 The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter One explains different approaches to understanding political participation 
concept and its forms. Moreover, this chapter provides a review of the literature, 
discussing previously published work on political participation and the main issues 
which are connected to the study topic. 
The aim of Chapter Two of this study is to provide a historical outline of the 
Jordanian legal framework, including the constitutional, political, legislative and 
electoral systems. This chapter also highlights the historical development of the 
Jordanian parliament and the role played by political parties and Jordanian tribes in 
parliamentary elections. 
Chapter Three explores in some depth the concepts and reality of political culture in 
Jordan, investigating political attitudes and the political culture which prevails in 
Jordanian society. This chapter also explains how Jordanian citizens perceive politics, 
and asks whether or not they trust political decision-makers, and are satisfied with the 
democracy in which they live. 
Chapter Four assesses the major factors surrounding Jordanian elections including 
tribalism and its role in the political and cultural development of Jordanian society in 
addition to its role in parliamentary elections. Moreover, this chapter investigates the 
religious dimension and the participation of Islamist parties in Jordan's elections. 
I f political participation is a key component of democracy, the participation of 
political parties is considered vital for stable and effective democracy. Therefore, 
Chapter Five investi gates the performance of political parties in the light of the 
political changes witnessed in Jordan. Moreover, this chapter reviews the historical 
background of the development and participation of political parties in parliamentary 
life. 
Chapter Six discusses the research methodology adopted in this study to examine 
political participation in Jordan and to investigate the main obstacles to effective 
participation in political life in general and parliamentary elections in particular. This 
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chapter also provides an overview of the data collection instrument, the study design, 
population and sampling. 
Chapter Seven provides an extensive descriptive analysis of the data obtained from 
the questionnaires distributed by the researcher. 
Chapter Eight provides an in depth discussion of the analysis of the quantitative 
results in terms of the study's objectives. Therefore, this chapter provides 
explanations of the important findings and their relevance in the context of the aims of 
the study. 
The final chapter of the thesis provides the conclusions of the study in addition to 
some suggestions and recommendations. 
5 
Theoretical Approaches to understanding 
Political Participation in Jordan 
1.3 Literature Review 
In Research Methods in Librarianship: Techniques and Interpretation, Busha and 
Harter state that in order to conduct a meaningful enquiry there is a need for "sound 
theoretical knowledge about the problem are from which the research task 
originated".1 Therefore, this chapter gives an overview of the literature and debates on 
democracy and political participation, examining the key themes of this study which 
are political participation in Jordan and the role played by political parties and tribes 
in parliamentary elections since 1989. Therefore, the literature review starts by 
discussing the main terms and issues concerning the topic of the thesis: democracy, 
political participation, liberalization. Then closer attention is given to the issue of 
political participation which is conventionally associated with democratization. 
1.3.1 Democracy 
While there is consensus on the desirability of democracy and political freedoms, 
there is no universally accepted definition of democracy. Sartori argued that 
democracy has become a 'diffuse, multifaceted' term2, and that it has been turned into 
an empty and meaningless concept.3 Furthermore, besides using the term democracy 
with reference to systems of government, it is used also to refer to other social 
relationships.4 Collier and Levitsky have argued that as a result of recent dramatic 
trends towards democratization, scholars have been faced with a major conceptual 
challenge in dealing with these new cases of democracy. Consequently, there are 
hundreds of subtypes of democracy such as 'neopatrimonial democracy', 'military-
1 Busha and Harter, Research Methods in Librarianship: Techniques and interpretation (1980), p. 17. 
2 Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (1987), p. 6 
3 Sartori (1987), p. 3. 
4 Birch, Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy (2 n d edition, 2001), p.72. 
6 
dominated-democracy', 'pseudo-democracy', 'semi-democracy', 'protodemocracy' 
and 'electoral democracy'.5 
The term democracy is derived from two Greek words: "demo", meaning people, and 
"kratos" meaning rule. Therefore, democracy means rule by the people. Huntington 
stressed that democracy is often used as a symbolic concept associated with the future 
of freedom in the world. He declared that there is a strong correlation between the 
existence of individual liberty and the existence of democracy.6 O'Donnell and 
Shmitter list the minimum requirements for political democracies as, secret balloting, 
universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational 
recognition and access, and executive accountability. 
Thus some have defined democracy as "a form of government where the legislature is 
elected directly by universal adult suffrage and the executive government is chosen 
either directly in the presidential system or indirectly from among elected 
representatives of the people, as is the norm in the parliamentary system". Another 
definition of democracy was given by Lipset as: "A political system which supplies 
regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social 
mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among 
conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to 
influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders 
for political office". 9 
In an article entitled 'Liberalization versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political 
Reform', Brumberg mentioned three essential elements for democracy: "political 
parties that speak for organized constituencies, parliaments that have the 
constitutional authority to speak on behalf of the electorate, and constitutions that 
5 Collier and Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, 
World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 April, pp. 431. 
6 Huntington, Will More Countries Become Democratic, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 2, 
Summer, 1984), p. 194. 
7 O'Donnell and Shmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies (1986), p. 8. 
8 Nehru, Western Democracy and the Third World, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 1, Issue 2, April 1979, 
pp. 53-70. 
Lipest, Some Social Requests of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, 1959, p. 71. 
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impose limits on executive authority". He argued that these democratic elements are 
missing in the liberalized autocracies of the Arab World. On these grounds no 
government in the region could claim a truly democratic mandate." 
It is clear that the fundamental features of democracy include government based on 
the rule of the majority through the election of representatives, free and fair elections, 
and respect for basic human rights. However, the terms freedom and democracy are 
often used interchangeably, because in real democracy all citizens have the right to 
participate in the decision making process. Accordingly, for democracy to be 
sustained a number of certain basic demands should be met: political competition and 
equal voting rights in free and fair elections; freedom of opinion; freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press; the right to join political organizations; and the 
right to form parties and to participate in elections. 
Although democracy is the only solution to the problem of tyranny, Huntington 
argued that there are three paradoxes for democracy. Firstly, the initiation of elections 
forces political leaders to compete to win votes within their own narrow circles such 
as tribal, ethnic, and religious constituencies. Thus democratization promotes 
communalism and ethnic conflict. Secondly, in the transitional phase of 
democratization, countries become more aggressive and more prone to war and 
fighting against foreign countries. Thirdly, democratization treats state constraints on 
individual behaviour by relaxing social inhibitions, leading to uncertainty and 
confusion about standards of morality.1 2 Furthermore, he argued that the electoral 
victory of parties or movements apparently committed to antidemocratic ideologies 
11 
constitute a potential threat to new democracies. 
Brumberg, Liberalization versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform, Democracy and 
Rule of Law Project Working Paper, No 37, (May 2003), web of Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (www.ceip.org_), p. 8. 
" Brumberg (2003),p. 8 
1 2 Huntington, Democracy for the Long Haul, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, (1996), p. 6. 
1 3 Huntington (1996), pp. 8-9. 
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1.3.2 Democratization, Liberalization, and Political Participation 
According to Huntington, in his book Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
three waves of democratization have taken place in history. The first was a long slow 
wave which brought democracy to Western Europe and Northern America in the 19 th 
century. The second wave began in World War I I from 1943-1962. The latest wave 
began in 1974 and is still ongoing. The process of democratization has been defined 
by Huntington as a process of moving from nondemocratic or authoritarian to 
democratic regimes which occurs within a specific period of time. 1 4 
Brynen, Korany, and Noble have defined democratization as "political 
democratization which entails an expression of political participation in such a way as 
to provide citizens with a degree of real and meaningful collective control over public 
policy". 1 5 This definition focuses on the expansion of public space through the 
recognition and guarantee of civil and political rights, particularly the ability of 
citizens to engage in free expression. However, O'Dennell and Schmitter define 
democratization as "the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are 
either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g., 
coercive control, social tradition, or administrative practice) or expanded to include 
persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g. ethnic minorities, 
women, foreign residents, etc.) or extended to cover issues and institutions not 
previously subject to citizen participation (state agencies, military establishments, 
etc.)".16 
The term political liberalization is connected with democratization. In his book The 
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century Huntington has defined 
political liberalization as "The partial opening of an authoritarian system, short of 
choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive election. Liberalising 
authoritarian regimes may release political prisoners, open up some issues for public 
debate, loosen censorship, sponsor elections for offices that have little power, permit 
some renewal of civil society, and take other steps in a democratic direction, without 
1 4 Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twenty First Century (1991), pp.16-24. 
1 5 Brynen et al (ed), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical 
Perspectives (1995), p. 3 
1 6 O'Dannell and Schmitter (1986), p. 8 
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submitting top decision makers to the electoral test".17 O'Dennel and Schmitter define 
liberalization as "the process of making effective certain rights that protect both 
individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or 
third parties. On the level of the individual, these guarantees include the classical 
elements of the liberal tradition On the level of groups, these rights cover such 
things as freedom from punishment for expression of collective dissent from 
government policy, freedom from censorship of the means of communication, and 
« 1 8 
freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens". 
Thus, political liberalization is only a step towards democratization, as liberalization 
can exist without democracy. Therefore, liberalization should be accompanied by 
institutional reform to achieve democracy, where the most important factors are: the 
government accountability to public control, a strong parliament that is derived from 
democratic elections, the broad possibility of public participation, the rule of law, and 
full respect for human rights.1 9 
Furthermore, modernization theory explains the relationship between the degree of 
democratization and socio-economic development. Lipset found a positive correlation 
between economic development and democracy, and he argued that the chance of the 
survival of democracy in prosperous countries is higher than in poor countries. He 
also argued that giving opportunities for the middle class to exert power and the 
spread of education through society will lead to the weakening of the power of the 
ruling elites in authoritarian countries. Accordingly, the middle class will obtain 
enough economic and political power to demand democracy. 
Huntington explained the third wave of democratization (which began approximately 
in 1974) as a result of socioeconomic development. He listed three economic factors 
which have affected this wave. First, the rise in the price of oil had an adverse impact 
on oil-consuming countries, which led to an economic downturn and the weakening of 
authoritarian regimes. Secondly, the state of economic development that many 
1 7 Huntington (1991), p. 9 
1 8 O'Dannell and Shmitter (1986), p. 7 
1 9 Panebianco (ed.), A New Euro-Mediterranean: Cultural Identity (2003), p. 101. 
2 0 Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (1960), p. 27. 
2 1 Lipset (1960), p. 28. 
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countries had achieved paved the way for democracy. Thirdly, the rapid economic 
growth achieved within some countries destabilised their authoritarian regimes, 
forcing them either to become liberalized or to intensify repressive legislation and 
other measures.22 Furthermore, Huntington listed twenty-seven factors that contribute 
to the consolidation of democracy and the democratic process. These factors include 
economic development and social modernization, a relatively equitable distribution of 
income and/or wealth, a high overall level of economic wealth, high levels of literacy 
and education, and the development of political contestation before the expansion of 
political participation. 
1.3.3 The Concept of Political Participation 
As political participation is the most prominent term in this study, it is therefore 
necessary to discuss the various definitions of the term in order to identify a reliable 
definition in the context of this study. Despite the fact that participation plays a vital 
role in both political and public life, the concept is still controversial. The first 
classical definition of political participation was proposed by McClosky, when he 
defined political participation as "Those voluntary activities by which members of a 
society share in the selection of rulers and, directly or indirectly, in the formation of 
public policy". 2 4 This definition confines political participation to relations between 
citizens and their government. 
Other scholars such as Verba and Nie have defined political participation as the legal 
activities exercised by ordinary citizens that are more or less directly aimed at 
influencing the process of selecting governmental personnel and/or the actions and 
decisions adopted by the government. This definition is also narrow, because it 
restricts the activity of political participation to legal activities and excludes 
demonstrations and sit-ins. Moreover, it considers political participation to be limited 
to ordinary citizens only. 
2 2 Huntington (1991), p. 59. 
2 3 Huntington (1991), pp. 37-38. 
2 4 McCloscky, Political participation in David L . Sills (ed) International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, Vol. 12 (1968), p. 252. 
2 5 Verba and Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (1987), p. 2 
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The classical definition of political participation has been subject to scholarly 
criticisms and reconsideration, because it confines the objectives of political 
participation to the government. However, there are many other activities which could 
be included in the definition of political participation. In Democratic Phoenix: 
Reinventing Political Activism, Norris argues that the term political participation 
should be broadened since the political prospect has changed. He states that instead, 
it is suggested, "not only is the obituary for older forms of political activism 
premature, but multiple forms of civic engagement may have emerged in modern 
societies to supplement traditional modes. Political participation appears to have 
diversified over the years, in terms of agencies (collective organizations), reporters 
(the actions commonly used for political expression), and targets (the political actors 
that participants seek to influence". 
Other scholars discern increases in the variety of forms of participation. Lam refers to 
political participation as "lawful or unlawful activities of support, making demands, 
debates, and other forms of expressions communicated verbally and /or through the 
media....Acts of political participation also include political activities that are targeted 
at private institutions, such as university administrations and business, and that they 
are designed to pose challenges to existing rules, norms, and practices".27 Bahry and 
Silver define political participation as "a multidimensional concept; involving far 
more than voting in elections, it includes election campaigning, collective action 
around policy issues, contacting political representatives, and direct action like 
protests and demonstrations".28 It is clear that these definitions are much broader than 
those of verba and Nie and McClosky, because the activities involved include 
demands and debates as well as lawful and unlawful activities. 
In his article 'Democracy and the Arabic Human Rights' Borhan Ghalyoon stated that 
political participation means and presupposes pluralism, which forms a natural 
framework for the devolution of power freely between the various parties of the social 
elite. Political participation does not necessarily mean inevitable change in the 
2 6 Norris, Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism (2002), p. preface. 
2 7 Lam, Alternative Understanding of Political Participation: Challenging of the Myth of Political 
Indifference in Hong Kong, International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 26, No. 5 (2003), p. 
491. 
2 8 Cited in Bratton, Political Participation in a New Democracy: Institutional Considerations from 
Zambia, Comparative Political Studies, 1999, Vol. 32, No. 5, p. 552 
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political system or values prevailing in the state, but rather it means a redistribution of 
power and authority within the moral influence and effective control positions in the 
community.29 
It seems that, in defining political participation, series of activities linked to political 
processes should be involved, whether these are conventional activities within 
political system or unconventional activities. Political participation can take many 
forms and therefore the activities that should be included in its definition should 
include these forms, such as voting in elections, joining political parties and other 
non-governmental civil organizations, campaign activity, standing as a candidate in 
elections, working for a party or a candidate, talking about politics, and participating 
in demonstrations. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study political participation is defined as Shetwi and 
Al Daghstani have defined it. Their definition is more satisfactory because it includes 
various different kinds of political activities. They defined political participation as 
"The overall political activities aimed at influencing the decisions taken by the 
political powers such as the executive power, legislature, and political parties. These 
activities include nomination to elected councils, voting to elect representatives, 
participation in the election campaigns of the candidates, joining political parties and 
participation in various community activities as well as participation in non-traditional 
activities such as demonstrations, sit-ins, and writing in the newspapers about 
important political issues".30 
1.3.4 Mechanisms of Political Participation 
There are many means and methods to participate in political life. These methods 
differ in terms of their importance and effectiveness as well as in their requirements, 
obligations, and legitimacy. Furthermore, these means vary both within the same 
society and from one society to another, from one political system to another or from 
time to time within the same society or the same political system. This diversity in the 
2 9 Ghalioun, al-Dimoqratiyyah wa Hoqooq al-Insan al-Arabi , [Democracy and the Arabic Human 
Rights], al-Mostaqbal al-Arabi Magazine, No. 13 May, 1990. 
3 0 Shetwi, and al- Daghstani, al -mr'a al-Urduniyyah wa al-Musharakah al-siyasiyyah [Jordanian 
Women and Political Participation] (1994), p. 6 
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mechanisms of political participation is in accordance with the requirements of or the 
level of development achieved by the community, or according to the nature and 
quality of the objectives and goals which the individual seeks to achieve through his 
involvement in political life. 
In An Introduction to Political Sociology, Rush and Althoff supposed a hierarchy of 
participation covering all levels of political participation, and at the same time 
appropriate for various political systems31 (see table 1.1). They assumed that each 
level of the hierarch would have a specific importance which might vary from one 
system to another. Moreover, certain of the levels may be of great importance in one 
system and less relevant or even absolutely irrelevant in another system. 
Table 1.1: The Hierarchy of Political Participation 
Filling a political or administrative post 
Seeking to fill a political or administrative post 
Active membership in a political organization 
Non-active membership in a political organization 
Active membership in semi-political organization 
Non-active membership in semi-political organization 
Participation in public meetings and demonstrations 
Participation in the informal political discussions 
Public interest in political matters 
Voting 
Political apathy 
Source: M . Rush and Ph. Althoff., An Introduction to Political Sociology, 
(London: Nelson and Sons LTD, 1971), p. 76 
3 1 Rush and Althoff, An Introduction to Political Sociology (1971), P. 76 
3 2 Rush and Althoff (1971), p. 76 
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There are several criticisms which have been directed at this hierarchy. The first of 
these concerns the summit of this hierarchy, where Rush and Althoff put the office-
holders of political and administrative posts all at the same level. In fact the role of 
politicians is different from that of administrators, in addition to the subordination of 
the latter to the political authority.33 Furthermore, politicians hold decision-making 
power, while the role of administrators is limited to implementing these decisions or 
taking action to implement them. Therefore, there is no equality between them in the 
degree of power, influence, and consequently their involvement in the political 
participation process. 
Regarding participation through membership in political and semipolitical 
organizations, this is not a real indicator of popular political participation. Behind 
these organizational affiliations may be personal motives or selfish aspirations but not 
the public interest.34 Moreover, these organizations may be merely political tools in 
the service of the political system, or may reflect the interests of groups that belong to, 
or seek to occupy positions of power. In addition, these organizations might be merely 
cosmetic facades designed to contain the masses or strong opposition groups to keep 
them away from real participation in political life or from resistance to the existing 
system.35 Finally, political apathy cannot be seen as a method of participation, but it 
might be as described by Al i Abd al-Raziq, as an expression of a crisis of 
participation.36 
In Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? 
Milbrarth argues that once a person is involved in one political activity he wil l be 
likely to also participate in all of the activities below it on the hierarchy. He argued 
that citizens' behaviour in political life is expected to be hierarchic and cumulative, 
with the lowest levels involving exposure to political stimuli and voting, and at the 
highest levels holding public and party office. Milbrath's proposed hierarchy includes 
the most common political activities in three main categories see figure 1.1. Moreover, 
he asserts that smaller numbers of citizens are involved in any activity other than 
3 3 Sa'ad and Al-zayat. al-Mujtamai wa al-Siyasah, [Society and Politics] (2003), p. 465 
3 4 Sa'ad and Alzayat (2003), p. 466 
3 5 Sa'ad and Alzayat (2003), p. 467 
3 6 Jalabi, et al., Majalat ' Urn al-Ijtima1, al-Mu 'asir: Nadariyyat wa Dirasat Waq'Ciyya, [Areas of 
Contemporary Sociology: Theoretical Fundamentals and Field Studies] (1982), pp.532-533 
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voting, and that voting appears to be a predictor of other more active forms of 
participation.37 
Figure 1.1 Milbrath's Hierarchy of Political Involvement 
Gladiatorial Activities 
Holding public and party office 
Being a candidate for office 
Soliciting political funds 
Attending a caucus or strategy meeting 
Becoming an active member in a political party 
Contributing time in a political campaign 
Transitional Activities 
Attending a political meeting or rally 
Making a monetary contribution to a party or candidate 
Contacting a public official or a political leader 
Spectator Activities 
Wearing a button or putting a sticker on the car 
Attempting to talk another into voting a certain way 
Initiating a political discussion 
Voting 
Exposing oneself to political stimuli 
Source: Milbrath, Lester W. Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get 
Involved in Politics?, (Chicago : Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1965), 
p. 18 
Milbrath, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? (1965), p. 18 
16 
Accordingly, political participation involves much more than just voting. It derives 
from the freedom to speak out, assemble and associate; the ability to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs; and the opportunity to register as a candidate, to campaign, 
to be elected and to hold office at all levels of government. At the forefront of 
political participation patterns are electoral activity, partisan action, and union work 
which are linked to the principles of political pluralism, freedom of opinion, freedom 
of peaceful assembly and the right to form associations and political parties. 
1.3.5 Why Do People Vote? Theories of Political Participation 
Milbrath asserts that "Taking any political action generally requires two decisions: 
one must decide to act or not to act; and one must also decide the direction of his 
action. For example, a person not only decides to vote or not to vote, but also decides 
whom to vote for". 3 8 There are three prominent groups of theories of political 
participation: the socio-economic or socioeconomic status (SES) school; the political 
culture school; and the institutional school. 
1.3.5.1 Socio-Economic Development and Political Participation 
The socio-economic school takes three basic economic factors as the main factors 
explaining individual differences in political participation. These factors are income, 
education, and occupation.39 The scholars in this school claim that there is a positive 
relationship between these factors and political participation. Therefore, those with 
higher incomes, better education, and respected jobs or occupations, alone or in 
combination, are expected to show higher degrees of political participation.40 
Therefore, people who have high incomes can apply those resources to their political 
activity: "for instance, they can make greater contributions to political campaigns and, 
of course, they have a greater property stake at risk in the political sphere that they 
3 8 Milbrath (1965), p. 6. 
3 9 Schlozman, Beyond S E S : A Resource Model of Political Participation. (Socioeconomic Status as 
Explanation for Political Activity), American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2. (Jun, 1995), p. 
271 
4 0 Conway, Political Participation in the United States (2 n d ed.), (1991), p. 21 
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may wish to protect by participating in politics".4 1 Regarding the role of education in 
political participation, Conway argues that it is the most important factor in SES that 
influences political participation because education enhances political interests and 
civic skills. 4 2 Almond and Verba argue that education is an important factor in the 
development of the active political participation which is necessary for democratic 
politics. They further argue that educated citizens have the key to be involved to 
produce high degree of political participation and therefore have more political 
influence than those who are less educated and accordingly less involved in political 
participation 4 3 
Sidney Verba states that the effects of education on political participation might 
operate in at least two ways: "formal education itself fosters organizational and 
communication skills that are germane to political activity and impart attitudes such 
as a sense of civic duty or political efficacy that are associated with political 
involvement. In addition, those with high levels of education are in a position to 
acquire further political resources: they are much more likely to have the kinds of jobs 
that pay high salaries and ...to have opportunities in several arenas to develop skills 
that are relevant to politics".4 4 
1.3.5.2 Political Participation and Political Culture 
Despite the fact that some theories rely on structural factors such as socioeconomic 
development that affect the processes of political participation, the political culture 
school emphasizes political values and attitudes. Here it is believed that political 
participation is initiated in the values, attitudes and motivations of citizens. They 
argue that political culture and attitudes towards political efficacy and political trust 
for example, affect political participation more than other factors. 
Inglehart argued that "There is no question that economic factors are politically 
important, but they are only part of the story. I argue that the different societies are 
4 1 Klesner, Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico, and Peru, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 1-32 
4 2 Conway (1985), p. 20 
4 3 Almond and Verba (1963), pp. 381-382. 
4 4 Verba, et al. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States, British 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 4, (1993), p. 457 
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characterized to very different degrees by specific syndromes of political culture 
attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable; 
and that they have major political consequences, being closely linked to the viability 
of democratic institutions".45 Hudson stresses that political culture is the most 
important factor in understanding politics regardless of the country, whether in the 
Arab World or elsewhere.46 
Almond and Verba have argued that "the development of a stable and effective 
democratic government depends upon more than the structure of government and 
politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process upon 
political culture".47 Ayubi, states that, "Democracy is not simply a form of 
government; it is also a cultural and intellectual tradition". I deas, attitudes and 
beliefs constituting political culture are derived from the broader culture of society 
itself. Therefore, Huntington argues that political culture and democracy are closely 
linked to religion, and that protestant societies have historically enjoyed more 
democracy than Catholic or Islamic societies. 
Peteman argues that one of the most important correlations between political culture 
and participation is the sense of political efficacy or sense of political competence. 
She stresses that, "people who have a sense of political efficacy are more likely to 
participate in politics than those in whom this feeling is lacking Persons who feel 
more effective in their daily everyday tasks and challenges are more likely to 
participate in politics". 4 9 
Some argue that Arab culture is incompatible with democracy. Patai argues that Arabs 
are seen as "ambitious and eager to be the leader"50, and that Arab culture has 
developed a state of mind that is not open to change because of its traditionalism.51 
4 5 Inglehart, The Renaissance of Political Culture, American Political Science Review , Vol. 82, No. 4, 
December 1988, 1203. 
4 6 Hudson, Democratization and the Problem of Legitimacy in the Arab World, In Middle East Studies 
Association Bulletin, Vol. 22, No.2 (1988), pp. 161-163. 
4 7 Almond and Verba, The civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (1963), p. 
498. 
4 8 Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State (1995), p. 397. 
4 9 Peteman, Participation and Democratic Theory (1970), p. 46 
5 0 Patai, The Arab Mind (\973), p. 20 
5 1 Patai, The Arab Mwtf (1976), pp. 294-296. 
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Kedourie argues that, as a result of the nature of Arab culture, a vibrant civil society is 
not possible in the Middle East. Moreover, he doubts democracy's future prospects: 
"those who say that democracy is the only remedy for the Arab world disregard a long 
experience which clearly shows that democracy has been tried in many countries and 
uniformly failed". 5 2 
In Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, Shrabi argues that 
modernisation in the Arab region has not replaced traditional, patriarchal structures, 
and that on the contrary these structures are becoming stronger. Sharabi attributes 
this situation to the halting of the development process half way between the 
traditional and modern.54 He argues that Arab societies are characterized by 
neopatriarchal values which often coexist in contradiction with modern values. 
"Whatever the outward (modern) forms material, legal, and aesthetic of the 
contemporary neopatriarchal family and society, their internal structures remain 
rooted in the patriarchal values and social relations of kinship, clan, and religious and 
ethnic groups. The modern and the patriarchal coexist in contradictory union."5 5 
1.3.5.3 Electoral System and Political Participation 
Scholars in the third approach, the institutional school have focused on the role of 
political institutions, such as the sets of rules constituting electoral laws in providing 
incentives and sanctions for parties and candidates in political participation and 
therefore in increasing voter turnout.56 
The electoral system concerns the rules and procedures by which votes cast in an 
election are translated into legislative seats. Therefore, choosing the type of electoral 
system is one of the most important institutional decisions for any democracy. This is 
because the design of the electoral system has a profound effect on the future political 
life of the country and influences the nature of representatives. Reynolds and Reilly 
argue that, "Any new democracy must choose (or inherit) an electoral system to elect 
5 2 Kedourie, Demcracy and political Arab Culture (1992), p. 105. 
5 3 Sharabi, Neopatriarchy, A theory of Distorted A change in Arab Society (1988), pp. 4-5. 
5 4 Sharabi (1988), p. 8 
5 5 Sharabi (1988), p. 8 
5 6 Jackman, Political Institution and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies, American Political 
science review, Vol. 81, No. 2 (June, 1987), p. 405 pp. 405-424 
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its parliament, but such decisions is often affected by one of two circumstances. Either 
political actors lack basic knowledge and information so that the choice and 
consequences of different electoral systems are not fully recognized or, conversely, 
political actors use their knowledge of electoral systems to promote designs which 
they think will work to their own partisan advantage". 
Reynolds and Reilly argue that, political institutions shape the rules of the game under 
which democracy is practiced, and it is often argued that the easiest political 
institution to be manipulated, for good or for bad, is the electoral system, because in 
translating the votes cast in a general election into seats in the legislature, the choice 
of electoral system can effectively determine who is elected and which party gains 
power.58 Moreover, these authors identified eight criteria that should be followed by 
the electoral system designer when designing an electoral system: 
1. Ensuring a representative parliament. 
2. Making elections accessible and meaningful with ease of voting and the ability 
of the electorate to understand the electoral process. 
3. Providing incentives for conciliation. 
4. Facilitating stable and efficient government. 
5. Holding the government and representatives accountable, so that state elected 
officials or parties are responsible to their constituents to the highest degree 
possible. 
6. Encouraging "cross-cutting" political parties. 
7. Promoting a parliamentary opposition. 
8. Cost and administrative capacity of the country should be taken in 
consideration when designing any electoral system.59 
These criteria can be employed to determine which electoral systems are most 
effective for any given society. In addition, it is argued that elections are the key 
factor in evaluating whether or not the political system is representative, because the 
electoral system reflects the ideological divisions within the society "Electoral system 
Reynolds and Reilly, The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design (1997), p. 1. 
5 8 Reynolds and Reilly (1997), p. 7 
5 9 Reynolds and Reilly (1997), pp. 9-13. 
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consequences depend upon factors such as how a society is structured in terms of 
ideological, religious, ethnic, racial, regional, linguistic, or class divisions; whether 
the country is an established democracy, a transitional democracy, or a new 
democracy; whether there is an established party system, whether parties are 
embryonic and unformed, and how many 'serious' parties there are; and whether a 
particular party's supporters are geographically concentrated together, or dispersed 
over a wide area".60 
1.3.6 Democracy and Political Participation 
Citizen participation in democracy is one of the main issues in democratic thought. In 
debates about the role citizen participation should play in a democracy, there are two 
different views which can be characterized as participatory or representative 
democracy. In the first view 'Schumpeterian view', citizen participation in 
representative democracy is seen as not essential to democracy and can be limited to 
voting in elections.61 Schumpeter is the main representative of this view. In the second 
view, theorists of participatory democracy see citizen participation as an essential 
element of democracy which means more than just voting in elections. 
Schumpeter defines democracy as "the democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power 
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote". The main 
element of political democracy, according to Schumpeter is the competition for 
leadership. Hence, according to this opinion democracy is first and foremost a process 
that takes place among leaders, and direct citizen participation in the decision making 
process is not essential to democracy. The role of the people is to produce a 
government, and Schumpeter argued that, one e voters have elected their leaders, 
political action is the leaders' business not the voters'.6 3 
In Democratic Theory Sartori argued that the people's massive participation in the 
political process would lead to totalitarianism. Therefore, the political activity of 
6 0 Reynolds and Reilly (1997), p. 8. 
6 1 Shumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942). 
6 2 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1976), p. 269. 
6 3 Schumpeter (1976), p. 295 
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people should be minimized, and he argued that the people should react and not act. 
A similar view of the role of citizen participation in democracy can be found in Dahl's 
work. He argued that the massive participation of ordinary citizens in political activity 
could be dangerous as it might be lead to a decline in consensus about the basic 
principles and norms of democracy.65 
On the other hand, there are many thinkers who see that citizen participation in 
political life is more than casting votes in elections and has a meaning much wider 
than producing a government. This view sees democracy, "first and foremost as the 
people's business; citizens are the central agent not the political leaders"66. Rousseau 
argued that participation is not only voting in elections, it covers every other aspect of 
participation in the political decision making process67. Table 1.2 shows the main 
elements of the two different views representative and participatory democracy. 
Table 1.2 Two Different Points of View on Political Participation and Democracy 
Participation plays only a marginal 
role in democracy 
Participation is an essential feature of 
democracy 
Representative democracy Participatory democracy 
The focus is on political leaders The focus is on citizens 
Participation is instrumental Participation is expressive 
Participation has no educative or social 
functions 
Participation has both educative and 
social functions 
There is no relationship between 
participation and good government 
Participation is a way of ensuring good 
government 
Massive participation is not desirable Massive participation is desirable 
Source: Michels, Ank., Citizen Participation and Democracy in the Netherlands. In 
Democratization, Vol 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 323-339. 
Sartori, Democratic Theory (1962),p. 77. 
6 5 Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956), p. 89. 
6 6 Michels, Citizen Participation and Democracy in the Netherlands. In Democratization, Vol . 13, No. 
2, 2006, pp. 323-339. 
6 7 Michels (2006), p. 3 
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In 'The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946-1994', John O'Loughlin and his colleagues 
defined democracy as widely "meant to refer to systems that encourage inclusion, 
participation, open competition, and institutionalized constraints". They argue that 
there are four basic elements in political democracy: (a) the regulation and 
competitiveness of political participation; (b) the extent of competition among various 
groups of the political forces; (c) constraints on the decision-making powers of the 
executive; (d) the openness of recruitment into the decision making bodies 6 9 They 
also mentioned that some scholars have specified indicators to measure the level of 
democracy; the extent to which these indicators are identified and protected the extent 
of democracy is embraced in the state. For example, Gastil mentioned two 
components, political rights and civil liberties; Downs mentioned the presence of free 
and fair elections; and Lerner stressed on the extent of political participation in terms 
70 
of voter turnout. 
Democratization is clearly a complex and long-term process that requires procedural 
changes, and in addition its outcome needs time to be achieved. Moreover, there are 
several basic criteria which can be used in judging whether or not the performance of 
any political system is democratic and successful: 
1. Commitment of the political leadership to accountability. 
2. Standards of honesty and efficiency of government officials. 
3. Transparency and openness of political decision making. 
4. Level of public awareness that is appropriate to enhance participation in 
political affairs. 
5. The capability of various civil society movements to represent the citizenry in 
71 
the political sphere. 
O'Loughlin, et al., The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946-1994. Annals, Association of American 
Geographers, Vol. 88, No. 4, (December 1998), p. 547. 
6 9 O'Loughlin, et al. (1998), p. 548. 
7 0 O'Loughlin, et al. (1998), p. 548. 
7 1 Harris, Democratization of the State: A Global Perspective and South African Case Study, 
International Journal of Public Administration, 2004, Vol. 27, Issue. 13/14, p. 1066 
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1.3.7 Jordan's Political Development 
This section introduces the literature on democracy and political participation in 
Jordan in order to find out whether there are any components which may contribute to 
this study. The review covers the most significant publications with relevance to the 
study. 
1.3.7.1 Democracy in Jordan: Literature Review 
"Building Democracy in Jordan" is a significant recent report in Arabic by Ibtissam 
Al-Attiyat, Musa Shteiwi, and Suleiman Sweiss. Published in 2003 this study was 
carried out by the International IDEA in cooperation with Arabic NGO for 
Development (ANND) and discusses democratic reforms in different Arab countries, 
Jordan was one of these countries, detailed national data in this report was collected 
from laws and official publications. Such as, the Political Parties' Law no. 15 of 1955, 
the Political Parties' Law no. 32 of 1992, the Constitution of Jordan of 1952, and 
other books and reports addressing Jordan's democratization. 
The first paper by Suleiman Sweiss discusses the evolution of Jordan's electoral 
systems and the main obstacles to democracy in Jordan. The paper starts with a 
comprehensive introduction to legislative and parliamentary life in Jordan and the 
most important changes to the electoral system since the establishment of TJ in 1921. 
In his evaluation of the electoral situation and the democratic process Sweiss argues 
that after the 2003 elections the conviction grew among different official and public 
sectors that Jordanian democracy was passing through a crisis. This was not only due 
to low voter turnout but also due to ineffective role of the Chamber of Deputies in 
terms of both political issues and legislative role, so that the credibility of the 
legislature and the elections in general were weekend. 
The second paper by Musa Sheitwi provides an analysis of the Jordanian political 
parties from (1921-2003). He critically highlights their activities and the main 
problems that led to their limited effective role in political transformation and 
participation in Jordan. The third paper by Ibtissam Al Attiyat examines the impact of 
25 
women's participation in public life on their position in the society focusing on 
women's participation in public life, elected councils, and political parties. 
Al Attiyat conducted interviews with female deputies and activists in women's rights 
and other women organizations to assess their political experience, quota system, and 
women's general role and participation in civil society and political life. Al-Attiyat 
outlines the most significant factors and the obstacles to an effective role for women 
in public affairs and elections. She reveals that women are unsatisfied with their 
political participation due to several factors. These include many social obstacles, as 
Jordan is a very conservative society and traditionally favours men candidates and 
hinges on tribes. Legal obstacles further obstruct women from becoming involved in 
political participation, and the author argues that the SNTV system supports tribalism 
in such a way to enhance male candidates' chances over those of women candidates. 
Jordan in Transition: from Hussein to Abdullah by Curtis R Ryan is a valuable book 
about the economic, social and political changes that Jordan has experienced since 
1989, offering a persuasive analysis of Jordan's domestic and international politics. 
Ryan argues that Jordanian politics has undergone four transitions. The first stage 
started in 1989 with liberalization and democratization programme when Jordan's 
regime first allowed competitive elections. The second transition also started after 
1989 when Jordan implemented policies to improve its economic situation and, in 
response to globalization, to embark upon economic reform and restructuring. The 
third transition occurred between the 1991 Gulf War and the Jordan-Israel peace 
treaty which was signed in 1994 fundamentally altering these countries' relationship. 
The final transition started when King Abdullah ascended to the throne in 1999 after 
the death of King Hussein who had ruled Jordan from 1953 to 1999. Ryan argues that 
King Abdullah took major steps towards domestic political reform, and author 
provides an analysis of the 1999 democratic elections which were the first to be held 
under this monarch. 
Democracy in Jordan? by Tujan Faisl and Ian Urbina was published on July, 2003. 
Tujan was the first woman to be elected Deputy in the 12 th Jordanian parliament in 
1993. The authors argue that the most important reasons for Jordan being a long way 
off from real democracy and have had serious effect on the electoral process are the 
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temporary laws which have been decreed from 2001 to 2003 contain a wide range of 
restrictions. Faisal and Urbina argue that these elections went smoothly with a voter 
participation percentage of 52%, in addition to allocating a quota for women with six 
parliamentary seats. Nevertheless, non-partisan candidates won the majority of the 
seats in the lower house of parliament, and this precludes Jordan having embraced a 
true democratic reform. 
Finally, the researchers wonder if, with this type of deputies, the parliament will be 
able to deal with the current political issues and important challenges and to do what 
is right. The researchers did not evaluate the performance of the 2003 parliament as 
they wrote their article one month after these elections, but they recommended that 
the parliament should review all of the temporary laws and decide whether to approve 
or reject them. 
Kamel S. Abu Jabir and Schirin H. Fathi.. Thel989 Jordanian Parliamentary 
elections (1990) provide an in depth analyse of the 1989 elections. This was the first 
general election since 1967, occurring two months prior to Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank. The authors argue that the 1989 election should be interpreted in the light 
of the important issues which formed its background. An analysis is then given to 
Jordan's electoral law after the disengagement decision in 1988 which redraw the 
electoral districts and were subject to lengthy discussions. 
The 1993 Elections in Jordan by Abla Amawi (1994) discusses the main significant 
points in the 1993 election and the impact of election law amendments on the 
electoral campaigns and results. Amawi points out in her Article that these elections 
constituted a significant step in Jordan towards the consolidation of democracy, 
particularly because they were the first elections to be held under Political Parties' 
Law issued in September 1992. She added that the 1993 election were also significant 
because women succeeded in this election and one woman succeeded in becoming the 
first and only Jordanian woman yet to be elected to the lower house of parliament. 
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The Process of Democratisation in Jordan by Katherine Ruth assesses the political 
reforms which took place in Jordan from 1989 to 1992 concentrating on the 1989 
elections. Ruth argues that the economic riots accompanied by the precise limits of 
pluralism and political freedom triggered a political liberalisation process in Jordan, 
and she notes that the Gulf crisis was a major crisis in Jordan after the initiation of 
liberalisation in 1989. Rath concludes that the crisis improved the relationships 
between the regime and parliament and led to greater national unity. 
Al-Hawmdeh carried out a study about the political development in Jordan from 1988 
to 1994. Al-Hawmdeh's 1994 study entitled Political Development in Jordan from 
1988 Until the Present72 investigated the effects of education, economics, and 
urbanisation on political development in Jordan. Al-Hawamdeh used a quantitative 
method to collect data and to identify the factors which encouraged the political 
development process in Jordan. Al-Hawmdeh's study sample was 510 respondents 
selected randomly from the population. He concluded that tribalism and 
communalism strongly influenced political development, in addition arguing that 
Jordanian citizens appeared to be relatively highly politically informed, interested and 
active. 
However, it is worth noting that Al-Hawmdeh and Katherine conducted their studies 
examining Jordan's program of political liberalization in 1992, less than two years 
after the initiation of political liberalization in Jordan. I argue that it was too early to 
know whether the development of political liberalization in Jordan has progressed or 
fallen backward, particularly after two decades of parliamentary suspension. 
Political Liberalization in Jordan: A Study of the Democratization Process 1989-1993 
by Mohammad Kanosh Al-Sharah. Al-Sharah investigated whether or not the process 
of political liberalization which began in 1989 had led to democracy in Jordan. Al -
Sharah used a qualitative method of research, interviewing senior government 
officials and political party leaders, and argued that the 1989 riots motivated 
Jordanian citizens to participate actively in the 1989 elections. Al-Sharah's study 
examined the role of parliamentary councils in the transition towards democracy in 
Present refers to 1994 when he completed his thesis. 
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Jordan. He argued that following the 1989 elections, parliamentary councils became 
the centre of political development. Moreover, he added that many steps have been 
taken on the road to democracy after 1989 elections such as 1992 Political Parties' 
Law and 1993 Press and Publication Law. Furthermore, Al-Sharah argues that all 
political groups and tendencies, including the Islamists, can participate freely in the 
political process. 
More importantly, al-Sharah argues that the only significant setback in the 
democratization process was the change in the electoral law in the absence of a 
parliament. Therefore, he argued that the Jordanian case can be characterized as 
democracy without a full transfer of power. However, it was too early to assess the 
impact of parliamentary councils on the liberalization process and judge whether the 
parliament became the centre of political development after only two parliamentary 
elections. Particularly that the two elections were held under two different laws and 
consequently produced two different kinds of parliamentarians. 
Moreover, Al-Sharah argued that the promulgation of the 1993 Press and Publication 
Law is considered as a positive step on the road to democracy. However, the period 
between 1993 and 1997 elections witnessed a decline in political freedoms as a result 
of the major amendments -in 1993, 1997, 1998, and 1999- that the government 
introduced to the Press and Publication Law which gave the authorities sweeping 
powers to reduce the degree of press freedom. 
Is It Democratization? The Rule of Law and Political Changes in Jordan since 1989 
by Anu Leinonen presented in 2006. The main aim of the study was to investigate the 
rule of law in democratization and whether the political changes that Jordan had 
witnessed since 1989 indicated the presence of a successful democratization process 
in Jordan. Leinonen argues that modern political democracy is not possible without 
embedded rule of law practices. Moreover, he asserts that one of the first conclusion 
to be drawn that political changes that have taken place since 1989 cannot be correctly 
understood as indicating a process of real democratization. 
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Conclusion 
This review of the most important studies about democratization and political 
development in Jordan was looking for anything can be used to assess the 
liberalization process through real indicators. Disappointingly, the reviewed literature 
offers early studies in 1992 after only two parliamentary elections and some before 
the issuance of the political parties' law. In view of that, I argue that it was too early 
to judge whether the process of liberalization has been fully consolidated and 
achieved the ambitious goals or not, as most of the dramatic and important events that 
have had a dramatic impact on the political liberalization process occurred after 1992, 
such as the consequences of the peace treaty with Israel, economic consequences of 
Iraq war, and the September 11 t h attacks and their consequences. 
Moreover, to measure transformation towards liberal democracy, different criteria can 
be used, the most important are through moving towards greater degrees of political 
participation; moving forward in terms of legislation to provide more opportunities for 
Jordanian citizens to participate in political life; through evaluating how effective the 
elected parliament is considered to be; the level of involvement of Jordanian citizens 
in the political process; and the level of political freedoms. However, most of the 
reviewed studies focused on participation in parliamentary elections only, while the 
current study aims to focus on conceptual and analytical issues such as political 
parties, political culture, tribalism, international context, and the socio-economic 
situation that led the political system in Jordan to liberalization and at the same time 
pushed it to reverse this liberalization. 
Additionally, from this review it is clear that there is a lack of comprehensive and 
empirical studies providing a thorough explanation of political participation in Jordan. 
Therefore, this study aims to provide different approaches to understand the main 
factors which affect political participation in terms of both the individual 
characteristics of Jordanian citizens and the external factors. 
Therefore, this study is important for both academic and practical reasons and 
considerations. In terms of academic considerations, despite the multiplicity of 
writings on democratization, political parties, parliamentary elections, and the 
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political system in Jordan, there is a paucity of research and field studies on the 
political participation in Jordan. There are no empirical studies identifying the reality 
of political participation in Jordan and investigating the most important factors 
associated with participation concerning the economic situation, social structure, 
religion, and political culture. 
From a practical viewpoint, the importance of this study lies in the following: 
1. Fifteen years have passed since political pluralism was initiated in Jordan. 
2. Despite the social, economic, and political transformation that Jordan has 
witnessed, the transition to democracy has not been linked to improvements in 
political participation, even though the regulation and competitiveness of 
political participation is one of four basic elements of political democracy 
according to O'Loughlin et al. 
3. During the period in which the empirical research for this study was 
conducted73, intense public debate in Jordan occurred concerning issues linked 
to political participation, and particularly about the next parliamentary election 
scheduled to take place in 20/11/2007. 
4. This study is also important because participation in Jordanian parliamentary 
elections is not only a political phenomenon but also a social phenomenon 
where the political and electoral behaviour of both voters and candidates is 
affected by many political, social, economic, and cultural factors. 
"from 1/5/2007-10/7/2007 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Historical Development of Constitutions and Parliaments in Jordan 
2.1 Introduction 
From the beginning of the twelfth century A.D Jordan, like other neighbouring Arab 
countries, was ruled by the Ottoman Empire through local administrative councils. In 
1921, however, Jordan came into being when the British reached a political agreement 
with Emir Abdullah in Amman in 1921, and the first national government was formed 
under his leadership. The following years witnessed crucial changes and in 1923 
Britain recognised Transjordan (TJ) as a national state under the rule of Emir 
Abdullah, which they would grant independence i f a constitutional regime was 
established. Since then a series of agreements were signed between Emir Abdullah 
and the British government, leading to the announcement of Jordan's independence in 
1946. 
After 1921 the country continued to develop its political and constitutional structures. 
The constitutional journey started with the Jordan's first constitution (The Organic 
Law) promulgated in 1928 during the British mandate. This law stipulated a 
hereditary monarchy with elected legislative councils, and was followed by elections 
for five legislative councils. The constitution was transformed in 1946 when Jordan 
gained its full independence and a new constitution was promulgated adopting the 
bicameral system. Only one election was held under this constitution, in November 
1947. A few years later a new constitution was instituted on January 1, 1952 after the 
West Bank was engaged with TJ. This constitution stipulated that the system of 
Jordanian government was a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system 
adopting the bicameral legislative council. 
This chapter covers the constitutional framework and the political developments in 
Jordan from 1928, and provides a historical background to Jordan's legislative 
structure and participation in Jordanian elections. 
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2.2 The Establishment of the T J State 
The territory constituting present day Jordan was conquered and ruled by the Ottoman 
Empire from 1516 until 1917, in which time it was a neglected governorate 
{mutasarrifiyyah) under the Syrian vilayet (an administrative division of the empire). 
The Ottoman Turks did not wish to rule the area east of the Jordan River directly 
because it was so difficult to rule being inhabited by Bedouins.74 During the World 
War I , Sharif Hussein ibn-'Ali, ruler of Mecca and Hijaz, was promised by British and 
French and their allies an independent Arab state i f the Arab revolted against the 
Turks. On July 14, 1915, the British High Commissioner in Cairo Sir Henry 
McMahon acting on behalf of the British government began a correspondence with 
Sharif Hussein.75 
In this correspondence Sharif Hussein was promised Arab rule in all of the areas 
liberated from Turkey except "The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and 
portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama and 
Aleppo which cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the 
limits demanded".76 On May 16, 1916 during World War I , an agreement concluded 
between British and France concerning the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was 
called Sykes-Picot agreement.77 Sir Mark Sykes represented the British and Georges 
Picot of France agreed that the Arab areas would be divided as follows 7 8 (see figure 
2.1): 
1. "Great Britain and France prepared to recognise and protect an independent 
Arab state or a confederation of states in the A and B zones (A included the 
interior of Syria; B comprised most of the hinterland of Mesopotamia and 
some part of eastern Palestine) under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. France 
in zone A and Great Britain in zone B were to have the right of priority in 
enterprises and local loans. In their respective zones France and Great Britain 
7 4 Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (1993) pp.35-36. 
7 5 Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development 1921 -1965, (1972), p.16. 
7 6 http://www.wzo.org.il/home/politic/dl48a.htm 
7 7 The agreement took its name from the negotiators. 
7 8 Antonius, The Arab Awakening: the Story of the Arab National Movement (1938), pp.428-430 
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the anger and tension in society and led to a further crisis of trust between the people 
and governments.268 
The Prime Minister, Dr. Marouf al-Bakhit, acknowledged in May 2007, that there is a 
crisis of confidence between the state and the society.269 Therefore, the Jordanian 
citizens believe that the successive governments have been unable to assume the 
responsibilities of the serious stages that Jordan has passed through. They have 
neglected the five basic issues which concern the internal life of the citizens: problems 
of poverty and unemployment, improving standards of living in general, the 
application of the principles of equal opportunities, and fighting corruption. 
The results of an opinion poll conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the 
University of Jordan in 2005 showed that a majority (86%) of Jordanians are not 
optimistic that the current government will be able to solve the basic problems. The 
general trends of Jordanian public opinion have not changed, and there is a growing 
lack of confidence among citizens about government in general. 
Moreover this poll also revealed that the confidence gap might increase during the 
present government or subsequent government i f policies were not pursued to 
successfully reduce poverty, unemployment, corruption, and price rises. These are the 
most prominent problems in Jordan which the citizens believe that their government 
must deal with immediately. 
More importantly, the Jordanian citizen believes that the government is not serious 
about strengthening the democratic process or undertaking political reform in Jordan. 
Zaki Bani Irshaid, Secretary General of the Islamic Action Party has stated that there 
is no governmental will for reform: " I do not trust that the government intends to 
achieve political reform and fight corruption" 2 7 1 
Live dialogue with Jamil Abu Bakr the Assistant Secretary-General of the Islamic Action Front on 
www.aslamonline.net, Saturday 30/11/2002 
2 6 9 http://www.ikhwan-ior.com/modules.php?name=News&file=Article&sid=465. May 22, 2007 
2 7 0 Jordanian Opinion Survey regarding measurement the performance of the government of Dr. Adnan 
Badran after the 200th day of formation (Amman: Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 
2005) 
2 7 1 Dialogue conducted by Shaker Al-Johari in Amman with the Secretary General of the Islamic 
Action Front Party on 22/6/2006. to read the full text see http://www.nazmi.org/media/report40.html. 
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3.5.4.3 Culture of Fear "Politically" 
The culture of fear is one of the biggest obstacles to political reform and change in the 
Arab world. Moreover, this culture is one of the dilemmas facing political opposition 
forces and makes them unable of paying people to support them to claim their rights 
and interests in the face of political power. Consequently, this culture leads to fear of 
power, lack of political participation, lack a strong liberal political culture and value 
for individuals, and lack of a strong opposition which contradicts all principles of 
democracy. 
Moreover, the culture of fear presents fetters and constraints on the ability of the Arab 
people to face political reality and reform. Despite the prevalence and depth of the 
discontent and a popular rejection of the current political reality, the Arab peoples are 
still in a state of passivity, unable to take clear steps towards the process of achieving 
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their usurped rights to meet the internal political challenge. 
Although the 1952 constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan guaranteed a set 
of rights and freedoms to be enjoyed by Jordanian citizens, the constitutional 
provisions that protect the individual's rights and freedoms often lack safeguards in 
practice. Moreover, various policies, resolutions and amendments have followed 
which have deeply violated these freedoms and rights. 
For example, Article 15/1 of the constitution stated that "The State shall guarantee 
freedom of opinion. Every Jordanian shall be free to express his opinion by speech, in 
writing, or by means of photographic representation and other forms of expression, 
provided that such does not violate the law". Jordan has passed through years of 
martial law where opinions were confiscated and accountable. Although this has 
improved and the citizens can now express their opinions through television, radio, 
and press, the control over these institutions is still exerted by the security agencies. 
Additionally, although Article 16/2 of the constitution guaranteed the rights to 
2 7 2 Abu Roman, Thaqafat al-khaouf Siyasian, [the Culture of Fear Politically], Al-Ghad newspaper, 
26/04/2006. 
2 7 3 Al-Emoosh, al-Hoqooq al-Madaniyyah wa al-Siyasiyyah li al-Muwatin al-Urduni, [The Civil and 
Political Rights of the Jordanian Citizen] in The National Symposium on Human Rights (1997), p. 107 
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establish societies and political parties, and to hold meetings within the limits of the 
law, prevention and hunting down political parties and punishing every citizen 
belonging to the political parties continued until the beginning of the 1990s. 
Jamil Al-Nemri, a writer and political analyst, wrote that the culture of fear 
concerning the criticism of governments and participation in the opposition activities 
developed through a long history, and grew up during generations of people, pointing 
out that this culture will not disappear unless the government provides and adopts 
tools and laws guaranteeing and enforcing freedom of opinion and expression.274 
Zaki Bani Irsheid, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) leader, stressed in the Alsabeel 
newspaper that the government is enacting legislation that would make people afraid 
to express their opinions, even feared over mere thoughts. The continual fear of 
Jordanians about criticizing the government indicates that the national environment 
does not allow the expression of strongly dissenting opinion. Legislations and official 
procedures, and particularly the laws on public meetings have created a culture of 
fear. Irshid, added that with the existence of such a culture of fear, Jordanians will not 
achieve political development and reform, and which might threaten the future of the 
political parties and organizations of civil society. 
3.5.4.4 The Political Culture Concerning Political Parties 
An analysis of the political and legal reality of partisan action in Jordan confirms that 
until 1957 the establishment of political parties was permitted, but during the 35 years 
since then until the issuance of the Parties' Law 1992, the establishment of political 
parties was actually banned under martial law. In addition, the partisan activity was 
punishable by law and many party members were confined in prisons and detention 
centres due to their political activities. 
Therefore, the political parties witnessed a decline in the number of their members 
and affiliates due to the security consequences which faced them, in addition to the 
general harassment by the government of those involved in political activities. 
274 Al-vifaq Magazine, No 2545, Saturday, 29 2004. 
275 Al-Sabeel newspaper, 02/08/2006. 
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Moreover, many of the members left the party's activity due the authority threats to 
the parties' members especially since getting any public job requires prior approval of 
the security agencies. 
Such collections from criminalization of partisan action, was settled in the minds of 
generations of Jordanians and planted fear and terror in the conscience of those 
generations from practising partisan activity. So, in spite of the existence of a law 
allowing the establishment of political parties and partisan activity the Parties Act of 
1992 and the abolition of martial law, this could not overcome what had been planted 
in the minds of Jordanians as a result of past practices. Each generation handed down 
to the next the fear of partisan action. 2 7 7 
The Jordanian Prime Minister, Marouf al-bakheet, stated that the entrenched culture 
of fear about party affiliation is an obstacle for Jordanian society to the establishment 
and evolution of real partisan life, and prevents the expansion of political 
development and democracy. Therefore, the Jordanian citizen wants, and wishes to 
join political parties but he fears the security consequences. 
In the prevailing political culture the executive authorities in Jordan have adopted 
clear and negative attitudes for several decades towards political parties, and have 
tended to consider them as responsible for threats to the security and stability of the 
country's political life. Even after the issuance of the political Parties' Law in 1992 
which decreed the legitimacy and plurality of political parties, these negative attitudes 
continued. In addition, the government has shown caution, and sometimes hostility 
toward social movements and non-governmental organizations led by the opposition 
forces that play a political role, and which seek to mobilize their members and public 
opinion to take political positions that do not agree with the policies of government.279 
Fregat, 'Ala Tareeq al-Tanmiyah al- Siyasiyyah , [On the Road to Political Development], (2005) , 
pp. 86-87. 
7 Al-Hamouri, Qanoon al-Ahzab al-Jadeed 2007, [The Parties' Law for 2007], al-Arab Alyoum 
Newspaper, 2/4/2007. 
2 7 8 In al-Basheeti, Thaqafat al-khouf men al-intima' al-hizbi fi al-Urdun, [Culture of Fear of Party 
Affiliation in Jordan], Al-Watan Newspaper, 09/06/2006. at http://www.al-
watan.com/data/20060609/index.asp?content=writer2 
2 7 9 Al-Hourani and Al-Soboh, al-Harakat al-Ijtima'iyyah fi al-Urdun, al-Dour al-Rahin wa al-
Mustaqbali, [Social Movements in Jordan: its Development, Infrastructure, the Current and Future 
Role], Word Document (2003). 
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Therefore, given the prevailing political culture, the political parties have remained a 
dubious enterprise, i f not deserving of the absolute or covert hostility of the organs of 
the executive authority. The MP Zuheir Abu Ragheb said that the martial law 
mentality still prevails in dealing with the parties, and Jordanians have not escaped 
from the conviction that affiliation to parties means being taken to prisons and 
detention centres. He added that the government has put obstacles in the new political 
parties' law. This necessarily means moving away from political development and 
also means that a large proportion of the practitioners of political activity have to 
work secretly and underground, which can be considered a decline in public freedoms 
and a great setback for democracy. 
Therefore, the persistent culture of fear is clear evidence that the Jordanian political 
parties are still experiencing crisis reflected in the reluctance of Jordanian citizens to 
engage in partisan activities. This is a fundamental reason for the lack of growth of 
political parties in terms of the number of members. 
3.5.4.5 Culture of Political Participation 
Political participation means the contribution of citizens and their active role in the 
political system to influence the official decision-making process. At the forefront of 
political participation patterns are electoral activity, partisan action, and union work 
which are all linked to the principles of political pluralism, freedom of opinion, 
freedom of peaceful assembly, and the right to form associations and political parties. 
Democracy is the best mechanism for effecting change for the better, through the 
peaceful rotation of power. This devolution of power is usually conducted through the 
empowerment of the people to exercise their right to elect their representatives in full 
freedom and fairness on the basis of the candidates' programmes. The electoral 
process provides the opportunity for the owners of these programmes to exercise their 
role in the executive branch and therefore apply their programme, thus providing a 
chance for people to judge their success or failure. Accordingly, success in the 
application of these programmes demonstrates confidence, or, to the contrary, failure 
2 8 0 The eighth meeting of the Parliamentary Media Forum held on 08/04/2007 entitled "The New 
Parties Law and its Impact on Development and Political Reform". 
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is reflected in the ballot box by withdrawing confidence. All of this guarantees the 
rights of individuals and groups to participate in public affairs, with devolution of 
power, and the possibility of change. 
The Jordanian citizen tends to refrain from political participation. Therefore, the 
electoral process for elections to the House of Representatives 11 t h , 12 th, 13 th, and 14 t h 
has witnessed reluctance among voters to participate. Table 3.1 shows statistical 
comparisons and the proportions of the participants in the electoral process for the 
years 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2003. 
Table 3.1 Participation of Jordanian Citizens in the Electoral Process from 1989-
2003 
1989 elections 1993 elections 1997 elections 2003 elections 
Population estimates 
by the General 
Statistics 3,370,867 4,152,000 4,580,234 5,255,677 
Number of registered 
voters 12,204,45 15,012,78 1,838,199 2,505,882 
The ratio of the 
number of voters to 
total population 36.21% 36.16% 40.13% 47.68% 
The number of 
election cards 1,049,582.7 1,201,022 1,479,934 2,505,882 
The proportion of 
registered voters 
obtaining election 
card 86% 80% 80.51% 100% 
The number of voters 541,426 822,294 824,664 1,252,941 
The ratio of the 
number of voters to 
the number of the 
election cards 51.58% 68.47% 55.72% 50.00% 
Source: Al-shikhani, Musa., the citizen and elections and the crisis of participation in the 
electoral process, http://www.electionsio.com/ESubject/DefaultSub.asp?seid=82 
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It is clear from table 3.1 that the populations has steadily grown as has in the 
percentage of registered voters approved in the records of the electoral process. 
However, there is also a decrease in the proportion of those obtaining election cards to 
register on the electoral rolls. Furthermore, the turnout for the selection of members of 
the Chamber of Deputies is as low as half of electoral card holders. In other words the 
proportion of voting participants is around 25%-28% of all registered voters according 
to the voter lists declared for those years. There are several reasons which have led to 
the reluctance of citizens to participate in the electoral process. 
3.5.4.6 Election Culture 
Since the return of electoral politics to Jordan in 1989, the Kingdom has held five 
parliamentary elections, in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003 and 2007. These polls have 
established clear indicators to measure the perceptions of Jordanians on their priorities 
and concerns, voter attitudes and electoral culture. The parliamentary season has come 
to be filled with excitement and interest for Jordanian society, particularly for those 
groups who are interested in participating in elections, such as tribes and parties. 
These elections have established various types of practice and ritual connected with 
the election process, creating a new type of electoral culture and campaign practices. 
3.5.4.6.1 Election Campaigns 
In modern democratic societies, election campaigns are important parts of deciding 
election outcomes. Furthermore, they are integral to the process of political 
programmes being reviewed and government policies discussed. In addition 
campaigns provide voters with important information that enables the m to make 
decision. According to Gelman and King, "campaign activities increase the amount of 
information that voters have available to them about the type of things that are 
important and the candidates' position on these things. In this way, campaigns do two 
things, they help voters make sense of the agenda and they reduce voter uncertainty 
about candidate positions or real conditions of important variables".281 
2 8 1 In Stevenson and Vavreck. Does Campaign Length Matter? Testing for Cross-National Effects, 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 217-235. 
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During the pre-election period candidates undertake organized efforts to influence 
voters' decisions to secure victory in parliamentary elections. In the case of Jordan, 
some candidates start their campaigns months before the official period in order to 
attract the voters to vote for them. Some candidates continue their campaigns right up 
till the polling day itself. Therefore, the candidates intensify their visibility in society 
and try to improve their relationship with the public, especially by making visits to 
Madafas (Guest Houses), and home visits particularly in rural areas and small 
districts, including meetings, visits both for congratulation and condolence, and 
presenting gifts in important occasions such as weddings. Moreover, the candidates 
attend and participate in all public meetings whether of a political, artistic, cultural, 
religious, commemorative, recreational or sporting nature in order to contact citizens 
during these public activities. 
3.5.4.6.2 Election Themes 
The campaign themes and slogans in Jordan vary from one place to another and 
according to the voters' cultural, economic, political, and educational circumstances. 
Moreover, the election campaigns reveal the complex political atmosphere in Jordan 
in addition to the attitudes and priorities of candidates and voters alike. Therefore, 
some of the slogans are tribal, or Islamist, and some seek the votes of Palestinian 
refuges and Jordanians of Palestinian origin. 
Accordingly, the candidates in Amman and other major cities and high 
neighbourhoods pronounce slogans including reform promises, such as for 
constitutional and political reform, strengthening the separation of powers, children's 
and women's rights, and other freedoms in various forms that will minimally satisfy 
popular sentiment in these areas. In other neighbourhoods and communities 
particularly in districts which have a large population of Palestinian origin, the 
candidates raise slogans such as 'no to normalisation with Jews', 'yes to the right of 
return and supporting of Palestinian issue' and 'liberation of Al-Aqsa Mosque'. In 
places with people from mixed roots and origins, the candidates focus on national 
unity, such as 'yes to national unity', and 'all Jordanians have equal rights and duties'. 
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In other poor areas the candidates focus largely on economic slogans 'no to 
corruption', 'no for raising prices', 'no for more poverty', 'yes for supporting the poor 
and combating unemployment', 'yes to governmental accountability', and 'yes for 
Justice and equality'. The party candidates advocate their political programmes and 
focus on political issues and on strengthening the national opposition and democracy. 
However, in terms of Islamist slogans in parliamentary elections, Islamist candidates 
campaign with their traditional slogans such as "Islam is the solution", and "the Quran 
is our constitution". 
Accordingly, electoral slogans in Jordan can be classified into two categories: first, 
the slogans of representatives of political parties calling for political reform and to 
create platforms concerning important issues. The second category reflects the 
population composition of each district, and these slogans cover various issues; they 
can include questions of political and economic reform, normalization with Zionism, 
and promises of a better life. 
Generally, electoral campaigns play the role of intermediary between candidates and 
voters. Candidates present their issues, agendas, and information. The voters, in turn, 
select their preferred candidates according to the information provided during the 
campaigns. The reality in Jordan, however, is that electoral campaigns and slogans 
play only a limited role in influencing voters' behaviour and attitudes in choosing 
candidate, especially in rural and tribal areas. 
In tribal areas, slogans are no more than hackneyed cliches, emptied of political 
content. A tribal candidate from a large tribe is the most likely to win his district seat, 
because tribes now conduct internal votes to choose their candidates for parliament, 
and most candidates have a clear idea of how many votes they will get because this is 
the same as the size of their tribe in the district. Fahd Alkhetan in Al-Arab Alyawm 
declares that "with the approach of the parliamentary elections due to be held on Nov 
20, 2007 any observer of parliamentary life can predict the names of 70% of the 
winners right now", and he attributes this to the tribal unanimity which decisively 
settles the results in many electoral districts.2 8 2 
Al-Arab Alyawm newspaper, Nov 11, 2007. 
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In the second meeting of 'Election dialogues 2007', organized by International Fact 
for Studies and Information in collaboration with Jordanian society for the Rights of 
Voters, the participants concluded that most of the electoral campaigns and themes 
are individualized and focus on the service dimension at the expense of aspects of 
political reform. 
3.5.4.7 Gender Culture (Masculine culture) 
Although Jordan has witnessed democratic transformation over the last decade, this 
requires the effective participation of women who constitute almost half of Jordanian 
society. Despite the growing role of women in social and economic life, however, 
their role in the political sphere is still weak. Like other Arab societies, Jordanian 
society from its inception and social composition is still a patriarchal society, where 
women are treated in such a way that hinders their access to the decision-making 
centres in the community. 
Therefore, the head of the family, the tribal leader (Sheikh), and sometimes the 
Secretary-General of the political party has the final say in deciding whether or not to 
participate, in guiding public opinion, and defining the direction of the electoral votes, 
in addition to the identification of the candidates and ensuring their access to the 
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council of deputies. 
Women have a limited presence in political positions due to the tribal nature of 
Jordanian elections. Consider the paradox in the last municipal elections in Jordan. A 
woman candidate who ran for a seat in the municipal council in Mafraq was appointed 
a council member even though she did not obtain a single vote. She did not vote for 
herself and neither did her husband and five children. 
Although the number of people registered for voting in her district was 144 men and 
207 women, and voter turnout was 95 per cent, she got no vote at all. She justified the 
result by saying " I did not vote for myself because of my commitment to my tribe and 
http://www.factio.com/fullNews.aspx7icH 1902 
2 8 4 Rantaoui, The National Conference to Support Women in the Parliamentary Elections / Support 
Women in the Parliamentary Elections, 2003. 
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the residents of my town to vote for another candidate, who unfortunately did not 
win.. . I would not break my commitment to the tribe. We are a tribal community and 
the priority is for electing a man". 
3.6 Women's Political Participation 
Women have been deprived of political participation for many decades since the 
founding of the Emirate of TJ in 1921. However, the right to political participation in 
the pre-independence period, which was restricted to males, has not really changed 
since independence, even during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Although women had no political and legal right to vote and to be elected for 
parliamentary elections until 1974, their struggle to be granted the right to vote and 
run in municipal and parliamentary elections started in the early 1950s. This struggle 
was led by the Women's Awakening Association, founded in 1952, which has been 
resolved as a result of its activities. 
The establishment of the Arab Women Federation (AWF) in Jordan in 1954 played an 
important role in raising women's political awareness. The AWF presented many 
memorandums to the government, Senate, and House of Deputies calling for the 
granting of political rights to women, and for changes in electoral law. However, 
when the government amendment to law was issued, the amended law gave the right 
to vote only to educated women but not those were illiterate. In the meantime, 
women continued to send memos until they got the full right to vote in 1974. 
Accordingly, women in Jordan were granted the right to vote for parliamentary 
elections in 1974 and for municipal elections in 1982. 
Since parliamentary life was suspended between 1968 tol984, women exercised their 
right to vote for the first time in the 1984 supplementary elections. However, women 
did not participate as candidates for parliamentary elections until 1989. 
285 The Jordan Times, New Female Council Member Wins Seat with Zero Votes, 3 August 2007. 
2 8 6 http://www.electionsjo.com/Esubject/DefaultSub.asp?seid=240 
2 8 7 Al-Atiyat, The Women's Movement in Jordan: Activism, Discourses and Strategies (PhD theses), 
(2003), p. 57 
2 8 8AI-Atiyat (2003), p. 59. 
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3.6.1 Women's Participation in Jordanian Parliamentary Elections 
The Jordanian constitution never distinguished between women and men in term of 
rights and duties, and in addition the 1974 election law granted women the right to 
vote. However, the theoretical equality in the constitution and election law did not 
reflect the reality of women's situation in the political sphere. Women remained 
subject to the effects of social values, traditions, and the prevailing culture. 
Over the last decade Jordan has witnessed important economic, social, and political 
transformations. At the political level, a new climate of political openness and 
pluralism encouraged women- as they accounted 49% of the Jordanian community 
according to the department of statistics in 2004- to strengthen their political role and 
participate in political life. 
1989 Parliamentary Elections 
The 1989 parliamentary elections was a turning point for women's political 
participation, because they have showed more interest in running for parliamentary 
elections. In 1989, women participated for the first time as candidates in elections to 
the lower house, where 12 women out of 647 candidates ran in the parliamentary 
elections. The proportion of women candidates was low at about 1.85% (see table 
3.2). Although none of them were able to win seat in these elections, this was an 
important step to break the norm of excluding women from elections. Furthermore, 
some women candidates achieved better success than men in some districts, even 
though the total votes they received was only 20,539 (1.01% of the total votes). 
Al-Zubi, et al, Musharakat al-Mar 'ah al-Urduniyyah fi al-Hayah al- Siyasiyyah , [Jordanian Women 
Participation in Political Life], (United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2007), p. 52 
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Table 3.2 Lower House Candidates by Sex, and Women Candidates' Proportion 
of the Total Candidates for the Years 1989,1993,1997, and 2003 
Year Men Women % of women 
candidates 
1989 635 12 1.85% 
1993 531 3 0.6% 
1997 544 17 3.1% 
2003 765 54 7.1% 
Total 2475 86 3.47% 
Source: Ministry of Interior 
1993 Parliamentary Elections 
The 1993 elections were the first parliamentary elections in which political parties 
were allowed to compete legally and freely since the election of 1956. In addition, 
while voter turnout in the 1989 parliamentary election was 41%, the 1993 elections 
witnessed a modest improvement to 5 1 % . 2 9 0 Moreover, there was an active 
participation by civil society organizations in the 1993 elections, in addition to the 
participation of 20 political parties. However, the 1989 results discouraged many 
women from running in the 1993 elections, and only three women ran. 
Meanwhile, the 1993 elections produced the first woman parliamentarian in Jordan's 
history, Toujan al-Faisal. She won the seat in the third district of Amman, despite the 
fact that she had no previous involvement in politics. She nominated herself as an 
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independent candidate and her platform was based on the concept of human rights. 
1997 Parliamentary Elections 
The 1997 election witnessed more women's participation than had previously been 
the case. Tojan's victory in the previous election encouraged 17 women candidates 
2 9 0 Lust-Okar, The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality, International Journal of 
Middle East Studies. Vol. 33, No. 4 (2001), pp. 545-569 
2 9 1 Abu-Zayd, In Search of Political Power-Women Parliament in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon., in Azza 
Karam (ed.), Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers (International IDEA: Stockholm, 2000), 
www.int-idea.se/women. 
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including Tojan Faisal herself to stand for the 1997 elections. Encouraging women to 
participate in parliamentary elections, Fiasal stated that; "women should not be 
frustrated. Instead, women who are qualified should learn from my victory and know 
that in the end they wil l win". 
The 1997 elections were boycotted by the IAF, and other seven political parties. In 
addition the number of political party candidates decreased from 93 in the 1993 
elections to 37 as a result of opposition to the one-person one-vote electoral system. 
Despite such a large-scale boycott by civil society, women candidates constituted 
about 3% of the total candidates as figure 3.1 shows. However, women MPs were 
totally absent from the 1997 parliament, although they obtained a total of 13,087 or 
1.6% of all votes.2 9 3 
Figure3.1 Participation as Candidates in 1997 Parliament, by Sex 
I 
Women 
3% 
Men 
97% 
Source: Jordanian Parliament Council 
2003 Parliamentary Elections 
In June 2001, the King dissolved the parliament at the end of its four-year term. 
Furthermore, as a response to the political instability in the region, including the 
outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada and the American threat of war on Iraq, 
King Abdulla postponed the elections due in 2001 until 2003. 
Jordan Times, Saturday, April 18, 1998 
Al-Zubi, et al (2007)., p. 53 
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Since King Abdullah I I assumed his constitutional powers as the monarch of Jordan, 
he has led a broad and comprehensive reform process. In the political sphere, one of 
the most important prominent aspects of this was the formation of the 'Jordan first 
commission' to present a set of recommendations to the king to advance the reform 
process in all fields. One of the commission's committees was the Women's 
Parliamentary Quota Committee. The document prepared by the Committee suggested 
the introduction of a parliamentary quota for women. 2 9 4 
The situation of women in parliament from 1989-2003 is shown in table 3.3 which 
clearly indicates that no women candidates had been able to win seats in the elections 
except in 1993 since the resumption of parliamentary life in 1989. The suggestion 
presented by the Women's Parliamentary Quota Committee was to guarantee at least 
six women in the House of Deputies. Consequently, a new electoral law was issued, 
lowering the voting age from 19 to 18 and creating a special quota system by adding 
six seats for women. Moreover, election law now allows women to win more seats i f 
they were able to collect enough votes in their districts and win outside of the quota. 
Accordingly the new electoral law opened the door wider to women's participation in 
the electoral process. 
As a result, 54 women candidates ran in the 2003 elections. None of them succeeded 
in being directly elected, however 6 women became members of parliament by quota 
system, comprising 5.5% of the lower house. Furthermore, women in these elections 
received more than twice the votes their counterparts received in the 1997 elections. 
In 1997 women candidates received 13,128 votes, compared to 36,382 in the 2003 
election.2 9 5 
1 Al-Zubi, et al (2007)., p.56 
Al-Zubi, et al (2007)., p. 74 
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Table 3.3 Jordanian Parliament Members by Sex, 1989-2003 
Year Men Women Women% 
1989 80 0 0% 
1993 79 1 1.25% 
1997 80 0 0% 
2003 104 6 5.5% 
Total 343 7 2% 
Source: Ministry of Interior 
3.7 Conclusion 
Despite the launching of political openness in Jordan which was crowned by the 1989 
parliamentary elections, and despite the fact that the democratic process has received 
and still receives considerable interest from successive governments at the level of 
writing and slogans, the same level of success has not been achieved in terms of 
practical application. Addressing the issue of democracy in Jordan requires a search 
for the real reasons that hinder the fundamental building of a democratic society rather 
than simply focusing on external manifestations of this problem. 
There is a series of subjective and objective factors that have led to drawing the 
development of the political culture of Jordanian society. One of the most prominent 
of these factors is the political and intellectual despotism that led to the fall of the 
society since many centuries in the quagmire of civilization underdevelopment. Those 
factors led to a revival of negative values such as lack of interest, introversion, 
intolerance, refusal of dialogue, encouragement of the narrow loyalties, hypocrisy, 
preference for self-interest rather than the public interest, and the promotion of male 
dominance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Tribal and Religious Factors in the Jordanian Elections 
4.1 Introduction 
What is a Tribe? 
The term tribe may be used loosely to refer to "a localised group in which kinship is 
the dominant idiom of organisation, and whose members consider themselves 
culturally distinct (in term of customs, dialect or language, and origins); tribes are 
usually politically unified, though not necessarily under a central leader, both features 
being commonly attributable to interaction with states".296 
One definition of a tribe from an online English dictionary is: "A unit of socio-
political organization consisting of a number of families, clans, or other groups who 
share a common ancestry and culture and among whom leadership is typically neither 
formalized nor permanent".297 In 'Who Is An Indian', Warren states that 
"Ethnologists define a tribe as a group of indigenous people, bound by blood ties, who 
are socially, politically, and religiously organized according to the tenets of their own 
culture, who live together, occupying a definite territory, and who speak a common 
language or dialect". 
The best definition of the concept of tribe that corresponds to Arabic culture was that 
given by Ghazi bin Muhammad bin Talal in The Tribes of Jordan at the Beginning of 
the Twenty-First Century. He states that, "What traditionally makes a person belong to 
a tribe is not merely successive degrees of genetic relationship which, after all, 
every family in the world has....but rather that a person and his/her tribe think the 
same way; believe in the same principles; assimilate the same values and ethos; act 
according to the same unique rules and laws; respect the same hereditary shaykh 
' Khoury and Kostiner, (ed). Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (1991), p. 5. 
http://www.powersource.com/cocinc/ancest/whois.htm 
1 Warren, Who Is An Indian, online http://www.powersource.com/cocinc/ancest/whois.htm 
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(tribal Lord); live together; migrate together; defend each other; fight together in 
short it is the consciousness of belonging to that tribe and behaving accordingly".299 
However, few Jordanians follow the traditional nomadic Bedouin way of life, and the 
cultural traditions based on this life-style have greatly declined. Nevertheless, a 
conception of cultural and national identity related to archaic Bedouin characteristics 
still exists in modern Jordanian society. Moreover, the role of tribes and tribalism 
remain a basic pillar of both society and the political culture in Jordan. 
Since the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the state has had 
pivotal social, tribal structure, demographical and political changes affected on the 
political system and parliamentary representation. Therefore, the political 
representation process in Jordan has witnessed continual progress and changes. As 
discussed in chapter two, parliamentary democracy as a transformative idea was 
introduced to Jordan during the British mandate and developed when Jordan 
promulgated the 1946 constitution which established the bicameral parliamentary 
system. 
Moreover, the Jordanian election system whether the current or the one that is 
expected to be drafted by the government will have a great effect on the elections' 
results and in the long run on the political and ideological structure of the Jordanian 
parliament. Therefore, this chapter assesses the major factors surrounding the process 
of political participation and Jordanian elections. It considers the role of tribalism in 
the formation of political culture of Jordanian citizens and consequently its role in 
political development in Jordan, as well as the religious dimension and the Islamist 
parties' participation in Jordan's elections. 
4.2 Jordanian Tribes (the Jordanian Identity) 
In 1983, Gubser classified the population in Jordan into nomadic or sedentary groups; 
as nomadic, semi-nomadic, sedentary, and semi-sedentary.300 Nomads or Bedouins 
were a fully nomadic group who might move thousands of miles wandering from one 
2 9 9 Bin Muhammad, The Tribes of Jordan at The beginning of the Twenty-First Century (1999), p. 13 
3 0 0 Gubser, Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events (1983), p-p.22-25 
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place to another, and whose livelihood was based on animal herding. The 
relationship between animals and tribes men was symbiotic; the animals supplied food 
and fulfilled other needs of the Bedouins, while the tribes' people assured the 
' i f ) ' ) 
animals' survival by locating in green pastures. The semi-nomadic populations 
move only twice a year and within a limited area, while the settled population consists 
of dwellers in rural areas such as farmers or peasants, or in urban areas.303 
The tribe (qabilah) in Jordan is divided into two or more sub-tribes (ashirah). Each 
sub-tribe is usually divided into two or more parts (hamulah), and the hamulah is 
divided finally into two or more related extended families. The hamulah consists of a 
group with which the individual identifies himself.3 0 4 As the society in Jordan is built 
along patriarchal and hierarchic lines, the tribe as a whole is consequently led by a 
leader {sheikh), and any competent male might be the head of his own extended 
family. When the sheikh dies one of the tribe's senior males inherit the title of sheikh. 
This is usually the first born son or nephew or other close relative or the most 
experienced member or one who has special features such as strength, wealth, and 
reputation for ability. 
The tribesman is bound to other members of the tribe by mutual obligations which 
have great force within the extended family. Family ties are extended into the 
structure of the tribe, which works as a unit and clearly shows the individual's 
identity. The tribesmen view themselves as members of this tribe in relation to each 
other and in dealings with other tribes. 
Tribes in Jordan involve an extremely complicated set of ideas, identities and 
structures that resemble the traditional set of loyalties bound by honour. The social 
structure of tribes is based on patrilineal ties among men. These ties dominate the 
ideology of family life and are most important when they marry within their group 
(endogamy). The preference for endogamy existed historically very commonly in the 
1 Bin Muhammad (1999), p. 9 
2Gubser(1983), p.25 
3 Bin Muhammad (1999), p. 9 
4 Harris, George L. Jordan: its people, its society, its culture (1958), p. 54. 
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Middle East, choose to marry others especially i f they are cousins at the first level and 
in descending levels of relatedness.305 
In the pre-1948 East Bank, the main solidarity group and the basic form of the social 
organization in TJ was the tribe. This was true not only of the Bedouin nomads and 
semi nomads, but also of many people in the villages and even urban dwellers. The 
social relations between the nomadic and semi nomadic tribes and between them and 
villages and towns were based on trade, selling animals and their products and buying 
goods they did not produce. 
4.3 The Relationship between Jordanian Tribes and the State 
King Hussein sent an open letter to his nephew Prince Ghazi Ben Mohammad, 
appointing him adviser to the King on tribal affairs in July 2, 1998. In it he stated that 
"the tribes of Jordan have always been at the centre of our confidence, a source of our 
pride and a target of our attention since the very beginning. The tribes of Jordan are 
our kinsmen who have served the Kingdom under the most adverse conditions and 
circumstances, always performing their duty to the nation. The tribes had supported 
the Great Arab Revolt since the start and helped the late King Abdullah to found the 
Kingdom, offering great sacrifices to attain this objective".3 0 6 
The promotion of tribalism has gone hand in hand with the monarchy in the 
Hashemite regime and into the machinery of the state. Many factors have threatened 
the survival of tribes as such in the Middle East, including the imposition of colonial 
government, establishment of new international borders, dramatic economic changes, 
and the spread of national ideologies. However, tribes in Jordan have remained the 
main solidarity groups since the establishment of the state in 1921. Tribal identity did 
not vanish and tribes remain prominent social and cultural units. 3 0 7 Furthermore, the 
tribal population of Jordan has been the bedrock of support for the regime since its 
3 0 5 Harris (1958), p. 133. 
306 Jordan Times, Saturday, July 4, 1998 
3 0 7 Alon, The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process: Mandatory Transjordan,1921-
46, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2005), p. 213. 
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establishment and continues to play an important role to be reckoned with, not only in 
Jordanian politics but also in the daily lives of the citizens. 3 0 8 
The monarchy had always depended on tribesmen as the most important aspect of the 
monarchy's strategy. They were vital for the regime's survival and for supporting and 
strengthening the political system through high-ranking members in the military 
forces, police officers, and the intelligence service officers who originated from 
Bedouin tribesmen.309 Richard L. Taylor argues that, "One advantage of employing 
the organizational strength of tribes is that historically they have provided valued 
assistance to intelligence, security and law enforcement, combat arms, and civil 
affairs capabilities".310 
One of the most important policies of Emir Abdullah throughout his reign to ensure 
the integrity of the regime and as the cornerstone for a new state was the 
establishment of the Desert Mobile Force This was raised in 1923 under the British 
Army officer Colonel Fredrick Gerard Peake. The legion later becomes the Jordan 
Arab Army {al-Jayesh al- 'Arabi) which is considered significant because of its role 
in the development of Jordan in addition to its composition mostly of soldiers from 
the Transjordanian tribes.3 1 1 
The most prominent Bedouin tribes of Jordan, which have played a political role 
historically, "al-Huwaytat " Tribes, which inhabit in the southern regions of Jordan, 
"Bani Sakhr" tribes which inhabit in the middle badiyah {al-Badiyah al-Wista), The 
tribes of "al-Adwan" one of the largest Balqa' tribes, and "Bani Hamida" tribes, one 
of the largest tribes of Jordan but are distributed among different regions of Jordan, 
"al-Ajarmah" tribe, one of the most known Balqa tribes. There are other tribes 
which contributed significantly to support and consolidate the influence of Prince 
3 0 8 Alon (2005), p. 213. 
3 0 9 Massad, Colonial effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan (2001), p. 243. 
3 1 0 Taylor, Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and End of Successful Strategy. ( August 2005). On 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksillO.pdf 
3 1 1 Jureidini and McLaurin, Jordan: The Impact of Social Change on the Role of the Tribes (1984), pp. 
19-20. 
3 1 2 Abu Roman, Dawr al-Amel al- 'Asharifi al-Intikhabal al-Barlamaniyyah , 17/may/2006,avialble 
at www.aljazeera.net/indepth/Jordanian_elections./2003/6/6- 14-2.htm - 63k 
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Abdullah at the Emirate of TJ, and continue to play an important political role in 
Jordanian political life. Table 4.1 shows the most prominent tribes in Jordan. 
Table 4.1: The Main Jordanian Tribes 
Tribe Name Main Cities and villages of Residence 
Al-Abbadi From Amman and Balqa' tribes 
Al-Adwan Tribe of the Balqa' 
Al-Azzam North of Jordan, mainly in Irbid villages and (Liwa A l -
Wustiyah) 
Al-Batyneh North of Jordan, mainly in Irbid city and Kufryuba 
Al-Bsharat Christian tribe, inhabit in Amman City 
Al-Dababneh Christian tribe, inhabit in Ajloun and al-Balqa' 
Al-Garmseh South of Jordan, mainly in Ma'an city 
Al-Ghazzawi North of Jordan, Mainly in al-Ghor and Mashare' 
Al-Hajaya Bedouin tribe, South Badiyah {Badu al-Ganub) 
Al-Hassan South of Jordan, mainly in Ma'an 
Al-Huwaytat Bedouin tribe, South Badiyah {Badu al-Ganub) 
Al-Khaswneh North of Jordan, Mainly in al-Noaemeh, Idoun 
Al-Lawzi Amman 
Al-Mahamid South of Jordan, mainly in Ma'an 
Al-Majali South of Jordan, mainly in al-Karak 
Al-Masaeed Bedouin tribe, inhabit in al-Mafraq 
Al-Momani From Ajloun tribes 
Al-N'emat South Badeouin {Badu al-Janub), mainly in Ma'an 
Al-Nawayseh South of Jordan, mainly in Al-Karak 
Al-Omari They inhabit different cities and villages, Mainly in the north of 
Jordan 
Al-Qadi North Bedouin, mainly in al-Mafraq 
Al-Rossan North of Jordan, mainly in Om Qayes and Sama villages 
Al-Sarhan Bedouin tribe, inhabit in al-Matraq 
Al-Saryreh South of Jordan, mainly in Al-Karak 
Al-Shreideh North of Jordan, mainly in {Liwa Al-Kora) 
Al-Smadi From Ajloun tribes 
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Al-Su'odeyin South of Jordan, mainly in al-Tafieleh 
Al-Tarwneh South of Jordan, mainly in Al-Karak 
Al-Zubi They inhabit different cities and villages, Mainly in the north of 
Jordan (Liwa Al-Ramthd) 
Bani Hassan They inhabit different cities and villages, mainly in Zarqa and 
al-Mafraq 
Bani Khalid North Badiyah {Badu al-Shamat) 
Bani Sakhor Bedouin Tribe, Central badiyah {Badu al-Wast) 
Bani-Hani North of Jordan, mainly in Irbid city, and Kufryuba 
Batarseh Christian tribe, inhabit in Jarash city 
Ma'ayah Christian tribe, inhabit in Madaba City 
Malkawi North of Jordan, mainly in Malka 
Obeidat North of Jordan, mainly in Kufersoom 
In Jordan: the Impact of Social Changes on the Role of the Tribes, Jureidini and 
McLaurin articulate that there were three main important reasons which were behind 
the tribal support for the monarch, and these are considered at the same time as major 
forces for Jordanian stability and national unity. Firstly, beside the nature of tribes as 
conservative, their support for the Jordan Hashemite rulers occurred partly because 
the latter enjoyed religious legitimacy by alleging direct descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad's family. King Hussein has noted through a meeting of tribal heads that 
" I am al-Hussein from Hashem and Quraish, the noblest Arab tribe of Mecca, which 
was honoured by God and into which was born the Arab Prophet Mohammad".3 1 3 
Secondly, the Kings of Jordan have worked strongly with the tribes and are viewed 
themselves as tribal leaders. Lastly, they have ruled through legal process rather than 
illegal acts or coups. 3 1 4 
The conflict by the early 1970s in September, which was between Palestinian guerrilla 
organizations, supported by the Palestinian refugees in the camps and in the other side 
King Hussein and the army (which is composed mostly from tribesmen) supported by 
313 The Jordan Times, January 28, 1985. 
3l4Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), p.37. 
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Jordanian tribes ended with the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan. This conflict came 
to be known among Palestinians as 'Black September' and was considered a pivotal 
sign in Jordanian political history. Moreover, these events supported and firmly rooted 
the relationship between the regime and the tribes.315 On the other hand, Jordanian 
tribes has benefited from the support of the monarchy, which provides a welfare 
service including financial support, land, clinics, education and good relations with 
and access to the palace.316 
4.4 The Role of the Tribes in Jordanian Society 
In the absence of political parties and civil society organizations for more than thirty 
years as a mechanism to organize and moderate political life, social institutions like 
tribes have played effective political, social, economic and cultural roles in Jordanian 
society. Despite the political, social, and economic changes that the society has 
witnessed since 1989, including the emergence of new political forces, the tribes still 
enjoy great importance and play a significant role in Jordanian society. 
4.4.1 Cooperation and Social Solidarity 
Tribes are characterized by cooperation and social solidarity among their members 
assisting those who need help or are exposed to harm or danger, in addition to 
protecting those who are threatened or assaulted. I f one of a tribe's members is 
wronged or attacked, his kinsmen must either take revenge on the aggressor or seek 
compensation. This phenomenon played an important role in the past. One of the 
tribal modes of conflict resolution is what is known as 'tribal exile' which is a 
venerable practice that entails a permanent collective movement of a tribe from a city, 
village or settlement to another area of the country in the event of a crime committed 
by one of its members against a member of another tribe living in the same area. This 
practice was adopted in order to prevent acts of revenge on the part of the victim's 
tribes. 
3 1 5 Abu Roman, 17/may/2006 
3 1 6 Jureidim and McLaurin (1984), p. 39 
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On Saturday, November 15, 1998 prominent tribal leaders representing all tribes in 
the Kingdom signed a document to restrict the practice of 'tribal exile' to involve only 
the close relatives of the murderer — his father, sons and brothers — who must leave 
their residences and relocate elsewhere in the country to avoid acts of revenge. 
Uncles, cousins and nephews are not required to move, as had previously been 
required.317 
4.4.2 Overseeing the Process of Social Control 
The tribes played a significant role in the social control process by providing internal 
security among members and protecting them against foreign attacks through the 
application of tribal law, customs and social systems under the tribal leader's 
supervision. These functions have now vanished, and the state plays this role by 
providing internal and external security for individuals through the different security 
agencies. 
However, tribes still play an important informal social role in the adjudication of 
disputes and conflicts that occur between individuals. The sheikh represents his tribe 
in the process of tribal conflict resolution and he plays an important role when he acts 
as arbiter or judge following various mechanisms such as intermediation (wasta), 
delegations (jahas), and in matter of compensation truce (atwa), and final 
reconciliation and peace-making (sulha). These tribal mechanisms for resolving 
conflicts by arbitration and the mediation of local disputes are much quicker than 
those of the state. Moreover, they were efficient due to their greater simplicity. 
4.4.3 Organizing Political Activities 
Jordanian tribes have played a pivotal and major role since the founding of the TJ 
Emirate in supporting the political system. Moreover, tribes were one of the main 
pillars that formed political stability, and were adopted by the government in the face 
of internal and regional political crises. 
3 1 7 Jordan Times newspaper, Tuesday, November 17, 1998. 
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Therefore, the Jordanian tribes have maintained a political and security role, which 
was strengthened by the state in its cognition of tribal leaders who are named by royal 
decree. Furthermore, the government routinely highlights of tribal leaders' role in 
national, religious, and social events. Moreover, the state co-ordinates many services 
in the communal areas together with the tribal leaders as well as in employment, 
especially in the security services. 
The political activities of the Jordanian tribes include the election process for tribal 
leaders and the selection of those who contest parliamentary and municipal elections. 
The change in the law in 1992 to SNTV also affected the way the tribes organized 
themselves. To succeed in the elections, the tribes had to devise modern political 
tactics. Many of these tribes democratically and unanimously elected one candidate to 
represent them by conducting internal elections. The tribes gather in a meeting of all 
branches of the tribe in the tribe guest house {madafa) to choose who is the most 
appropriate and efficient candidate to represent them in front of tribes and other 
political forces in the same region. Thus, the candidate who has the greatest chances 
of success is the candidate who possesses the largest tribe. The winners in these 
elections are the consensus candidates who will therefore get all the tribe's votes. 
However, i f the tribes failed to field a single candidate to compete against other tribes' 
candidates in the same district, as a result, by dividing the vote, these tribes decreased 
their prospects of winning seats. 
Therefore, in the regions dominated by tribes, political and intellectual considerations 
diminished in front of tribal competition. The competition becomes balance of forces 
between the most powerful tribes located in the same electoral district. Thus, the 
competition in the elections between the candidates within the tribe is not different 
from what happens at the national level. The personal considerations and services 
dimension (either the financial or the social services) plays an important role and has 
a strong effect on voters' choices to vote for one candidate over another regardless of 
the political and legislative efficiency of the candidate. 
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4.5 Social Change and its Impact on the Role of Tribes in Jordanian Life. 
The importance of the tribal aspect of social change in Jordan comes from the special 
relationship of the tribes with the Hashemite monarchy and their important role in 
supporting the Hashemite regime. In addition, stability in Jordan has based on the 
tribal nature of politics and social relations in Jordan. However, the winds of social 
change that have swept across the Middle East have affected the role of tribes in 
Jordanian life. 
The main forces of change that have accelerated the rate of social change in Jordan 
and have affected the tribes' role have combined two factors. Firstly, the political 
system attempted to extend its authority, imposing the concept of the state on tribal 
society which was fragmented between several local authorities. In addition to gain 
the support of the tribes and various social forces, and quell the sporadic revolts 
against the new ruling. Therefore, the government concentrated on policies to 
sedentarize the tribes mainly through education and communication. Secondly, the 
establishment of Israel and subsequent Israeli-Arab conflicts caused the migration of 
Palestinians to Jordan, forming a large and influential part of Jordan's population. 
4.5.1 Sedentarization 
When the Emirate of TJ was established in 1921, the basic form of social organization 
was the tribe and the vast majority of the Emirate's population consisted of a variety 
of tribally organised and oriented groups. The state thereafter attempted to join the 
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tribesmen in the country and encouraged the settlement process. 
In 1922 the total population in TJ was 225,350, less than half of which (46%) were 
nomadic Bedouins numbering 102,120 people. The government designed policies to 
encourage the settlement process through sedentarization campaigns and a variety of 
other techniques, mainly through the Arab Legion and through the reduction in 
Bedouin mobility within the country and internationally. A nomad loosely defined the 
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/jordan/SOCIETY.html 
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percentage of Bedouins in the general population then decreased to 23% byl946. 3 1 9 
By 1967 the percentage of Bedouins in the country had decreased further to constitute 
no more than 6%, and by the late 1970s, to less than 3%. 3 2 0 
Sedentarization in Jordan had a great influence on the tribes. Jordan gradually 
changed to what Tarwneh called a 'salary-based society' and it is now very rare to 
find families depend only on the farming and herding of animals. However, they 
turned toward military or civil posts in the central state domain. 
One of the effects of the settlement process which was part of government policy was 
to create a national identity in Jordan and to unify the Jordanian population under one 
identity 'the Jordanian national identity'. Moreover, sedentary groups are assumed 
more willing to invest in their communities physically, financially, and 
psychologically. Jureidini and McLaurin describe the effect of sedentarization in 
Jordan thus, "the settled population tend to develop new means of cooperation and 
tend to redefine their concepts of community. The redefinition does not exclude old 
and perhaps still primary identities and associations, but may supplement those 
established patterns with new interactive links in accordance with new perceptions or 
needs and interests foreign to a nomadic lifestyle". 
4.5.1.1 Education 
The British mandate period from 1921-1946 was considered as a period of training 
and practice for Transjordanians to enable them to govern and administer the country 
by themselves according to modern scientific methods and through institutions, laws 
and regulations.324 The Europe relations with TJ led to important developments and 
3 l 9 M a s s a d (2001), p. 56 
3 2 0 Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), p. 31 
3 2 1 Tarwneh, Public Land Between the State and the Tribes: A Dilemma of Rural Development: A Case 
from Southern Jordan., Zaragoza : CIHEAM -IAMZ (Options Mediterranees) , 1999, p. 348. Available 
at http://ressources.ciheam.org/om/pdf/a38/99600176.pdf 
3 2 2 http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres 
3 2 3 Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), p. 32 
3 2 , 1 Al-Musa, al-Tahawwulat al-Ijtima'iyyah fi al-Urdun (1945-1970), [The Social Changes in Jordan 
(1945-1970)], in Dirasat ft Tareikh al-Urdun al-Jjtimali, [Studies in the Social History of Jordan] 
(2003) . ,p. 343. 
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changes which affected traditions, values, culture, and social life in general through 
education and use the English of language as a second language in the country.3 2 5 
The development of the educational system in Jordan can be described as dramatic, 
starting from nothing at the time of the establishment of Jordan, after which the state 
paid great attention to it. The plans for education were intensified in the 1950s and 
1960s to incorporate male and female tribes people to the state and to engage them in 
the civil domain of the state. In addition, education provided a wide range of 
employment opportunities that became more important and prestigious than herding 
animals or farming. 
After Jordan's independence in 1946 Jordan's school system expanded rapidly. The 
number of students aged 18-23 in 1996 was 28%, which was the highest in the Middle 
East. Since the 1970s the demands for bachelor's degrees increased to enable students 
in Jordan to continue their higher education. That policy of higher education in Jordan 
has brought about a major socio-economic transformation, with extremely important 
political ramifications.327 The formation of an educated middle class included 
increasing numbers of educated and working males and females, and this led in the 
late 1980s to some strains in the traditional patterns. Men and women now interacted 
in public at school and in universities, in the workplace, on public transportation, in 
voluntary associations, and at social events. 
Education has had a profound impact on the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of the 
population. Moreover, it has changed the nature of social interaction at the levels of 
both individuals and groups, and is considered as an instrument of control, 
participation and influence for the government.328 However, tribalism in Jordan has 
also been transformed through many other factors, such as modernization, 
sedentarization, urbanization and development of Jordan's cities, the socioeconomic 
impacts of the oil boom, and the social changes occurring as a result of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. These challenges affected tribalism as a lifestyle which has now 
3 2 5 Al-Musa (2003), pp. 343-344. 
3 2 6 Tarwneh (1999), pp. 347-348. 
3 2 7 Reite, Higher Education and Socio-Political Transformation in Jordan. British Journal of Middle 
Eastern studies. Vol. 29, No. 2. (Nov., 2002), p. 142 
3 2 8 Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), p. 32 
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almost disappeared, but at the same time there is no doubt that tribalism as a culture 
never disappeared. The people of Jordan continue to practise of tribally based 
activities, such as in the tribal models of conflict resolution, and the establishment of 
family and tribal leagues, along with the role of tribes in local politics. 
4.6 The Palestinian Factor 
In 1947 there were about 1.3 million Palestinians in the West Bank, the great majority 
of whom lived in villages or were Bedouins, while the rest lived in towns and cities. 
The creation of Israel changed everything for this largely rural people. The period 
1948-1951 was a turning point in the traditional relations between the East and West 
Banks of Jordan and Jordan's involvement and engagement in the Palestine issue. 
Jordan was involved in the 1948 war and the West Bank became part of Jordan, where 
upon Jordan absorbed a considerable number of Palestinian refugees who became part 
T O O 
of the Jordanian population. 
Several hundred of Palestinian refugees fled to Jordan in 1948 and 1967 as a 
consequence of the Arab Israeli wars. In addition, the annexation of West Bank to 
Jordan in 1950 increased the numbers of Palestinians, and Jordan became the primary 
host of Palestinian refugees. Between 1948 and 1961, Amman's population increased 
from 30,000 to 250,000 and just before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war reached 350,000. 
After the 1967 war an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Palestinians from the West Bank 
sought refuge in Jordan. 
The immigration to Jordan thereafter continued, but at a lower rate. Prior to Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, there were approximately 40,000 Palestinians 
living in Kuwait. As a result of the Gulf crisis and war 1990-1991, Kuwait and Saudi 
were angered by PLO support for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and cut off aid and 
expelled about 300,000 Palestinians from Kuwait, who fled to Jordan.331 
3 2 9 Al-khazendar(1997), p. 3 
3 3 0 Bannerman, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Long D E and B, in Reich (ed.) The Government and 
Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (1980). p. 225 
3 3 1 Lesch, Palestinians in Kuwait, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer, 1991), pp. 42-
54. 
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As a result of the wars of 1948 and 1967, the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank 
in 1950, and the Gulf crisis, Palestinians by most estimates composed more than 50% 
of Jordan's population. Most Palestinians who fled to Jordan were granted full 
Jordanian nationality, and this affected Jordan's politics, demographics, socio-
economics and cultural life. In addition, these events set the scene for what later came 
to be identified as the general social and political characteristic of Jordan's society. 
It is clear that the influx of Palestinian refugees had a direct impact on Jordanian life. 
Kamel Abu Jabir has pointed out that the Palestinian immigrants into Jordan have 
played a key role in the country's politics, economy, and society: "The Palestinians 
brought with them to Jordan a healthy respect for modernity, and knowledge and an 
awareness of the twentieth century. Their frustration and anger was also accompanied 
by ... hard work [and an orientation to] achievement. As politically mature people 
they began placing demands on the machinery of the state for services, job 
opportunities, facilities, and other amenities of l i f e" . 3 3 3 
Historically, Jordan had faced domestic structural dilemmas that affected the process 
of state formation, and led to the development of a plural society divided along deep 
reinforcing cleavages. In the early 1920s the segmental composition of the Emirate of 
TJ was differentiated along four cleavages concerning lifestyle and economies, 
religious, ethnic and tribal affiliations. 
As a result of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967 and subsequently the significant 
influx of Palestinian refugees from the Israeli-occupied territories,334 the entire 
country changed from having a vast indigenous majority East Jordanian majority to 
one with a Palestinian majority. Henceforth, in Jordanian society the segmental 
cleavage was the sociopolitical cleavage and national distinction between the 
politically dominant Transjordanian and the Palestinian refugee and immigrant 
communities whose loyalty and faith to the kingdom has been deeply suspect. 
A l abed, F M O Research Guide: Palestinian Refugees in Jordan. Forced Migration (February 2004) 
online. http://www.forcedmigration .org/guides/fmo025 
3 3 3 Abu Jabir, The Jordanians and The People of Jordan (1980), p. 12. 
3 3 4 Sayigh, al-Urdun wa al-Filastiniyyun: Dirasa fi Wihdat al-Masir wa al-Sira' al-Hatmi, [Jordan 
and the Palestinians: A Study of a United Destiny or the Certain Struggle]. [1987), pp. 12-14. 
3 3 5 Salloukh, State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behavior: Jordan in Theoretical 
Perspective, Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Vol. 18, No. 2, (Spring 1996): pp. 37-65. 
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Following the annexation of the West Bank in 1950, the Jordanian government has 
tried seriously to absorb the West Bank Palestinians into Jordanian society and to 
create a common identity, but these continuing efforts have been only partially 
successful. Some Palestinians still live in refugee camps and in addition the 
Palestinians' national movement is still struggling for an independent state. These two 
factors contributed to Palestinians retaining a strong sense of Palestinian separateness 
leading to two distinctive identities: Palestinian and Transjordanian.336 
4.6.1 Transjordanian Identity 
The creation of Transjordanian identit y was achieved by mixing and joining the 
nomadic and sedentary tribes into a state system, the demarcation of the borders and 
the establishment of central authority in the capital of the state, which supplied a 
framework of national identity. The tribesmen based their identities upon their tribes, 
and there is no doubt that the ashira is considered as a primary base of affiliation and 
source of prestige and patronage. Moreover, ashira has played an important role in 
the identity of a majority of Transjordanian citizens. This is shown by the results of 
the parliamentary elections that prove the continuing importance of the tribe in 
Jordan.337 
After the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which stated that the British government 
supported the Zionist plans for a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine, one of the 
earliest attempts of the Transjordanian elite was the Um Qays conference on 
September 2, 1920. The aim of this conference was to avoid the implications of the 
declaration which might affect their prospective state in TJ. Moreover, they demanded 
forcefully the formation of 'an independent national Arab government' under the 
leadership of an Arab Emir. Such a demand could have disconnected this government 
from the Palestinian's government completely, therefore avoid including Jordan in 
Balfour Declaration. 3 3 9 
3 3 6 Morse, Palestinian Identity and the Jordanian State: Old Dilemmas, New Manifestations. The 
Brandies Middle East Reviews. Vol. 1 issue 1, Fall 2005), pp. 10-24. 
3 3 7 Laurie, Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crises of identity. Journal of Palestine studies, VoL. 24, No. 
4 (Summer, 1995), pp.46-61 
3 3 8 An ancient city at the northern tip of Jordan. 
3 3 9 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process 
(1999), pp. 14-15. 
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4.6.2 Palestinian Identity 
Since the establishment of international boundaries between TJ and Palestine, people 
on both sides of the Jordan River began to be aware that there were two identities: 
Transjordanian and Palestinian. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of 
Palestinians living in Jordan enjo yed citizenship rights, but continue d to identify 
themselves as Palestinians with a deep-rooted attachment to the West Bank. 
In Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crises of identity, Laurie classified the Palestinians 
in Jordan into different socio-economic groupings. The first group comprises those in 
Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars. This group 
maintains a strong sense of 'Palestinianness' while their sense of being 
'Jordanianness' is absent except for the convenience of having a passport. The 
identity of this Palestinian sector was defined as hostility to a Jordanian identity. The 
second group consists of middle-class Palestinians, most of whom were merchants 
and lower level governmental employees. This group has a strong sense of Palestinian 
identity but their hostility to a Jordanian identity is less pronounced due to their 
economic success. 
The third group was composed of elite groups of Palestinians who have achieved 
business success. This group identify themselves as Palestinians and Jordanians and 
became, with fellow Jordanians, the bedrock of support for the regime. The fourth 
group consists of Palestinians who have moved to other Gulf countries to work. These 
Palestinians used the Jordanian passport as a convenience rather than as a basis of 
their identity. 3 4 0 
In September 1970, the PLO's growing military power and the wide political support 
it enjoyed amongst Palestinians threatened Jordan's cohesion and the Hashemite rule. 
Therefore, King Hussein decided to take military action to protect his regime. The 
ensuing conflict affected Jordanian society deeply, and the Transjordanian-Palestinian 
3 4 0 Laurie (1995), p. 49. 
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relationships suffered a major setback due to the sense of a Palestinian national 
identity amongst Palestinians in Jordan.341 
4.7 The Tribalism Debate in Jordan (the pros and cons of tribalism) 
Tribalism in Jordan is used sometimes in a positive sense concerning the 
establishment and maintenance of certain moral values to distinguish the Jordanian 
people and their opinion, convictions and principles which are seen as the legacy of 
tribal social life. On the other hand, tribalism is also sometimes used to criticize 
aspects of contemporary society and culture as backward and standing in the way of 
progress. 
Those who are critical of tribalism argue that tribalism and democracy are antithetical; 
they see tribalism as incompatible with full participation in a modern state. One who 
is against tribalism argued in Al-Rai newspaper 3 4 2 that, "such a system was 
appropriate and good at the time of no state? Then it was one of the means for 
peaceful existence in the absence of a state, but today tribalism is a kind of illness and 
affliction which eats at the fortunes and sustenance of the people".343 
Marwan al-Musher344 was a Jordanian politician who had criticized tribalism. He 
expressed his concerns about the bases of affiliation in Jordan as follows: " I wish to 
see people proud because they are part of a professional organization, not because 
they are members of a big tribe. I wish to see people proud because of their personal 
achievements, not those of their cousins. And, above all, I wish to see people proud 
because they are Jordanians not only because of their surnames".345 
Arguments put forward to discuss the situation have focused on the political culture of 
Jordan and concentrated on tribalism as one of the predominant factors that is not 
4 Yorke, Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel: the End of an Era? 
(cl988), p. 39 
3 4 2 Daily newspaper and the most read paper in Jordan. 
3 4 3 Layne, The Dialogics of Tribal Self-Representation in Jordan, American Ethnologist, Vol. 16, No. 1 
(Feb., 1989), pp. 24-39. 
3 4 4 He was the Deputy Prime Minister of Jordan in Adnan Badran's cabinet from October 25, 2004 to 
November 28, 2005. He had been the Foreign Minister from January 2002 until October 2004. 
3 4 5 Jordan Times newspaper, January 19, 1985. 
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conducive to greater freedom and democracy, particularly in the absence of a 
developed party system. Iman Al-Hussein, a professor at Al-Balqa University, has 
talked about the influence and importance of tribalism in Jordanian political life, 
arguing that "We can't separate tribalism from politics as long as political parties are 
weak". 3 4 6 Jamil Nimri is a specialist on parliamentary issues and the Democratic Party 
of the Left (DPL) spokesperson. Focusing on an electoral system based on individual 
and tribal features, Nimri stated that, "We need a system that would mitigate the 
effects of the one-person, one-vote formula, leading the chorus of those accusing the 
current system of encouraging already strong tribalism". 3 4 7 
Bater Mohammed, a journalist in Addustour newspaper, stated that with the current 
election law (SNTV) and the distribution of election districts, Jordan would never be 
able to achieve the political progress and free and fair elections on which any 
democratic system ultimately depends. On the contrary, he argues, such a system 
supports tribalism and opens the door for real conflicts between families and tribes. 
On November 3, 1997 Marwan Muasher, Jordanian ambassador to the United States, 
addressed the Institute's Special Policy Forum regarding Jordan's November 4 
parliamentary elections as follows: "The Jordanian parliament has assumed a greater 
role in legislating and monitoring the executive branch in the last eight years, but 
there has not yet been adequate time for the evolution of a strong party system in the 
country. Jordanians have never liked political parties; indeed, other than the Islamists, 
Jordan has no major political party. In fact, of more than 500 candidates, only twenty-
five are running on a party ticket. Tribalism remains a much more important political 
force than party affiliation". 3 4 9 
On the other hand, those who argue in favour of tribalism and are positive about 
organizations based on tribalism represent or describe these as the embodiment of a 
valued past. King Hussein publicly supported the role of the tribe and tradition in 
Jordan's past and future, stating, "Whatever harms tribes is considered harmful to us. 
3 4 6 Jordan Times, Friday-Saturday, April28-29, 2006 
3 4 7 Jordan 77mes,Thursday, December 31, 1998 
34f* Addustour newspaper, Thursday, March 15, 2007 
3 4 9 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID= 1155 
Policy Forum Report was prepared by Rachel Ingber. 
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Law will remain closely connected to norms, customs, and traditions. . . . Our 
traditions should be made to preserve the fabric of society. Disintegration of tribes is 
very painful, negative and subversive". 
Nabeel Gheshan, a journalist on Al-Arab Alyoum newspaper, argues that there have 
been so many false charges against tribalism and its role in Jordanian society, because 
some people try to link Jordanian tribes with backwardness and illiteracy in our 
society. He insisted that Jordanian tribes have developed socially and politically and 
contribute to a state of civil stability. Moreover, the increased number of educated 
tribesmen with experience led them to play an important role in the renaissance of the 
country.3 5 1 Sabri Rbeihat, a doctor at Philadelphia University, argued that tribalism in 
Jordan was an obstacle to modernity in the previous years, but it was at the same time 
a social and economic necessity and the government preserved it for its own 
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purposes. 
4.8 Tribes and Political Participation 
There is no doubt that the tribes in Jordan have accommodated to the new political 
events. In addition, the tribes present themselves as political alternatives to civil 
society institutions such as the political parties. Even after the return of political 
parties to the Jordanian arena after 1990, they have not been able to operate properly, 
and have failed to gain the confidence of most Jordanians (except for the Muslim 
Brotherhood party). 
This tribal presentation in political life came from the government's support to the 
tribal organization and ideology. Massad noted that Jordan's stability depends to a 
very large extent on the tribal nature of socio-political relationships, and despite the 
social changes that have decreased the effect of tribalism it still has an effective role 
in government systems, and the government seeks tribal support when facing any 
problems.353 
3 5 0 Jordan Times , 28 January 1985. 
3 5 1 Al-Arab Alyoum newspaper, Sunday, 7 May, 2007 
3 5 2Reibhat, Government and civil society, in Government and Civil Society, Workshop Seven, 3 
November 1996, PASSIA, Jerusalem. P. 221 
3 5 3 Massad (2001), p.243. 
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In terms of political participation and the electoral process, tribal affiliation has played 
an important role in most of the electoral districts, which reflects nature of Jordanian 
society. The political participation in 1989 and 1993 elections was very high in the 
electoral districts which were based on tribal affiliation as table 4.2 shows. On the 
other hand, the voter turnout was particularly low in Amman, (Jordan's capital), and 
in the other populated urban areas such as Irbid and Al-Zarqa as shown in table 4.3. 
Table 4.2 Numbers and Percentages of Votes in the 1989 and 1993 Elections 
1989 elections 1993 elections 
District Population No of No of % of Population No of No of % of 
RV* votes total RV votes total 
cast votes cast votes 
Ma'an 23,592 19,427 14,427 69.4 36,467 35,824 26,534 74 
Al-Tafilah 54,589 21,908 15,364 70.1 61,156 25,985 19,787 76 
Al-Mafraq 124,046 21,825 14,622 67 170,903 32,389 22,928 70.8 
Al-Ramtha 122,164 41,360 26,727 64.6 130802 58,403 38,457 65.8 
and 
BaniKanana 
Badu Al-Ganub 35,510 18,476 12,191 66 45,869 24,186 20,205 70.7 
Badu Al-Wasat 43,551 18,155 12,243 67.4 75,000 25,203 14,993 59.5 
Source: Khazaileh, Abd El-Aziz., Researches of Jordanian Studies Center, (Yarmouk 
University, 1996), pp. 94 - 98. *RV Registered Vote 
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Table 4.3 Numbers and Percentages of Votes in Amman, Irbid and Zarqa in the 
1989 and 1993 Elections. 
1989 elections 1993 elections 
District Population No. of No. of Total population No. of No. of Total 
the RV votes votes 
% 
the RV votes votes 
% 
Amman 1207838 330812 157541 47.6 1567908 3896014 213057 45.3 
Zarqa 494680 116371 58153 50 623943 180719 90949 50.3 
Irbid 414769 126903 53400 42.1 468548 172026 93896 54.6 
Source: Hani, Al-Hourani, et al. Dirasatfi al-Intikhabat al-Niyabiyyah al-Urduniyyah 
1997, [Studies in the Jordanian Parliamentary Elections 1997], Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 
Research Center (UJRC), (Amman: Dar Sindibad lil-Nashr, 2002), p. 173. 
It worth noting that the parliamentary elections of 1989 witnessed an overall voter 
turnout of 53%, although the political parties were still illegal and candidates ran 
without official party affiliation. Although a new law legalising political parties was 
issued in 1992, the 1993 elections witnessed a voter turnout only of 55.6%. 
More importantly, although the 1997 elections were boycotted by eight political 
parties led by the Muslim Brotherhood, voting turnout was still high in districts based 
on tribal affiliation, while the overall turnout was 43.4%.3 5 4 The highest turnout, of 
70.7% was registered in the constituency of Ma'an, followed by 69.9% in Al-Tafilah, 
while the lowest ratios of 24% were in Amman, 26.9%, in Zarqa, and 50.3% in 
Irbid. These data confirm that tribal and rural regions witnessed a higher interest in 
voting more than the populated urban areas. In the 2003 parliamentary elections nine 
political parties participated, wining 33 seats 30% of MPs, while the majority of 
parliamentary seats went to candidates who stood as independents and with tribal 
support. 
Abu Rumman, Boycott of the Parliamentary Elections of the 1997, (Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research 
Center (UJRC) . 
3 5 5 Al-Urdun A L - Jadid Research Center (UJTC.C), Dirrassat fee al-Entikhabat al-Barlamaniah al-
Urduniah 1997 (2002)., p. 173. 
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4.9 The Religious Factor in Parliamentary Elections 
4.9.1 The Religious Dimension in the Arab World: Islam and Democracy 
Islam is not only a religion, but also a socio-political entity which includes basic 
religious beliefs, practices and norms of behaviour usually associated with it, and it is 
considered as a major source of legitimization of political power.3 5 6 Muslims believe 
that Islam is a complete way of life and that there should be no separation between 
religion and politics. Jerrold wrote that, "In Islam there is no separation between 
temporal and spiritual life. The two are synonymous. Thus, the involvement of 
Islamic activists in daily political life is not aberrant but, by Islamic standards at least, 
normal, desirable, and de rigueur". 
Defining the relationship of Islam to democracy has been problematic and is one of 
the most hotly and sensitively debated topics. It is argued that democracy is basically 
a western concept and ideology and therefore Islamic values are fundamentally at 
odds or incompatible with Western liberal values (antithetical). It is argued also that 
because most Islamic countries are monarchies or dictatorships, or due to certain 
events that have taken place in these countries, Islam is incompatible with either 
democracy or modernity. On the other hand some argue that there are no 
contradictions between Islam and Democracy, and that on the contrary they are 
compatible, and that democratic ideals and principles coincide with Islamic ideals and 
principles. 
Huntington asserts that "Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, 
human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the 
separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, 
Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures".358 
Jeffery, The Political Importance of Islam, Journal ofNearEasterten Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 9, 
October 1942, pp. 383-395. 
3 5 7 Jerrrold, Islam, Ideology, and Democracy in the Middle East, paper presented at the B R I S M E S 
Annual Conference, University of St Andrew, 8-10 July 1992. 
3 5 8 Huntington (1984), p. 208 
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Many contemporary Muslim scholars believe that Islam is completely compatible 
with democracy, Rashid Ghannoushi, the leader of a Tunisian Islamist party, said that 
" I f by democracy is meant the liberal model of government prevailing in the West, a 
system under which the people freely choose their representatives and leaders, and in 
which there is an alternation of power, as well as all freedoms and human rights for 
the public, then the Muslims will find nothing in their religion to oppose democracy, 
and it is not in their interest to do so anyway." 
Abdul Karim Soroush, has also argued that there is no contradiction between Islam 
and the freedoms inherent in democracy: "Islam and democracy are not only 
compatible, their association is inevitable. In a Muslim society, one without the other 
is not perfect."3 6 0 Furthermore, "Islam and democracy are not contradictory to each 
other. Democracy is the form of government based on the will of the people as well as 
run and changed with their consent only. This is also the form of Islamic government. 
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But the values of western democracy are not identical with those of Islam". 
Radwan Masmoudi asserted that there is no inherent contradiction between Islam and 
democracy and that democratic ideals and principles are also Islam's ideals and 
principles. Thus, the explanation of why so many Muslim countries are not 
democratic depends on historical, political, cultural, and economic factors, and not 
religious ones. 
Many Muslim scholars have tried to prove that Islam is compatible with democracy 
on the grounds of the Islamic principle of 'Shura' or consultative decision making, 
and they agree that the principles of shura are the source of democratic ethics in 
Islam. Therefore, again, the fact that the Muslim World is as large in population as 
the Christian world but is less developed and many Muslim countries are not 
democratic, is something related to historical, cultural, and economic obstacles that 
are not related to religion. 
Esposito and John, Markers of Contemporary Islam (2001), p. 114. 
3 6 0 Abootalebi, Islam, Islamists, and Democracy, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, 
No. 1 (March 1999), pp. 14-24. 
3 6 1 Zakir Aijaz, (ed.), Selected Speeches and Writings ofMaulana Maududi, (1982), p. 198. 
3 6 2 Sidahmed, and Ehteshami (ed), Islamic fundamentalism (1996), pp. 12-13 
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Some countries in the Muslim world are in uproar, and could not embark upon 
political advancement for several reasons. The first and most important reason for this 
is that these Muslim countries have been engulfed in major social and political 
convulsions whether internally or externally that have led to a lack of community 
stability and settlement consequently leads to the decline of democratic reform. 3 6 3 The 
Arab region was under Ottoman domination for more than four centuries, then under 
French and British colonial rule. Subsequent international actions starting with the 
Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 and the promise to create a Jewish state in Palestine 
according to the Balfour Declaration in 1917 make the origin of the present conflicts 
in the region.3 6 4 
Moreover, the oil boom in the Arab peninsula has attracted many groups with 
contradictory interests, all seeking to control a region with exceptional strategic 
significance. Many have embraced Islamism in the face of the states' neglect of their 
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responsibility for meeting basic needs. In addition, legitimacy crises in some Arabic 
countries mean that the political regimes do not enjoy the trust and goodwill of the 
governed. Therefore they have resorted to coercion and force to maintain their 
This series of regional destabilizations, foreign interventions, unresolved regional 
conflicts and the accumulation of socioeconomic crises in the Islamic World and 
Arabic region in particular have created explosive regional tensions leading to the 
delaying of political reforms and a decreased desire to embark on democratic reform. 
That is why Arabic societies live in superficial democracy. 
4.9.2 The Religious Dimension in Jordanian Political Life 
The considerable importance of Islam in Jordanian political life springs from the fact 
that Islam is the predominant religion in Jordan. The overwhelming majority of the 
population are Sunni Muslims, comprising 92% of the population. 6% are Christians 
3 6 3 Lane and Hamadi, Religion and Politics : Islam and Muslim Civilisation (2004), p. 13 
3 6 4 Democracy in the Arab World, Challenges, Achievements and prospects, published by I D E A in 
2000, which is available at www.idea.int. 
3 6 5 Beinin, The Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an Egyptian 
Social Movement, 77ie New Centennial Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, ( Spring 2005), PP. 111 -39. 
3 6 6 Lane, and Hamadi. (2004), p. 108. 
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while the Shia Muslims, Sunni Circassians, Chechens, Druze, and Bahai comprise 
2%. Moreover, Jordan's constitution stipulates that the country is a constitutional 
monarchy based on the constitution promulgated on January 8, 1952, which defined 
Islamic law {Shan'ah) as one of the pillars of the legislation in the state, and 
stipulated that Islam is the official religion and that the king must be a Muslim and a 
son of Muslim parents. 
The religious dimension in Jordanian elections is considered the second biggest factor 
after the tribe effect which dominates the political scene. Moreover, Islam is an 
important factor in Jordan and it acts sometimes as "motivator, legitimator, or simply 
a justifier for any particular foreign policy". 3 6 9 This situation was particularly acute in 
the 1980s when Jordan experienced a crisis with political, social, and economic 
dimensions that led to an increase in the popularity of the Islamic movement. Other 
background factors also helped the rise of Islamic movements, including the failure of 
the national liberation movement to offer a democratic environment when it was in 
power, the success of revolutionary Islamic movements such as in the Iranian 
revolution that boosted its morale, and lastly the failure of Arab nations to combat 
The Muslim Brotherhood {Jama' at al-Ikhwan al-muslimin), popularly known as {al-
ikhwan), is regarded as the oldest and the most important Islamist movement in 
Jordan. Its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) {Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami) 
is the country's biggest party and played a prominent role in the parliamentary 
elections, both during the campaigns and by supporting certain candidates in some 
371 
cases securing them resounding success. 
4.9.2.1 The Historical Record of Loyalty (Islamist - Regime relations). 
Islamist movements are not simply political actors; they function also as major social 
actors and religious organizations committed to spreading a set of beliefs, values, and 
3 6 7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan. 
3 6 8 See the Jordanian Constitution. Online see http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitutionjo.html 
3 6 9 Dawisha (ed), Islam in Foreign Policy (1983), p.5 
3 7 0 Al-Khazendar (1997), p. 137 
3 7 1 Majed Ziad (ed), Building Democracy (2003) p. 87. 
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practices. Therefore, Islamism plays a significant role whether as religious 
organizations in the society or as a political force in advocating active participation in 
local politics. 
It is clear that the relationship between the monarchy and religion started with the 
establishment of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan, when it was considered as the 
cornerstone of security in Jordan. Furthermore, the Hashemite ruling family has 
enjoyed religious legitimacy by alleging direct descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad's family which was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in 
Jordan. 3 7 2 
Historically, King Abdullah I , the founder of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
granted the Islamic movement the legal status of their establishment in January 1946. 
Moreover, the movement's secretary Abd al-Hakim al-Din has been a member of the 
cabinet, and the King has stated that Jordan is in need of the Brotherhood's efforts. 
Furthermore, the king supported the Brotherhood in creating branches throughout the 
country, enabling them to exercise considerable influence during the initial phase of 
state-formation. 3 7 3 The Brotherhood has also actively participated in the building of 
the new Jordanian entity and played a pivotal role in shaping the national affairs of the 
country. In addition, the movement came to be seen as an essential source of stability 
throughout Jordan's tumultuous history.3 7 4 
The relationship between the traditional Islamic movement and the government was 
one of wariness but was based on co-operation more than conflict. In the 1950s and 
1960s the government built a tactical alliance with the Islamic movement to combat 
the growing strength of leftist and nationalist parties that were dominating the 
375 
Jordanian street supported by Baathism in Syria and Iraq and Nassirism in Egypt. 
i u Jureidini (1984), p.37. 
3 7 3 Wiktorowicz, Islamists, The State, And Cooperation In Jordan. Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Vol. 
21, fall, 1999. 
3 7 4 Wiktorowicz (1999) 
3 7 5 Abu Roman, Dinamikiat al- Azma bayn al-Hukoma wa al-Ikhwan fi al-Urdun, [The Dynamic of 
Conflict between Regime and the Brotherhoods in Jordan]. 7/7/2006. 
http://www. aljazeera. net/NR/exeres 
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Despite Islamists as a political movement define themselves as part of the opposition 
and has always criticized the regime and disagree with policies, it desired-as a 
moderate reform movement- to act through the political system and the institutions, 
assuring their loyalty to the throne and they had no interest in overthrowing the 
regime but they decided to integrate themselves by participating in the political 
process.376 
The Muslim Brotherhood's former leader Abdul Majid Thunaybat, describes the 
movement's approach to change: "Our approach to education is to begin with the 
individual and then move on to the family and then ultimately the Islamic government 
that rules as provided for in God's sharia. Our mission does not envisage an 
overthrow of the regime in the sense of holding the reins of power, regardless of 
people's temperament or whether they approve of this regime or not. We seek the 
creation of faithful grassroots that receive these instructions and this order, and 
government by Islam comes later. We renounce violence and say that the alternative 
is political reform and respect for Islamic sharia, which constitutes the base of powers 
as approved by all Arab and Islamic constitutions".377 
In the two most critical political crises that had arisen in the country, between the 
palace and the leftist/nationalist opposition in the 1950s and between the regime and 
the armed Palestinians resistance in the early 1970s, the Brotherhood acted as a loyal 
opposition and stayed out of the conflict or neutral.378 As a result, the government 
allowed the Brotherhood to operate openly, without interruption or suppression, while 
restricting the other parties that were operating in secret and who were subject to 
Despite the mutual cooperation between Brotherhood and the regime, the relationship 
has experienced periods of tension, particularly in 1956 when street protests were 
organized by the Muslim Brotherhood to oppose policies that permitted a substantial 
British military presence in Jordan. Furthermore, in 1979 and after the Camp David 
agreement between Israel and Egypt, King Hussein when he refused to break ties with 
Wiktorowicz. (1999) 
Wiktorowicz(1999) 
Abu Roman (2006) 
Majed (2003), p. 87. 
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Egypt, despite an otherwise unanimous Arab boycott of Egypt. This dismayed the 
Muslim Brotherhood and they considered the King's condemnation as inadequate.380 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the gap between the Islamists and the regime 
widened particularly after the 1989 elections and the considerable successes achieved 
by the Islamists which were stronger than expected. The conflict reached a turning 
point when the government opened peace negotiations with Israel and a treaty was 
signed in 1994 at the southern border crossing of Wadi Araba. 
Since the 1989 elections the government has planned to weaken the rising power and 
popularity of Islamism; meanwhile the government was preparing to start negotiations 
to produce a treaty of peace with Israel, which the Islamists oppose due to ideological 
religious doctrine. Therefore, the government changed the electoral law adopting a 
one-person, one-vote formula instead of the former system of multiple votes. As 
Jordan is a tribal society this resulted in most Jordanians voting along tribal lines 
- T O T 
rather than according to ideological considerations. 
The year 2006 has witnessed two major conflicts between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the government. As a result of the Hamas' surprise victory in the last 
parliamentary elections, by this victory the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan became 
more self confident and saw a path to political power. The chief of the Islamic Action 
Front's parliamentary bloc stated that "his party will be qualified to form the 
government after getting a majority of seats in the coming elections".384 This 
statement has sparked a strong reaction by the government. 
These events followed by the Hamas' weapon file when the government has 
announced in April while the Palestinian foreign minister Mahmoud al-Zahar was 
planning to visit Jordan that it caught Hamas members engaged in smuggling 
3 8 0 Wiktorowicz (1999) 
3 8 1 Abu Roman, Dinamikiat al- Azma bayn al-Hukoma wa al-Ikhwan fi al-Urdun [The Dynamic of 
Conflict between Regime and the Brotherhoods in Jordan] (2006) 
3 8 2 Sabbagh, Electoral Process in Selected Countries of the Middle East: A Case Study. 12 January 
2004. 
3 8 3 Amawi, The 1993 elections in Jordan. Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ). Vol. 16, No. 3, 
(Summer), 1994, pp. 15-27. 
3 8 4 Al Rantawi, One Eye on Hamas, the Other on the Brotherhood, bitterlemons-intemational 
organization, Middle East Roundtable, May 04, 2006 Edition 16 Volume 4. 
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weapons from Syria, consequently the government cancelled the planned visit. The 
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan denied the truth of the government statement and 
considered the government's position a result of American and Zionist pressure to 
isolate the Palestinian government. The government subsequently arrested some 
Brotherhood members.385 
The second conflict came when the government arrested four Brotherhood members 
who paid condolences to the Zarqawi family at the Zarqawi's death. Consequently, 
the relationship between the government and the Islamist movement has been 
characterized by increased tension, and the government described that action: "the 
Muslim Brotherhood group has trespassed the red lines in the traditional relation with 
the government".386 
Regardless of any differences that may have surrounded the Ikhwan-regime 
relationship, the Muslim Brotherhood has remained within the law and entirely loyal 
to the monarchy and it has never operated underground. Moreover, the vast majority 
of the movement's leaders articulate themselves as reformists or modernists and not 
revolutionaries. They argue that their strategy of change or reform is through 
evolution not through violence. 
4.9.2.2 Islamist Participation in Parliament 
Since its establishment in 1945, the Muslim Brotherhood has had a general social 
focus, with charitable and educational activities that helped them to have a deep 
impact on Jordanian society. The Islamic movements avoided political activities 
and participation in government until 1956 when the Islamic movement in Jordan 
Al-Najar, 2006 'Am al-Azamat bayn al-Hukoma al-Urdunniyyah wa al-Islamieen, [2006 the Year of 
Conflicts between the Jordanian Government and Islaimist]^ 29/12/2006 on Alajazeera.net. 
http://www.aliazeera.net/>fR/exeres/64F66DCF-05AB-420F-BEB6-7E5C9C196BD7.htm.(access at 
5:00pm) 
3 8 6 Al-Haya magazine, 2006 by Ghassan Charbel. 
3 8 7 Brown, Jordan and its Islamic Movement: the Limits of Inclusion?. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. No. 74. (November 2006), p.5. 
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moved into political affairs to participate in elections and parliamentary life and won 
4 of the 40 seats to be the second largest faction in parliament.388 
The Islamic movement in Jordan represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
political wing the (IAF) grew steadily and gained even more international attention 
389 
after the April 1989 disturbances. In the subsequent November 1989 parliamentary 
elections the Islamist candidates established a strong presence wining 34 of the 80 
parliamentary seats: 22 seats went to the Brotherhood's candidates and were backed 
up by 12 Islamist independents.390 
In Jordan's 1989 parliamentary elections the Islamic Action Front (IAF) occupied 
22.5 percent of seats, having won 15.6 percent of the overall vote. Therefore, in 1991 
when he appointed a new 21 member cabinet, King Hussein nominated among them 6 
members who belonged to the Islamist movement. This high level of representation in 
government achieved by the Islamist reflects the influence of the movement in the 
parliamentary elections. In addition, the King was in need of Islamist support to 
contain public hostility to the coalition of forces stationed in Saudi Arabia during the 
1991 Gulf War against Iraq. 3 9 1 
Although the 1993 elections were held after the legalization of political parties, and 
with the participation of twenty parties, the number of IAF parliamentarians declined 
from 22 to 16 (17.3 percent), but their percentage of the overall vote increased to (16 
percent). These results were obtained after the adjustments in the electoral law that 
limited each voter to one vote. 
Gharaibeh, al-harakah al- Islamiyyah fi al-Urdun wa al-Intikhabat al-Niyabiyyah [The Islamic 
Movement in Jordan and the Parliamentary Elections]., published at 17/05/2006, on 
http://www.aliazeera.net/NR/exeres/8B64F9D0-5737-40E7-BC6F-6989D03EF A7D.htm#0 
3 8 9 When riots broke out in a number of towns after the increases in prices announced by the 
government. 
3 9 0 Robins, Jordan's Election: A New Era?., Middle East Report, No. 164/165, Intifada Year Three. 
(May-Aug., 1990), PP.55-57. 
3 9 1 Kepel, Jihad : the Trail of Political Islam, translated by Robert, Anthony F , (London : I .B. Tauris, 
2002), p. 334 
3 9 2 Piscatori, Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral Principles in the Middle East. An article was based on 
presentations he gave at a conference held by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the 
Modem World (ISIM) in Leiden, the Netherlands. Published 2000. online 
http .//www. isim.nl/files/paper_piscatori.pdf 
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The 2007 parliamentary elections results showed Islamists losing more than half of 
their parliamentary seats. The Islamic Action Front had won 17 seats in the 2003 
parliamentary elections, but won only seven of the 22 seats they fought in the 2007 
elections for the 110-seat assembly.393 
4.10 Conclusion 
As a result of a long period in which the political parties were banned for about 30 
years394, the tribes were the most prominent political organizations and played the 
most decisive role in the formation of the new state. Accordingly, the state dealt with 
the society through the tribes as the most important channel for people to contact the 
authorities, offer services and to help them to solve their problems. In addition, the 
state supported the tribes' role in becoming the pillars of society and did not allow 
other institutions such as political parties to play the same role, instead keeping them 
outside of the political development process. 
Regarding the participation of the Islamic movements, despite the strong presence of 
the Ikhwan in Jordanian elections, most of their candidates and even the IAF leaders 
still had to get support from their tribes. One of the things that drew attention in those 
elections was the number of partisan candidates who denied their partisanship and 
declared their tribal loyalty in order to gain a seat in parliament. This perhaps explains 
the resort of several parties to keeping their lists secret or undeclared and believing in 
the wisdom of the saying, "The tribe's sword is sharper in the elections than the 
swords of political parties'. 
Some of the partisan candidates interpreted their failure to declare lists of candidates 
as electoral tactics. In some cases candidates in tribal regions could not announce that 
they belonged to particular parties, because that would affect their electoral chances. 
Even for the candidates for quota seats in the 2003 Parliamentary elections, tribal 
support had a major say in the voting process and five of the winner were fielded as 
tribal candidates.395 
Ministry of Interior 
Since the early 1960s until 1992. 
Sabbagh (2004). 
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were to supply advisors or foreign officials at the request of the Arab state or 
confederation of states. 
2. France was to control, directly or indirectly, the blue zone (coastal belt from a 
little north of Haifa to point west of Mersina, including Cilicia and Mosul), 
and Great Britain was to control the red zone (southern Mesopotamia from the 
Persian Gulf to a line south of Baghdad, and an enclave around Haifa and 
Acre). Both powers were to set up administrations in the Blue and Red zones 
respectively after they had reached an understanding with the Arab state or 
confederation of states. 
3. The brown zone (Palestine south of Haifa) was to remain under international 
administration, the form of which was to be decided after consultation with 
Russia and other allies and with the Sharif of Mecca." 
According to the Sykes-Picot agreement, TJ fell under British administration, but 
without a government or forces to maintain security. This situation led the British 
High Commissioner in Palestine to appoint British officers to the districts of Ajlun, 
Salt, and Karak in order to help the Trans-Jordanians to organise their government 
and to give advice.80 
Shwadran, Jordan A State of Tension (1959), p. 110. 
Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (1987), p.45. 
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Figure 2.1 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916 
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In November 1920, Emir Abdullah arrived at Ma'an at the head of 2,000 strong of 
tribal forces declaring his intention to conquer Syria from the French mandate and to 
return his brother Faisal to his throne. The British High Commissioner in Palestine 
intervened and called for a conference in Salt attended by Arab leaders. The High 
Commissioner concluded an agreement with Emir Abdullah, offering him the 
leadership of TJ and financial support. In addition the Iraqi throne would go to his 
brother Emir Faisal, who became King in November 1921. The advantages to Britain 
from this agreement were that it stopped his invasion and provided protection to 
Q 1 
British interests in Palestine and Egypt. Consequently, at the Cairo conference 
between Emir Abdullah and Winston Churchill on March 27, 1921 the British decided 
to name Emir Abdullah, Emir of Trans-Jordan as part of the British mandate, 
providing TJ with a permanent constitution and a trial period of six months rule to 
Emir Abdullah. 8 2 
2.3 The Era of the Emirate, 1921-1946 (Creating a Government in TJ) 
In 1921 the Emirate of TJ was established under the British mandate by the prince 
Abdullah bin Hussein who established the first centralised government in April 11, 
1921. As TJ was not a state at that time, the government council was called "a 
Council of Consultants {Majlis Al-Mushawiriri) which was composed of eight 
members. Three were from the Arab nationalists of the Freedom Party (Hizb Al-
Istqlal), one was the Transjordanian Al i khulqi Al Sharayri, and the other members 
were chosen from among men who had served in different parts of Syria.84 
May 25, 1923, was the day Great Britain formally recognized an independent 
government in TJ under the rule of Emir Abdullah Ibn Al Hussein. This is regarded as 
the beginning of the establishment of the Emirate of TJ, which remained under the 
British mandate until 1946. The treaty stipulated TJ as a national state preparing for 
independence.85 
1 http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/transjordan. 
2 Dangoor, The Cairo Conference of 1921. The Scribe, 1989. 
3 Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (1993), p. 93. 
4 Salibi (1993), p. 93. 
5 Salibi (1993), p. 94 
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2.4 The Constitutional Structure and Parliament in the Emirate of T J in the 
Mandate Period, 1923 - 1946 
The first experiment in representative politics started on June 11, 1923, when Prince 
Abdullah issued a decree (Iradah) allowing elections for twelve representatives to 
form the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) under the mandate rule. For this 
election the country was divided into six districts; two deputies from each district 
were elected by local municipal councils and district administrative councils. The 
responsibility of this Council was to debate and discuss with civil servants concerning 
the drafting of laws and regulations, but it had no authority to make laws. 
2.4.1 Constitutional Structure: The Organic Law of T J . 
"The constitution is the defining document of any political system. It sets up the main 
institutions of the polity, organizes the relationship between the population and the 
* 87 
state, and decides the distribution of power and roles within that state." TJ was ruled 
without a constitution until the first was set up on April 19, 1928 according to the 
Anglo-Trans-Jordanian treaty, which was signed on February 20, 1928 in Jerusalem 
between HBM and Chief Minister Hassan Khalid Pasha Abul Huda for TJ. The 
* • * 89 
agreement was imposed on TJ by Britain without consultation or discussion. 
The agreement consisted of preamble and twenty-one Articles. In the first and second 
Articles the Emir agreed that Britain would be represented in TJ by a British Resident 
who exercised the legislative and communicative powers through a constitutional 
government.90 
Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: the Creating and Development of 
Transjordan: 1920-1929 (1989), p. 92 
8 7 Salem, Constitution Building in Iraq. Paper presented at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation 
Conference, Amman, Jordan, June 2005 
8 8 Shwadran(1995),p. 167. 
8 9 Al-Madi and Al-Musa, Tarikh al-Urdun fi al-Qarn al-'Ishrin, [The History of Jordan in the 
Twentieth Century] (1959), p. 279. 
9 0 Shwadran(1995) ,p. 167. 
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Article 2 stated that "The power of legislation and of administration entrusted to his 
Britannic Majesty as Mandatory for Palestine shall be exercised in that part of the area 
under Mandate known as Trans-Jordan by His Highness the Emir through such 
constitutional Government as is defined and determined in the Organic Law of Trans-
Jordan and any amendment thereof made with the approval of His Britannic Majesty". 
Moreover, the agreement placed upon the Emir's powers several restrictions, and 
enabled Britain to control the Emir, while the Emir had the power to govern the 
country through the Organic Law. 9 1 For example, the agreement retained a degree of 
British control over foreign affairs, financial issues, armed forces and 
communications. Article 3 stated that the Emir could not employ any civil servants 
other than those of Transjordanian nationality without the approval of the British 
government. 
The Emir also agreed in Article 5 to be guided by the advice of the British 
government in financial and international matters. Furthermore, the Emir was required 
to seek the advice of the British government in setting the annual budget, currency 
rules, custom duties, the construction and operation of railways and the raising of 
loans, as declared in Articles 6 and 17.9 2 Consequently, the two countries agreed to 
93 
promulgate an Organic Law of seven parts and 72 Articles on April 16, 1928. 
Part I dealt with the rights of the people. It proclaimed in Article 5 that "There shall 
be no difference in Rights before the law among Trans-Jordanians although they may 
differ in race, religion and language". According to Article 6, personal freedom 
should be granted and no arrest should be performed except in accordance with the 
law as stated in Article 6: "The personal freedom of all dwellers in TJ shall be 
safeguarded from aggression and interference and no person shall be arrested or 
detained or punished or forced to change his residence or submitted to bonds or 
compelled to serve in the Army except in accordance with law. Al l dwelling houses 
shall be safe from aggression and no entry therein shall be permitted except in the 
9 1 Aruri(1942),p.77. 
9 2 Text of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian agreement in Abu Nowar (1989), pp. 286 - 290. 
9 3 Text of Organic Law 1928 in Davis, Constitution, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and 
Middle East (1947), pp.303 - 314, and Abu Nowar (1989), pp. 291-299. 
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circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law." Article 11 of the 1928 
constitution granted to all Transjordanians the right to express and publish their 
opinions: "Al l Trans-Jordanian shall be free to express and publish their opinions and 
assemble together and to form and be members of associations within the provisions 
of law". 
Part I I dealt with the Emir's rights. It proclaimed in Article 16 that "Subject to the 
provisions herein powers of legislations and administration are invested in Emir 
Abdullah Ibn Hussein and his heirs after him. The Heir-Apparent shall be a male 
descendent of the Emir in accordance with a special law of succession to which the 
provision of Article 70 and 71 of this Organic Law regarding variation, annulment 
and amendment shall apply." 
According to Article 18 the Emir was immune from legal responsibility "The Emir 
shall be immune from Liability and responsibility." And the Emir was to be the head 
of the state and the Organic Law granted to him all sanction to promulgate all laws 
but he was not to suspend or modify the laws. "The Emir is the head of the state. He 
sanctions and promulgates all laws and supervises their execution. He is not entitled 
to modify or suspend laws or to give dispensation in their execution, except in the 
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law." 9 4 Furthermore, the Organic Law 
granted to the Emir the power to appoint and dismiss the Executive Council consisting 
of the Chief Minister and not more than five members appointed by the Emir 
according to the Chief Minister's recommendation.95 
Part I I I of the constitution dealt with the Legislature. According to Article 25 the 
legislative powers were vested in the Legislative council with the Emir. According to 
the 1928 constitution the Legislative council was to have three ordinary sessions, one 
session each year beginning on November 1 after the election.96 The Emir was to 
summon, dismiss and dissolve the Legislative council, and i f he dismissed the 
Legislative Council new election should take place and the new council should 
assemble not later than four months in extraordinary session. 
The Organic Law, Article 19 provision 1. 
The Organic Law, Article 21. 
The Organic Law, Article 28. 
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2.4.2 The Legislative Council Electoral Law, 1928 
The Organic Law that followed the Anglo Trans-Jordanian agreement stipulated a 
hereditary monarchy with elected legislative councils, and adopted the one chamber 
system with two-thirds of its members elected by an indirect balloting system through 
two levels of primary and secondary elections. 
In the primary elections all Trans-Jordanian males (except Bedouins) of eighteen 
years of age or over were eligible to vote to select the secondary electors. In the 
secondary elections, the secondary electors selected the representatives to the 
council.9 7 Seats for the Bedouins were filled in two stages: in the first stage by the 
appointment of two committees, with every committee composed of ten tribal leaders 
(Sheikh) selected by the Emir. In the second stage each committee was to nominate 
one member to sit on the Legislative Council. The Electoral law which came into 
effect on June 17, 1928 divided TJ into four districts; Ajlun in the north, Balqa in the 
centre and Karak and Ma 'an in the south (see table 2.1). 9 8 
According to Article 5 the electoral system had some form of quota or reserved 
number of seats for ethnic and religious communities (see table 2.1), and the council 
seats were divided as follows: 
1. Non-Bedouin Muslim Arabs were awarded nine seats. 
2. Circassians received two seats. 
3. Christians received three seats in the legislative council. 
4. The Bedouin received two seats. 
9 7 Amawi, Jordan, in F. Tachau (ed.), Political Parlies of the Middle East and North Africa, (1994), p. 
260. 
98 i Electoral Law, 1928. Article 5. 
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Seats in the Legislative Council According to the 
Electoral Law, 1928 
District Muslim Arab Muslim Christian Total 
Circassian 
Balqa 3 2 1 6 
Ajlun 3 - 1 4 
Karak 2 - 1 3 
Ma'an 1 - - 1 
Total 9 2 3 14 
2.5 Legislative Elections and Political Parties Participation in the First Phase 
1921-1950 (Traditional Parties) 
In the early beginning of the political parties' life in Jordan, and before the unification 
of the East and West banks of Jordan in 1950, political parties had been an expression 
of the social structure without any clear ideological programme. Most of the political 
parties' demands focused on independence and development concerns." Therefore, 
the political parties in the Emirate of TJ until 1946 were depended mainly on 
traditional leaders, landowners and tribal leaders (sheikhs) without popular 
participation in these parties. As a result, the political parties lacked practical 
experience and political ideologies, and tended to survive only for short period of 
time. 1 0 0 
Nidam Assaf pointed out in al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyyah al-Urdimiyyah (1992-1994) [The 
Jordanian Political Parties] that party development reflects that of the civil society. 
Consequently, the features of the Jordanian political parties represented the features of 
the country - the Emirate of TJ- that suffered from wide spread illiteracy, poverty, 
colonization, and general backwardness.101 
Khaza'aleh,, al-Musharakah al- Siyasiyyah fi al-Urdun, [Political Participation in Jordan] (1996), 
p. 80 
1 0 0 Al-Zu'bi, al-Murshid ila al-Hizb al-Siyasi [A Guide to the Political Party] (1995), pp 91-92. 
1 0 1 Assaf, al-Ahzab al- Siyasiyyah al-Urduniyyah (1992-1994) [the Jordanian Political Parties (1992-
/ 9949] (1998), p. 26. 
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During this period, the country was under the Mandate rule and political parties were 
formed and exercise their activities without laws regulating them. Despite this, several 
political parties were formed in this period as table 2.2 shows. 
Table 2.2: Jordanian Politica Parties, 1921-1950 
Name of Party Year of 
founding 
Notes 
Jordanian Freedom Party 
Aharar al -Urdun 
1921 Formed by Jordanian intellectuals under the slogan 
'Jordan for the Jordanians' 
Arab Covenant ( al-Ahd al-'Arabi) 1921 Pan Arab nationalists, competing with the 
Independence Party 
Arab Levantine 
Association(Jam'iyyat al-Sharq al-
'Arabi) 
1923 A political association formed by leaders 
(Jam'iyyat al-Sharq al-'Arabi) 
of the Liwa of Ajloun 
People's Party (al-Sha'b) 1927 The first opposition political association 
springing from the local environment 
Executive Committee of the 
National Conference (al-Lajna al-
Tanfiziyya lil-Mu'tamar al-Watani) 
1928 Formed after the first National Conference of 
Jordanian opposition to the treaty with Britain 
Free Moderate Party 
(al-Hurral-Mu'tadil) 
1930 Included traditional leaders; set up to 
combat the opposition 
Jordanian Workers' Party 
(al-'Ummal al-Urduni) 
1931 
Jordanian Solidarity Party 
(al-Tadamon al-Urduni) 
1933 Pro-government 
Association of Jordanian 
Intellectual National Youth 
(Jam'iyyat al-Shabab 
al-Watani al-Urduni al-Muthaqqaf) 
1933 Youth organization, later led political opposition 
Jordanian National Party 
(al-Watani al-Urduni) 
1936 Opposition party established in exile 
(Damascus) 
National Brotherhood Party 
(al-Akha' al-Watani) 
1937 Pro-regime party comprising notables 
and tribal sheikhs 
Executive Committee of the 
National Conference (al-Lajna al-
Tanfiziyya lil-Mu'tamar al-Watani) 
1944 Re-formation of older party, dissolved at 
the end of the year 
Muslim Brotherhood 
(Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) 
1946 Formed by a number of merchants, a branch of the 
mother party in Egypt 
Jordanian Free Youth Association 
(Jama'at al-Shabab al-Ahrar al-
Urduniyyin) 
1946 Opposition group with headquarters in 
Damascus 
Jordanian Arab Party 
(al-'Arabi al-Urduni) 
1946 Opposition party comprising Jordanian 
intellectuals, but did not receive 
licensing from the government 
Arab Revival Party 
(al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya) 
1947 Pro-regime; set up to support Prince 
Abdullah's Greater Syria project 
Jordanian People's Party (al-Sha'b 
al-Urduni) 
1947 Opposition party dissolved after a number of 
months, on the pretext of extremism 
Source: Majid, ziad (ed)., Building Democracy in Jordan.(Stockholm : ArabNGO 
Network for Development and International IDEA, 2005), p.7 
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2.5.1 The First Legislative Council (1929-1931) 
The first legislative elections were held in February 1929, bringing the first 
Legislative Council to power. The Council was composed of 21 members; fourteen of 
the members were elected and five executive councillors were appointed by the Emir 
in addition to the two Bedouin members. This composition of the council made it 
easily influenced by executive control given that five of the members from the 
executive council (non elected members) sit with the elected members, and the Chief 
Minister acted as chairman in Legislative Council meeting. 
The Council was elected to a 3-year term, and would sit in ordinary session for three 
months a year. The powers of the Emir were virtually unlimited, since he could 
dismiss the Chief Minister and his cabinet. Moreover, the Legislative Council had no 
power to propose legislations and could be dismissed by the will of the Emir. 1 0 3 
2.5.1.1 Political Parties' Participation in the First Legislative Council 
On July 25, 1928 the opposition parties convened a National Congress {Al-Mutamar 
Al-Watani) in Amman attended by 150 representatives of all districts, representing 
Syrian Nationalists, tribal leaders, and various notables and thinkers. The Congress 
established an executive committee and agreed to abide by a National Pact (Al-Mithaq 
Al-Watani).m The National Pact declared that the Emirate of TJ is an independent 
sovereign Arab state ruled by Emir Abdullah and his successors. Moreover, the pact 
included many important proposals: 
1. The pact called for direct responsibility of the government to the Legislative 
Council instead of the Emir. 1 0 5 
2. The opposition called for a boycott of the registration for the February 1929 
elections because of its strong opposition to the Anglo-Trans-Jordanian Treaty 
of 1928 and the electoral law which was deemed incompatible with the 
1 0 2 Robins, A history of Jordan (2004), p. 37. 
1 0 3 Robins, (2004), pp. 37, 38 
1 0 4 Aruri( 1972), p. 81 
1 0 5 Aruri( 1972), p. 81 
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principle of representation, especially since the distribution of seats was based 
along ethnic and religious lines. 1 0 6 Voter participation was considered an 
indication of the level of political consciousness. The first elections of 
February 1929 witnessed a very low percentage of voting where only 3% of 
the electorates participated in these elections.1 0 7 
3. The opposition further called for a separation of powers between the executive and 
108 
Legislative Councils in accordance with the constitutions in other countries. 
However, the opposition parties were divided, and five members of the National 
Congress who had opposed the electoral law went back on their attempted boycott and 
decided to run in the elections, and wining five seats. Meanwhile the People's Party 
won one seat and the rest of the seats went to non ideological representatives. 
The members of the National Congress who won seats in the first Legislative Council 
carried on their struggle in the Council and formed the opposition bloc demanding the 
separation of powers and freedom of speech within the Council. 1 0 9 On April 2, 1929 
the Emir summoned an extraordinary session of the Legislative Council and the major 
order of business was to approve the Anglo-Trans-Jordanian agreement which was the 
first confrontation between the opposition members and the government. After 
lengthy debate and under pressure, the Council approved the agreement on June 4, 
1 9 29.iio 
The first crises occurred on February 9, 1931, when the Legislative Council refused to 
approve the annual budget, when the government requested approval for specific 
sums of money to create the desert military force (Qywwat Al-Badiyah). Emir 
Abdullah then dissolved the Legislative Council and explained his decision on the 
basis of lack of cooperation between it and the government."1 The chief minister 
Hassan Khalid Pasha Abu Alhuda who had been the Chief Minister from 1926, 
1 0 6 Amawi, Jordan (1994), p. 261 
1 0 7 Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921 - 1957 (1967), p. 
48. 
1 0 8 Abu Nowar(1989), p. 208. 
1 0 9 Amawi, Jordan (1994), p. 261. 
1 1 0 Abu Nowar(1989), p. 234. 
1 1 1 Aruri(1972), p. 84. 
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resigned and the Emir appointed a new Chief Minster Abdullah al-Sarraj who 
organized a cabinet of ministers composed of three Muslims, one Circassian and one 
Christian."2 
2.5.2 The Second Legislative Council (1931-1934) 
Elections for the second Legislative Council were held on June 1, 1931, with the 
government hoping that the new election would bring more cooperative deputies. The 
results of the election revealed that only four of the sixteen members from the 
previous council were re-elected.113 Moreover, none of the members who had 
previously voted against the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian treaty were elected, and the 
opposition parties' representatives in the previous council vanished from public 
l i f e . 1 1 4 
The second Legislative Council was not as cooperative as the government had hoped, 
and difficulties between the legislative council and the government re-emerged when 
the Council failed to appoint members to the financial, legal and administrative 
committees of the Legislative Council. Subsequently, the legislative council prevented 
the transaction of activities by failing to form a quorum.1 1 5 
The members of the Legislative Council boycotted meetings and called for separation 
between the executive and legislative authorities that led to disagreement between the 
Chief Minister and the Legislative Council. The legislative process was halted. 
Consequently, the Emir dismissed the Chairman of the Executive Council, Abdullah 
al-Saraj and his cabinet and replaced him with Ibrahim Pasha Hashim, as the Chief 
Minister." 6 
1 1 2 Shwadran(1995),p. 176. 
1 1 3 Three tribal shiekhs; Hamad Ben Jazi, Saleh al-Quran and Rfaifan al-Majali; and the Circassian 
leader Said al-Mufti. 
1 1 4 Aruri(1972),p. 84. 
1 . 5 Shwadran (1995), p 182. 
1 . 6 Al-Hurani, Tareikh al-Hayah al-Niyabiyyah fi al-Urdun: 1929-1957 [ The History of Parliamentary 
Life in Jordan: 1929-1957], (1989), p. 23. 
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In August 1933 the Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Jordanian 
People held a congress."7 The main objective of the Congress was "to question the 
authenticity of the Executive Council of the National Congress and refute the 
accusations of land sales to Jewish people"."8 The most important issue presented to 
the second Legislative Council was an amendment to the Organic Law to give the 
Emir more legislative power which weakened the legislature's power. The 
amendment was as follows: " I f the Legislative Council refused to pass any law 
affecting the fulfilment of the treaty obligation, His Highness-in-council shall have 
the power to enact the necessary legislation which shall not be submitted to the 
Legislative Council". 1 1 9 
In 1934, while the second Legislative Council was not in session, the Emir issued a 
decree which provided that no public meeting should be held without permission from 
the Executive Council. This weakened the role of Legislative Council members and 
opposition forces and strengthened the powers of the Executive Council. The second 
Legislative Council completed its full constitutional term on January 31, 1934.120 
2.5.3 The Third Legislative Council (1934-1937) 
Elections for the third Legislative Council were held on October 16, 1934. The Chief 
Minister Ibrahim Pasha Hashim got along with the new council, and the elections 
controlled by the government that led to successes of pro-regime members.121 The 
Council approved the Defence Law of 1935 which provided the Emir with another 
way to serve British interests.122 During the second Council the Government had 
demanded modifications to the 1928 agreement to give some relief, releasing TJ from 
paying for the Resident's staff, and proposing locally recruited armed forces. The 
British Government agreed to these demands two years later in 1939.123 
1 1 7 The Congress was attended by 300 Tribal sheikhs and notables and was led by sheikh Naji al-
Azzam. 
1 1 8 Amawi, Jordan (1994), p. 262. 
1 , 9 Aruri( 1972), p. 86. 
1 2 0Shwadran(1995),pp. 182-184. 
1 2 1 Al-Hurani (1989), p. 24. 
1 2 2 Aruri(1972),p. 87. 
1 2 3 Al-Madi and Al-Musa (1959), pp. 355-357. 
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The Jordanian Solidarity Party (Hizb Al-Tadamun Al-Urduni) was organized on 
March 24, 1933. The party was a coalition of landowners and tribal sheikhs and 
declared itself in favour of the protection of the status of TJ by building mutual 
cooperation between them. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 36 of the Party's 
constitution, the members of the party should be settled in TJ before 1922.124 The 
third Legislative Council completed its full legal life on October 16, 1937. 
2.5.4 The Fourth Legislative Council (1937-1942) 
The fourth Legislative Council was elected on October 16, 1937.1 2 5 In December of 
that year the Council passed a bill amending the Organic Law, limiting the Emir's 
126 
powers to enact legislation while the Council was not in session. In February 1939 
the Palestine conference was held in London, where all important Arab countries were 
represented except for Syria and Lebanon as they were under the French mandate. 
During that conference, negotiations were carried out by the Chief Minister Abu al-
Huda -who represented TJ with Emir Abdullah- and the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm 
Macdonald. As a result the Transjordanian delegation gained a number of 
concessions: The Executive Council was replaced by a Council of Ministers, where 
each Minister was a head of department responsible to the Emir. The second 
concession was the deletion of Article 10 of the 1928 Anglo-Trans-Jordanian 
127 
agreement, which restricted the Emir's power to maintain military forces. 
On September 25, 1937 the Brethren Party {Hizb Al-Ikha' Al-Urduni) was established. 
Its aims were the unity of the Arab countries, and it called for freedom and the 
independence of the country.1 2 8 In the fourth Legislative Council the government of 
Trans-Jordan decided to cooperate with British forces during World War I I , and the 
council approved several amendments to the Organic Law. The fourth Council 
completed its full legal term in October 1940, but the Emir extended the Legislative 
Council for two more years due to the ongoing World War I I . 1 2 9 
1 2 4 Al-Madi and Al-Musa (1959), p. 328. 
1 2 5 Al-Madi and Al-Musa(1959), p. 360. 
1 2 6Shwadran(1995),p. 184. 
1 2 7Shwadran(1995),p. 185. 
1 2 8 Al-Madi and Al-Musa (1959), p. 361. 
1 2 9 Al-Madi and Al-Musa (1959), p. 375 
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2.5.5 The Fifth Legislative Council (1942-1945) 
The election for the Fifth Legislative Council was held in October 20, 1942.1 3 0 The 
most important developments which took place in this council term were the new 
Anglo-Transjordanian treaty which signed on March 22, 1946, ending the British 
mandate and gaining the independence for TJ. 1 3 1 In addition, the Legislative Council 
approved a new constitution on November 28, 1947 which was published in the 
official Gazette on February 1, 1947. 
On May 25, 1946, the Transjordanian Parliament proclaimed the title of King for 
Emir Abdullah, officially changing the name of the country to the Hashemite 
Kingdom of TJ. 1 3 3 The fifth Legislative Council completed its full constitutional term 
on October 20, 1945, but the Emir extended its term for more two years until October 
20, 1947.1 3 4 
2.6 The Era Between 1947-1950: Constitutional Structure and the Jordanian 
Parliament 
The first Jordanian Constitution, the Organic Law, remained in effect from 1928 until 
1946 when Trans -Jordan finally acquired its independence through the Anglo-Trans-
Jordanian Treaty in March of that year.135 Accordingly, a new constitution was 
formulated which provided for two legislative chambers. Moreover, the government 
changed the name of the country to the Hashemite Kingdom of TJ, which was 
changed three years later after the unification of the East and West Banks of the 
Jordan River to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
1 3 0 Al-Hurani (1989), p.25 
1 3 1 Shwadran (1995), p. 240. 
1 3 2 http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/governmentl .html 
1 3 3 Sinai and Pollack (ed), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank (1977),p. 26 
1 3 4 http://www.parliament.gov.jo/ummah/history_a.htm 
1 3 5 Text of the Anglo-Tran Jordanian Treaty in Davis (1947), pp.333-338. 
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2.6.1 The 1946 Constitution 
The government published the new constitution on February 1, 1947. It was 
composed of seven parts and seventy-nine Articles. 1 3 6 This constitution adopted the 
principle of two houses a parliament {Majlis Al-Ummah) consisting of an elected 
Council of Representatives {Majlis Al-Nuwab) comprising 20 members to be elected 
for four years. The second house, the Council of Notables {Majlis Al-A 'ayan) 
comprised 10 members appointed by the King for an eight year term, arranged so that 
their number should not exceed one half that of the Council of Representatives.137 The 
King's powers in the 1946 constitution were stated in Article 26: 
• The King is Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Army, and Air force. 
• The King declares war, and concludes treaties with the agreement of the 
Council of Ministers. 
• The King issues orders for the holding of elections to the Council of 
Representatives, summons the National Assembly, opens it, adjourns it, 
prorogues it, and dissolves it in accordance with the provisions of the law. 
Part three of the 1946 constitution dealt with the Jordan Legislative Branch and its 
powers. According to Article 33 legislative powers were shared by the King and the 
National Assembly "The legislative power is vested in the National Assembly and the 
King. The National Assembly consists of the Council of Notables and the Council of 
Representatives elected in accordance with the Electoral Law, which shall have regard 
to the proper Representation of minorities. The duration of the Council of 
Representatives shall be four years." The 1946 constitution did not rise to national 
expectations as it failed to make the Executive Cabinet responsible to the Legislature, 
but kept governmental responsibility to the King as heretofore in the Organic Law. 
1 3 6 Shwadran(1995), p. 241 
1 3 7 Text of the 1947 Constitution in Khalil, The Arab State and the Arab League; Constitutional 
Developments (1962), pp. 43-53. 
1 3 8 Abu Jabir, The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan, in Ismael, Y.T and Ismael, J.S (edit), Politics and 
Government in the Middle East and North Africa (1991), p. 243. 
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2.6.2 The Electoral Law, 1947 
The Chamber of Deputies' Electoral Law was issued on April 5, 1947.1 3 9 The 
Jordanian Electoral System was then based on the proportional representation, and 
provided for the election of Muslims and deputies from the minority communities of 
Christian, Bedouin tribes, Chechen, and Circassians140 (see table 2.3). According to 
Article 18 of the Electoral Law the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan was divided into nine 
electoral districts: 
1. Amman District (the Qada of Amman), including the Qasabat1 4'of Jerash 
and Madaba. 
2. Al-Salat District (the Qada of al-Salt). 
3. Madaba District (the Qada of Madaba excluding the Qasabat of Madaba). 
4. Irbid District (the Qada of Irbid including the Qasabat of Ajlun). 
5. Ajlun District (the Qada of Ajlun excluding the Qasabat of Ajlun). 
6. Jerash District (the Qada of Jerash excluding The Qasabat of Jerash). 
7. Al-Karak District (the Qada of Karak). 
8. Al-Tafileh District (the Qada of Tafileh). 
9. Ma'an District (the Liwa of Ma'an). 
1 3 9 Text of the Chamber of Deputies' Electoral Law in Davis (1947), pp. 253-262. 
1 4 0 Abu Jabir, The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan (1991), pp. 242-243 
1 4 1 Qada, Qasabat and Liwa are administrative divisions in Jordan. 
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Table 2.3: Distribution of the Seats in the Legislative Council According to the 
Electoral Law, 1947 
District Muslims Muslim 
Circassian 
Christian Total 
Amman 2 2 1 5 
Al-Salat 1 - 1 2 
Madaba 1 - - 1 
Irbid 2 - 1 3 
Ajlun 1 - - 1 
Jerash 1 - - 1 
Al-Karak 2 - 1 3 
Al-Tafileh 1 - - 1 
Ma'an 1 - - 1 
Total 12 2 4 18 
The number of seats of the Bedouins under this Electoral Law remained the same as 
stated in Article 16 of the 1928 Electoral Law. The Bedouins were to be represented 
by two deputies, one from the Bedouins of the North and the other from those 
Bedouins of the South. The seats were filled in two stages. In the first stage the King 
appointed two committees with each consisting of ten Sheikhs. In the second stage 
each committee nominated one representative to sit in the Council of Representatives. 
Article 31 explained the representation process for the Bedouins in Jordan as 
follows:" His Majesty the King shall by proclamation published in the official Gazette 
appoint from the Bedouins of the North and the Bedouins of the South respectively 
two commissions each composed of ten Sheikhs, and each commission elects one 
member." 
2.6.2.1 The First House of Representatives, 1947 - 1950 
The elections for the first House of Representatives were held on October 20, 1947. 
Only independents and the pro-government Revival Party (Hizb al-Nahda) ran in 
these elections, because this was the only legal party at the time, and the other 
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opposition parties were banned.142 The Revival Party was established by the 
government on May 7, 1947 to support King Abdullah's plan for Great Syria. The 
Revival candidates won four of 20 seats, and the rest of the seats had gone to the 
independent candidates.143 
In 1947 there were 100,000 registered voters in TJ about sixty percent of these cast 
their ballots. The first House of Representatives was the same as the previous Council 
and was composed of land-owners, and tribal leaders.144 In May 1948 the first Arab 
Israel war occurred after Israel proclaimed itself an independent state on May 14. 
Following this declaration, armies from Egypt, Syria, TJ, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and 
Iraq entered Palestine and clashed with Israel forces. In December 1, 1948 after the 
Arab-Israeli War ended, King Abdullah annexed the West Bank and declared himself 
King of Jordan both West and East Banks. 1 4 5 
The first Council of Representatives was dissolved on February 1, 1950, prior to the 
completion of its legal term in order to arrange for the holding of new elections 
following the unification of the East and West Banks. As a result of the annexation of 
the West Bank an amendment to the Electoral Law was issued on December 13, 1949 
in order to double the number of seats from twenty to forty seats to cover both banks 
of the Jordan.146 
2.7 The Constitutional Structure and Jordanian Parliaments From 1950 - 1974 
Two important events took place in the early 1950s. The first was the formal union 
between the two banks of the Jordan on April 24, 1950, when King Abdullah 
extended his control and influence throughout TJ, Jerusalem and the West Bank. 1 4 7 
The second event was the assassination of King Abdullah on July 20, 1951, as a result 
of his policies which were strongly opposed by the Palestinians. There were several 
grounds for this opposition, the most important of which were his annexation of West 
l 4 2Shwadran(1995),p. 241 
1 4 3 Arur i ( 1972), p. 93. 
1 4 4 Lanczowski, The middle East in World Affairs (1980),p.478 
1 4 5 Sinai and Pollack (1977), p. 27. 
1 4 6 Abu Jabir, The Jordanian Parliaments (1972), p. 92. 
1 4 7 Aruri(1972), p. 89. 
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Bank, in addition to his engagement in secret negotiations with the Zionist leaders for 
a treaty, and his acceptance of the UN partition Resolution.148 
These two events contributed to the initiation of the political liberalization process in 
Jordan following the independence. The unification between the two banks and the 
annexation of Palestine, with its well-developed middle class, led to an increase the 
effect of West Bank opinion on Jordanian politics. Moreover, the assassination of 
King Abdullah led to a transfer the power from the King to the Palace as a group.1 4 9 
2.7.1 The 1952 Constitution 
Following the assassination of King Abdullah, his son Talal ascended the throne on 
September 6, 1951. Although the reign of King Talal was short,150 he was responsible 
for the formation of a new liberalised constitution that made the government 
responsible to Parliament.151 The new Constitution -the one in current use today- was 
promulgated in the official Gazette on January 1, 1952 to replace the 1946 
Constitution.152 The 1952 Constitution composed of nine Chapters with 131 Articles, 
and avoided the provisions of the 1947 Constitution that had been subjected to 
criticism, including the provisions that made the Cabinet responsible to the King and 
not to parliament and those denying parliamentary control over financial policy. 
Chapter one relates to the State and System of Government. Article 1 declares that the 
country is an independent Arab State and the people of Jordan form a part of the Arab 
Nation. Moreover it stipulates that Jordan is a hereditary monarchy with a 
parliamentary form of government. However, the 1952 Constitution also contains 
most important principles concerning respect for human rights and basic freedoms. 
These are as follows: 
Al-khazendar, Jordan and the Palestinian Question: The Role of the Islamic and Left Forces in 
Foreign Policy-Making (1997), p.4 
1 4 9 Aruri(1972), p. 89. 
1 5 0 Until September 1952. 
1 5 1 Al-Madi and AJ-Musa (1959), p. 539. 
1 5 2 Text of the 1952 Constitution in http://ww\v.kinghussein.gov. io/constitution_io.html. (The 
Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, January 1, 1952. pp. 5-68. 
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• The principle of separation between authorities: 
This Constitution adopted the principle of a separation between the executive 
legislative and judicial authorities. The constitution established that there would be a 
need for cooperation and coordination between the Legislative and the executive, but 
it gave parliament the right to oversee the government performance. The new 
constitution adopted more democratic principles based on the government's 
responsibility to the Council of Representative which should approve the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet. Moreover, parliament had some authority to regulate or 
approve budgetary issues (Article 51). 
• The balance of power between the authorities: 
One of the most important improvements in the current constitution is the authority 
granted to the Representative Council to dismiss the Cabinet or a Minister by a two-
thirds vote of no confidence. Article 53 states the following: "(i) A motion of no 
confidence in the Council of Ministers or in any Minister may be raised by the 
Chamber of Deputies, (ii) I f the Chamber of Deputies casts a vote of no confidence in 
the Council of Ministers by an absolute majority of all its members, the Council of 
Ministers shall resign, (iii) I f the vote of no confidence concerns an individual 
Minister, he shall resign his office." 1 5 3 But the King still has the power to appoint and 
dismiss the Prime Minister, dissolve the Representative Council and appoint the 
members of the Council of Notables. 
• The Constitutional guarantees of equality and political freedom 
Chapter Two of the constitution outlines the rights and duties of Jordanians, "(i) 
Jordanians shall be equal before the law. There shall be no discrimination between 
them as regards to their rights and duties on grounds of race, language or religion, (ii) 
The Government shall ensure work and education within the limits of its possibilities, 
and it shall ensure a state of tranquillity and equal opportunities to all 
Article 53 was amended on April 17, 1954. 
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Jordanians."154 Article 16 of the Constitution stipulates the rights of Jordanians to hold 
meetings and form societies and political parties"(i) Jordanians shall have the right to 
hold meetings within the limits of the law. (ii) Jordanians are entitled to establish 
societies and political parties provided that the objects of such societies and parties are 
lawful, their methods peaceful, and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the 
Constitution, (iii) The establishment of societies and political parties and the control 
of their resources shall be regulated by law". 1 5 5 
• The principle of sovereignty of the nation 
In the Organic Law and the 1946 Constitution the sovereignty was concentrated in the 
hands of the Council of Ministers and the King. However, according to the new 
constitution, sovereignty is transferred to parliament. Chapter Three of the 
constitution defines the power of the State; Article 24 defines the people as the source 
of all powers. Articles 25 and 26 define the powers of the legislature and executive; 
legislative powers are vested in the King and the National Assembly, and executive 
power is vested in the King who exercising his powers through his Council of 
Ministers. 
• The Parliament has the right to propose laws 
The new constitution gave ten of Deputies or Senators the power to propose 
legislations: "(i) Any ten or more Senators or Deputies may propose any law. Such 
proposal shall be referred to the committee concerned in the House for its views. I f 
the House is of the opinion that the proposal be accepted it shall refer it to the 
Government for drafting it in the form of draft law, and to submit it to the House 
either during the same session or at the following session.156 (ii) Any law proposed by 
Senators or Deputies in accordance with the preceding paragraph and rejected by 
either House shall not be presented for a second time during the same session".157 
1 5 4 Constitution, 1952 Article 6. 
1 5 5 Constitution, 1952 Article 16. 
1 5 6 As amended in the Official Gazette No. 1380 of 4/5/1958. 
1 5 7 Constitution, 1952, Article 95. 
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2.7.1.1 The Government in the 1952 Constitution (The Executive Branch) 
• The King 
Chapter Four of the Constitution is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the 
king's powers and rights, and declaring that the King is the head of the State, the head 
of the government and the commander of the armed forces (Articles 30, 32). The King 
exercises executive authority by appointing the Prime Minister and his cabinet 
according to the Prime Minister's recommendation. Furthermore, the King has the 
right to dismiss the Prime Minister and his cabinet or accept their resignation. 
According to Article 34, which was amended on November 10, 1974, and Article 36 
of the Constitution, the King issues orders for the holding of elections to the Council 
of Representatives, and he has the right to dissolve the Council. Moreover, he 
appoints the Senators and the speaker of the Council of Notables, and he has the 
power to dissolve it or relieve any Senator of his membership according to the 
amendment of Article 34. Although the 1952 Constitution stipulates that the King 
should approve laws before they can take effect (Article 31), it limits his power of 
veto by giving parliament the power to override his veto by a two-thirds majority of 
both houses of parliament (Article 93 Section IV). 
• The Executive 
Part two of Chapter Four deals with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, The King 
appoints the Prime Minister who organizes the Council of Ministers according to 
interest or general need, to be appointed by the King (Article 41). Articles 51 to 56 
specify the accountability of the Council of Ministers before the Chamber of 
Deputies. The Constitution made the Prime Minister and his Cabinet collectively 
accountable and answerable to the Chamber of Deputies and not to the King, as 
Article 28a of the previous Constitution stated. Article 51 states that: "The Prime 
Minister and Ministers shall be collectively responsible before the Chamber of 
Deputies in respect of the public policy of the State. In addition, each Minister shall 
Constitution, 1952, Article 35. 
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be responsible before the Chamber of Deputies in respect of the affairs of his 
Ministry." 
On the other hand, in cases that parliament is dissolved or is not sitting the Council of 
Ministers with the approval of the King has the power to issue temporary legislations 
(provisional laws) which has the force of law. However, the constitution specifies the 
conditions that should be met before enacting these temporary laws and this 
lawmaking should take place only when concerning urgent matters. Article 94 1 5 9 
Section 1 of the Jordanian Constitution states that :"(I) In cases where the National 
Assembly is not sitting or is dissolved, the Council of Ministers has, with the approval 
of the King, the power to issue provisional laws covering matters which require 
necessary measures which admit of no delay or which necessitate expenditures 
incapable of postponement. Such provisional laws, which shall not be contrary to the 
provisions of the Constitution, shall have the force of law, provided that they are 
placed before the Assembly at the beginning of its next session, and the Assembly 
may approve or amend such laws. In the event of the rejection of such provisional 
laws, the Council of Ministers shall, with the approval of the King, immediately 
declare their nullity, and from the date of such declaration these provisional laws shall 
cease to have force provided that such nullity shall not affect any contracts or 
acquired rights." 
2.7.1.2 The Legislature in the 1952 Constitution 
Chapter five of the Constitution deals with the legislative powers and the National 
Assembly. The National Assembly is comprised of two Houses, the House of 
Notables {Majlis Al-A 'yan) and the House of Deputies {Majlis Al-Nuwab). While the 
members of the House of Deputies are directly elected by secret ballot in general 
elections for a four-year term, the Notables are appointed by the King, when their the 
number should not exceed half that of the lower house. 
Legislative powers are shared by the King and Parliament. The King has extensive 
lawmaking powers in that he appoints the Notables, signs and executes all laws, and 
Article 94 was amended on May 4, 1958. 
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can postpones parliamentary elections (Articles 31, 93). Legislative power rests in the 
bicameral National Assembly. Both Houses of Parliament have the power to initiate 
discussions, reviews, proposals, and the enactment of legislations. Furthermore, the 
new Constitution gave parliament the power to discuss and approve the annual budget 
where it might reduce and suggest expenditure.160 
The process of lawmaking in the 1952 Constitution is explained in Articles from 91 to 
96. The process starts by referring proposals from the Prime Minister to the House of 
Deputies, where the deputies have the power to accept, amend or reject them. I f the 
House of Deputies accepts the proposals, it refers them to the government to draft 
them in the form of a bill and to return them back to the House for approval. 
A bill is passed on to the House of Notables for debate and a vote. Then i f the bill is 
approved by both councils it should be submitted to the King to ratify it, or he might 
return it with justifications for his refusal. In this case both Houses should hold joint 
meeting to pass the bill by a two-thirds majority, where upon it becomes 
constitutionally in act and effective. 1 6 1 
2.7.2 Jordanian Parliaments and Parties Participation (1950 to 1974). 
This stage of Jordan's parliamentary life witnessed the unification between the West 
and East Banks of the Jordan River. Thereafter, political life was influenced by the 
presence of many political parties that helped to make the parliamentary life more 
effective. In the field of political reform Jordan during this stage had moved forward 
and entered an important stage of implementation; achieve separation between the 
authorities and made the government accountable to Parliament. 
This period began after the announcement of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan's 
independence followed by the unification of the East and West banks of Jordan in 
1950, in addition to the 1948 war and the establishment of the state of Israel. These 
events led to significant changes in Jordan's population as a result of the arrival of 
Constitution, Article 112 Section 4 
1 6 1 Constitution, Article 93 
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Palestinians which affected Jordan's politics, demographics, socioeconomics and its 
cultural life. 
This period witnessed a new and important stage of political reforms. Indeed, a new 
constitution was created in 1952 that adopted various democratic principles and stated 
the right of citizens to set up and join political parties162, and this was confirmed by 
the passing of the first Political Parties Law of 1955. In the 1950s and as a result of 
the political events and challenges that the Arab world had passed through such as the 
loss of Palestine and issues concerning liberation from the oppression of colonialism, 
the emergence of Communist parties and other socialist movements was observed 
throughout the world. 1 6 3 Jordanian political life then witnessed the birth of many 
ideological trends and the formation of nationalist, religious and leftist parties,164 as 
table 2.4 shows. 
Table 2.4: Jordanian Political Parties, 1950-1956 
National Front Hizb Al Jabha al-Wataniyya 
Jordanian Communist 
Party 
Hizb Al Shiyu'i al-Urduni 
Arab Baath Party Hizb Al Ba'th al 'Arabi 
Liberation Party Hizb Al Tahrir 
National Union Party Hizb Al Ittihad al-Watani 
National Front Hizb Al Jabha al-Wataniyya) 
Arab Nationalist Party Hizb Al Qawmiyya al 'Arabi 
Syrian Nationalist Party Hizb Al Qawmi al-Suri 
National Socialist Party Hizb Al Watani al-Ishtiraki 
National Party Hizb Al Umma) 
Arab Constitutional Party Hizb Al 'Arabi al Dusturi) 
Source: Majid, (ed.), (2005), p. 75 
See Article 16 of the Jordanian constitution. Text of the 1952 Constitution on 
http://www.kinghussein.gov.io/constitution_io.html 
1 6 3 Majid Ziad (ed), (2005). P. 16 
1 6 4 Al-Abdullat, Kharitat al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyyah al-Urduniyyah [Map of the Jordanian Political 
Parties], (1992), p.20. 
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All of the parties established in this phase were influenced by the unification of the 
two banks of the Jordan, which created a new national reality, and new Jordanian-
Palestinian relations. In addition, those Jordanian students who had returned from 
their studies in Soviet Union, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq often held Communist, 
Nassirist and Ba'athist ideologies. Consequently, the country moved towards a 
restructuring of civil society based on increasing and reactivated political 
participation.165 
The most remarkable event which occurred in this phase was the 1956 parliamentary 
elections, which were the freest and fairest elections Jordan had experienced since its 
independence.166 In addition to the seats that gained by opposition political parties, the 
elections saw the formation of the government of Suleiman Nabulsi 1956-1957167, 
which was the first, and to date the only left-wing government in Jordan's history. Al -
Nabulsi promised during his government to enact more liberalizing legislation relating 
to the political parties, freedoms and the press.168 
2.7.2.1 The Second Chamber of Deputies, 1950 - 1951 
After the unification between the East and West Banks of Jordan, an amendment to 
the electoral law was issued to reflect the new demographic development, and the 
number of lower house seats was increased from twenty to forty seats divided equally 
between the two banks. The first election after the unification was held on April 20, 
1950, and this election was free and fair in comparison with the previous elections.1 6 9 
Five political parties competed in this election although they were not officially 
recognized. Three of them were opposition parties and had most support in the West 
Bank, and the two were pro-regime parties based in the East Bank. 1 7 0 The opposition 
parties won fourteen seats while the pro-regime parties won ten seats and 
independents took the rest (see table 2.5). 
Naqrash, al-Tajribah al-Hizbiyyah ft al-Urdun {The Partial Experience in Jordan] (1991), p. 51. 
Abu Jabir, The Jordanian Parliaments (1972), p. 105. 
Assaf(1994),p. 30. 
Aruri(1972), p. 134. 
Abu Jabir. The Jordanian Parliaments. (1972), p-p. 92-98. 
Aruri(1972), pp. 93-94. 
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Table 2.5: Distribution of Seats in the Second Parliament 1950. 
The political Party Number of seats 
The Jordanian Communist Party 2 
The National Front Party 10 
The Jordanian Resurrection Party 2 
The Arab Constitutional Party 8 
The Community Party 2 
Independent candidates 16 
Source: Aruri, N.H., Jordan: A Study in Political Development 1921 -1965, (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1972), p.94 
On April 24, 1950, the Houses of Deputies and Notables adopted in a joint session a 
Resolution for complete unity between the East Bank and the West Bank and 
Jerusalem. The resolution declared: "First, its support for complete unity between the 
two sides of the Jordan and their union into one State, which is the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, at whose head reign King Abdullah Ibn al Husain, on a basis of 
constitutional representative government and equality of the rights and duties of all 
citizens".171 
The 1950s elections showed a considerable evolution of the political parties through 
their effective role in the legislative council to realize their objectives. The political 
parties' objectives at that time included: amendment of thel947 constitution so as to 
be more democratic, rejection of the annexation between two banks, which was not 
generally approved, and a refusal of British military and financial support and a call 
for Arab aid as an alternative.172 
On May 3, 1951, the King dismissed Parliament after the 1951/52 budget crisis.1 7 3 
During the debate in parliament in a joint session of both houses, the deputies refused 
to approve the new budget which was the first to cover both banks as two-thirds of the 
1 7 1 Shwadran(1995),pp.296-297. 
1 7 2 Amawi, Jordan (1994), p. 263. 
1 7 3 The King explained his decision on the basis of lack of cooperation between the legislative and 
executive powers. 
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proposed expenditures were dedicated to the Arab Legion and other defence costs.174 
Consequently, King Abdullah dissolved Parliament and announced new elections 
within three months in both banks. Moreover, the King promised to revise the 
Constitution to make the government accountable to Parliament instead of to the 
2.7.2.2 The Third Chamber of Deputies, 1951 - 1954 
The third Chamber of Deputies was elected on August 29, 1951. The main objectives 
after the dissolution of the second Parliament, was to have a new Parliament with less 
bothersome and more cooperative legislators. But King Abdullah was assassinated six 
weeks before the new elections, which completely change the significance of these 
elections.176 
The results of the 1951 elections revealed that there was little difference between the 
third Parliament's structure and the Parliament that had been dismissed. More than 
half (twenty three out of forty) of the previous Council were re-elected, and no 
changes occurred in terms of the political parties' representation. 1 7 7 
The 1951 elections witnessed a high representation of East Bank (60%) compared to 
West Bank deputies (35%), which reflected the progression of political background of 
the Transjordanians. Furthermore, 1951 witnessed a voter turnout of 37% in the East 
Bank (58% of the total vote's cast) despite the lack of participation among Amman's 
citizens, whereas only 30% voted in the West Bank. 1 7 8 
The same political parties that had competed in the previous election ran in the 1951 
elections. Only two parties won more than two seats in the lower house; the National 
Socialist and the Ba'ath parties (see table 2.6). 
1 7 4 Satloff From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (1994), pp. 10-11. 
1 7 5 Shwadran (1995), pp. 308-309. 
1 7 6 Satloff (1994), p. 33. 
1 7 7 Satloff (1994), p. 35. 
1 7 8 Satloff (1994), P. 35 
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Table 2.6: Distribution of Seats in the Third Parliament 1951, by Parties 
The Political Party Number of Seats 
National socialist Party 11 
Communist Party 2 
Resurrection Party 3 
Community Party 1 
Arab Constitutional Party 9 
Independent candidates 14 
Source: Abu Jabir, The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A Study in 
Political Development, in Muslim World, Vol. LVI I I , Nos. 3-4, July-October 1969, p. 
231 
The third Parliament immediately started to press for the fulfilment of King 
Abdullah's promise to revise the Constitution. In January 1952 the opposition 
achieved its goal and a new Constitution was issued. This was one of the highlights of 
King Talal's rule. 1 7 9 On August 11, 1952, King Hussein was proclaimed King of 
Jordan at the age of 16 years old. Because he was under the legal age, a Regency 
Council 1 8 0 was appointed which ruled until he ascended the throne in May 1953.181 
On June 22, 1954, the third Parliament was dissolved due to its opposition to the 
government's strategy, and the government explained the dissolution in terms of the 
lack of co-operation with the executive.182 
On August 16, 1954, after the third Parliament had been dissolved and before the 
formation of a new Parliament, the government issued new Defence Regulations 
empowering the authority of the Ministry of Interior to ban political meetings, and to 
suspend any newspaper without any explanations.183 
I 7 y Aruri(1972), p. 104 
1 8 0 The Regency Council was composed of Ibrahim Hashem, Sulayman Tuqan, and Abd al-Rahman al-
Rashidat. 
1 8 1 Kostiner (Ed), Middle East Monarchies (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2000), p. 98. 
1 8 2 Abu Jabir, The Jordanian Parliaments. (1972), p. 104 
1 8 3 Aruri(1972), p. 111. 
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2.7.2.3 The Fourth Chamber of Deputies, 1954 - 1956 
The elections for the fourth Chamber of Deputies were held on October 17, 1954.184 
The 1954 election results were positive for the government, and only 50% of 
members in the dissolved Chamber were re-elected. For instance, the National 
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Socialist Party won only two seats whereas it had eleven in the third Parliament. 
The 1954 elections were characterized by widespread violence, and the government 
tightened its control on the opposition parties. Moreover, the government used the 
military army to cast ballots in support of government candidates, and they voted in 
their own camps instead of voting at polling booths.186 Accordingly the results were 
favourable to the government and the opposition parties' representation in the fourth 
council was smaller than in the third Council see table 2.7. 
In Jordan: A State of Tension, Shwadran pointed out that the political parties 
withdrew from these elections alleging that the government was interfering in the 
electoral process. Demonstrations were held, and fourteen persons were killed and 
127 injured in these clashes.187 
Table 2.7: Distribution of Seats in the Fourth Parliament 1954, by Parties 
Political Party Number of seats 
National socialist Party 1 
Communist Party 2 
Resurrection Party (Ba'ath) 0 
Community Party 0 
Arab Constitutional Party 17 
Muslim Brethrenhood 4 
Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir) 1 
Independent candidates 15 
Source: Abu Jabir, The Legislature of the -lashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A Study in 
Political Development (1969), p. 23 
Abu Jabir, The Jordanian Parliaments. (1972), p. 104. 
Aruri (1972), p. 112. 
Satloff(1994), p. 96. 
Shwadran (1995), p. 323. 
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The results revealed that the Constitutional Party won Seventeen seats while two of 
the opposition parties were left without representation. On November 8, 1954, the 
government submitted a ministerial statement to obtain a vote of confidence in 
parliament. The Council of Deputies voted overwhelmingly in favour of the 
government, and the no confidence motion received three votes from the National 
Socialist and the Communist Deputies. In the previous Council, eighteen deputies 
voted for no confidence in the same government.188 
During the fourth parliamentary period, Iraq signed a mutual defence treaty with 
Turkey in February 1955. Called the Baghdad Pact it was supported by Britain and 
was formed as part of the Cold War to undertake political and military action to face 
the Soviet threat in the Middle East. Jordan was encouraged to join this pact, but pro-
Nasser elements and Syria refused and many demonstrations were held to condemn 
it. The King dissolved the fourth Parliament on June 26, 1956, and the government 
announced that Jordan did not intend to join Baghdad pact.1 9 0 
2.7.2.4 The Fifth Chamber of Deputies, 1956-1957 
The election for the f if th Chamber of Deputies was held on October 21, 1956. The 
1956 election was the freest and fairest Jordan had experienced since its 
independence. Moreover, the government created a degree of political liberalization 
so that main issues could be discussed in preparation for the elections. 1 9 1 
The political party candidates captured twenty-six of forty seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies. The National Socialists under the leadership of Suleiman Nabulsi won 
eleven seats and became the major party in the fifth Council see table 2.8. The King 
subsequently assigned the chairman of the National Socialist although he had not won 
a seat in Parliament to form a new government.192 Three political parties were 
1 8 8 Aruri ( l972) , p. 113. 
1 8 9 http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/middle_east/2801487.stm. 
1 9 0 Abu Jabir, The Jordanian Parliaments (1972), p. 105. 
1 9 1 Aruri (1972), p. 134. 
1 9 2 Aruri (1972), p. 134. 
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represented in the Nabulsi government, which had seven National Socialist ministers, 
a Ba'athist, a communist, and two independents.193 
Table 2.8: Distribution of Seats in the Fifth Parliament 1956, by Parties 
The Political Party The number of seats 
National Socialist Party 11 
Communist Party 3 
Resurrection Party(Ba'ath) 2 
Arab Constitutional Party 4 
Community Party (al-Umma) 1 
Muslim Brethrenhood 4 
Liberation Party ( al-Tahreer) 1 
Independent candidates 14 
Source: Abu Jabir. The Legislature of the lashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A Study in 
Political Development, (1969), p. 231. 
The election results revealed that the opposition parties were victorious (The National 
Socialist, Communist, Muslim Brethren and the Ba'ath parties). On the other hand the 
Arab Constitutional Party (pro-regime party) won four seats, whereas it had seventeen 
in the former Council. In November 1956 during the fifth parliament, the opposition 
parties recommended the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and British 
financial subsidies.194 
Accordingly, a new agreement was signed in January 19, 1957, between Jordan, 
Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia which stipulated financial aid to Jordan to replace 
British aid. 1 9 5 The Nabulsi government fulfilled most of its manifest to promises 
including an open and free political environment, and termination of the Anglo-
Jordanian treaty on March 15, 1957. Al-Nabulsi announced that the country would 
build diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and communist China.1 9 6 
Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of the Arab Radicalism: Jordan, J 955- 1967 (1989), p. 41. 
Britain was the main financial source to Jordan. 
Shwadran (1995), pp. 242-243. 
Aruri(1972), pp. 135-136. 
66 
The King was dissatisfied with the al-Nabulsi government's relations with 
Communist regimes. For that reason, on February 2, 1957, the King issued an open 
197 198 
letter to al-Nabulsi warning him against the danger of communist infiltration. On 
April 10, 1957, the King asked al-Nabulsi to resign from office. 1 9 9 After the Jordanian 
parliament was dissolved and the Nabulsi government was dismissed, clashes between 
the government and the parties developed. Therefore, all political parties were 
outlawed and the government banned party activity. In addition to this, the 
government imposed the martial law, and froze the Political Parties' Law. The latter 
measure lasted until 1992 when a new law was issued which repealed the law of 
1955.2 0 0 
In the long run these laws led to a political vacuum within the community and made 
the monarchy as the sole concern for its loyalty. 2 0 1 Political life in Jordan entered an 
unprecedented period of repression, leading the political parties to work 
underground.202 Voting for political party candidates in 1950, 1951, and 1954 
elections had not been extensive. The parties' candidates had received less than 20% 
of the total popular vote, as table 2.9 shows, which reflects the lack of confidence in 
elections in general and in political parties in particular, who did not represent the 
voters' political, social, and economic aspirations. However, voting patterns were 
different at the 1956 elections, and in particular the national socialist and communist 
candidates obtained noticeable proportions of the votes. 
1 9 7 For full text of King Hussein's open letter see Hussein, King of Jordan, Uneasy Lies the Head, 
(London: Heinemann, 1962), pp. 159-160. 
1 9 8 Aruri(1972), p. 138. 
1 9 9 Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study; 1948-1957 (1965), pp.160-162. 
2 0 0 Abidi. (1965), p. 30. 
2 0 1 Salloukh(1996): pp. 37-65. 
2 0 2 Kilani, (editor), 2001. The National Integrity Systems, Country Study Report: Jordan 2001, p. 7 
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Table 2.9 Number and Percentage of Votes for all Party Candidates: 1950s 
Election 
1950 Elections 1951 Elections 1954 Elections 
Party No of 
votes 
Total 
votes % 
No of 
votes 
Total 
votes % 
No of 
votes 
Total 
votes % 
No of 
votes 
Total 
votcs% 
Ba'th 5,061 1.6 21,120 6.2 10,474 2.3 34,00 8.4 
Socialist 
Nationalists 
- - - - 29,427 6.6 72,467 17.9 
Communists - - 37,902 11.05 21,250 4.8 51,398 12.7 
Nation Party - - - 17,113 3.8 — 
Arab 
Constitutional 
Party 
32,083 7.9 
Liberation 
Party 
- - 3,596 1.04 6,920 1.6 6,130 1.5 
Muslim 
Brotherhood 
- - - - - - 33,518 8.3 
Total voters 304,000 342,714 445,928 405,000 
Total votes for 
party 
candidates % 
1.6 18.29 19.1 56.7 
Source: Lust-Okar, Ellen M , The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or 
Reality?, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Nov., 2001), p. 
5 
2.7.2.5 The Sixth Chamber of Deputies, 1961-1962 
On October 22, 1961, elections to the sixth Jordanian Parliament were held. However, 
political parties were not permitted to participate, and the government disallowed any 
candidate from standing as representative of political party. The 1961 election 
witnessed a lack of participation by the electorate, with a voter turnout of about ten 
percent.203 
Abu Jabir, The Jordanian Parliaments, (1972), p. 109 
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On January 28, 1962, Wasfi al-Tall was appointed as Prime Minister. "Wasfi al-Tall 
was the most controversial figure in the history of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
His supporters believed he was Jordan's greatest statesman, whose first government in 
Uriel Dann's words marked the birth of modern Jordan."204 Wasfi al-Tall formed a 
new Cabinet of Ministers who had not served before as ministers, and only one of 
them had been a deputy in Parliament. His government was composed of educated 
and professionals members (Technocratic government).205 However, although the 
sixth parliament was unpopular, the government was very progressive, and 
consequently the Prime Minister took steps to offer substance to the parliamentary 
system and persuaded the King to dissolve Parliament as it was not representative of 
Jordanians and had been elected under repressive conditions. In response, the sixth 
Parliament was dissolved on October 1, 1962. 2 0 6 
2.7.2.6 The Seventh Chamber of Deputies, 1962-1963 
The elections to the Seventh Parliament were held in November 24, 1962. Voter 
turnout was estimated to be around seventy percent of the 450,000 registered voters 
and 166 candidates ran for the seventh parliamentary elections. Most candidates were 
independents because political parties were again banned and did not compete in these 
elections. Fifty nine percent of parliamentary seats were captured by representatives 
running for the first time. 2 0 7 
The seventh Parliament did not complete its constitutional period and was dissolved 
on April 21, 1963 due to lack of cooperation between the two authorities and as a 
result of a vote of no confidence in Samir al-Rifai's government.208 The seventh 
Parliament was the first parliament in the history of Jordan to force the government to 
resign when the parliament voted no confidence in the al-Rifai cabinet to replace the 
government of the nationalist Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tall. 2 0 9 
2 0 4 Tal, Friend or Foe, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.25, No. 1. (Autumn, 1995), pp. 110-112. 
2 0 5 Robins (2004), pp. 108-109. 
2 0 6 Dann, King Hussein and the challenge of the Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955- 1967 (1989), p. 122. 
2 0 7 Aruri(1972), p. 179. 
2 0 8 Abu Jabir, The Jordanian Parliaments, in Jacob M. Landau (ed), Man State and Society in the 
Contemporary Middle East (1972), pp. 109-110. 
2 0 9 Aruri (1972), p. 180. 
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2.7.2.7 The Eighth Chamber of Deputies, 1963-1966 
On July 8, 1963, the eighth Parliament was elected. Only twenty deputies of the 
former Council were re-elected, while most of those who had voted for no confidence 
in the previous government were not re-elected in the eighth council. The eighth 
Parliament did not complete its constitutional term and the King dissolved it on 
December 22, 1966 after demonstrations that followed Israeli operations in the West 
Bank village of Sammu in November 1966. 
2.7.2.8 The Ninth Chamber of Deputies, 1967 
The elections for the ninth Chamber of Deputies were held on April 18, 1967, and it 
completed its constitutional term in April 1971, but was extended several times as a 
result of political conditions and Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The 1967 
elections were held two months prior to the Six-Day War with Israel that started on 
June 4, 1967 which resulted in Israel capturing the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East 
Jerusalem from Jordan. As a result, new elections could not be held in Jordan and 
parliamentary life was frozen until the 1989 elections. Furthermore, in 1974 the Arab 
2 1 3 
Summit of Rabat was held and the Arab league recognised the PLO as the sole, 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, so the King issued an Iradah to 
dissolve the ninth parliament in November 23, 1974.214 
2.8 Freezing of Parliamentary Life from 1974 -1989: The Martial Law Period 
Parliamentary life in Jordan was frozen due to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank 
of Jordan, in addition to other Arab and international issues such as the resolution of 
the Arab Summit in Rabat. The decisions that had been adopted by Arab heads of 
state in the Rabat Summit raised question about the political relationship between the 
two banks of the Jordan. For this reason, King Hussein dissolved the Chamber of 
Deputies in November 1974, half of whose members were from the West Bank. 
2 1 0 Abu Jabir, The Jordanian Parliaments (1972), pp. 110-115. 
2 1 1 Dann( 1989), p. 158. 
2 1 2 http://www.iordan-parliament.org/date.html. 
2 1 3 Palestine Liberation Organization. 
2 1 4 http://www.jordan-parliament.org/date.html. 
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Parliament was replaced by the National Consultative Council (NCC), which was 
created in 1978 to f i l l the void resulting from the suspension of parliamentary life. 
This was an attempt by the King to allow limited public participation in the political 
process. The role of the NCC was to debate public policy, discuss the temporary laws 
issued by the government in the absence of parliament and offer advice and 
9 1 S 
consultation to the Executive Authority. 
The King explained the aims of the creation of these councils. "It became obvious that 
it was unnatural for the country to remain without one of its main foundation while 
waiting for circumstances to improve", he said adding that, It is not possible for the 
burden of legislation to be borne by the Executive alone. The Council was 
composed of members appointed by the King representing various sectors of 
Jordanian society, in addition to those from different localities and minority 
communities; Christians, and Circassians. The National Councils were composed of 
educated members and political leaders, professionals, Bedouins and women (see 
tables 2.10 and 2.11). Moreover, the first Council included three members from the 
Muslim Brotherhood and six were known to be leftists. 
Table 2.10: Occupations of NCC Members 
Tribal leader {Shaikh Ashira) 11 
Businessman 9 
Farmer/Landowner 14 
Teacher/Educator 4 
Professional 22 
Total 60 
Source: Khoury,N.A., The National Consultative Council of Jordan: A Study in 
Legislative Development, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1981, p. 
432. 
2 I 5 A L Rashdan, al-Tatawwur al-Dimuqrati fi al-Urdun, 1952-1989 [The Democrtic Development in 
Jordan, 1952-1989] in Qira'at Siyasiyyah [Political Readings], Vol. 4. No.2. Spring 1994, pp. 88-113. 
2 1 6 Khoury.N.A., The National Consultative Council of Jordan: A Study in Legislative Development, in 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1981, p. 430. 
2 1 7 Khoury (1981), p. 433. 
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Table 2.11: Academic and Professional Degrees Held by NCC Members 
High School Diploma 21 
BA or BS 11 
M.A 1 
PhD 2 
Law Degree 13 
Engineering 5 
MD 7 
Total 60 
Source: Khoury,N.A., The National Consultative Council of Jordan: A Study in 
Legislative Development, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1981, p. 
432. 
Women were also represented in the NCC. In the first Council which was formed in 
1978 three women were included as members, and four women were appointed to 
each of the second and third councils (1980-1982) and (1982-1984).218 The NCC was 
dissolved by royal decree in January 1984 as a part of a return to parliamentary life. 
The ninth Parliament was called to convene in an extraordinary parliamentary session 
to amend Article 73 of the Constitution by adding an extra paragraph. This 
amendment was to allow direct elections to replace those members who had died 
since 1967 or who were unable to attend due to the Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank. 2 1 9 
The ninth Parliament that had been called for an extraordinary session was called the 
tenth Chamber of Deputies and was sustained until 1988 when it was dissolved with 
the aim of preparing for new elections and as a result of the disengagement between 
the two banks of the Jordan.220 
Al-Jraibi, Women and Political Participation in Jordan: The Development of Attitudes Towards 
Allocating a Quota of Parliamentary Seats for Women, Case Study:2, (Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research 
Center (UJRC) . 
2 1 9 Robins (1991), p. 191. 
2 2 0 http://www.jordan-parliament.org/date.html 
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2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed that despite the extended history of parliamentary life in 
Jordan since 1929, and in addition to establishment of three constitutions, five 
Legislative Councils, nine parliaments and three Consultative Councils, the legislative 
processes and political reforms were ineffective. There are several reasons for this. 
Firstly, even a quick reading of parliament history in Jordan and the history of 
conflicts between the parliament and the executive branch indicate the tendency of the 
balance to tilt in favour of the latter. 
Such conflicts led the government to repeatedly dissolve seven Chambers of Deputies 
out of nine before they had finished their Constitutional terms (see table 2.12). This 
impacted negatively on the main duties of being performed parliament. On the other 
hand, the parliaments did not exert their authority to withdraw confidence from the 
government or any minister except on one occasion in the seventh parliament because 
there was always the threat of dissolution i f parliament went too far in opposition to 
government policy, withdrew confidence, or did not pass laws suggested by 
government. 
Secondly, parliaments were composed predominantly of members without substantial 
organizational power. This was an important cause of an ineffective parliament, along 
with the absence of an effective role for political parties in political reform and in 
society in general due to continual interference by the government in the parties' 
issues and in the electoral process and its attempts to control parliament and political 
parties. 
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Table 2.12: The Status of Jordanian Parliaments during the Period 1947-1974 
Parliament No Year Status 
First 1947-1950 Dissolved 
Second 1950-1951 Dissolved 
Third 1951-1954 Dissolved 
Fourth 1954-1956 Dissolved 
Fifth 1956-1961 Extended 
Sixth 1961-1962 Dissolved 
Seventh 1962-1963 Dissolved 
Eighth 1963-1966 Dissolved 
Ninth 1967-1974 Extended 
Overall, the constitutional developments that made the government responsible to 
parliament and gave the latter the right to dismiss either the government or any 
minister, in addition to the implementation of regular elections can all be considered 
positive limited steps towards representative democracy and real parliamentary 
reform, and furthermore, rather advanced steps in comparison with other 
neighbouring countries at that time. 
Moreover, during the period from 1950-1957, and due to the unification between the 
East and the West Banks Jordan had witnessed a short period of liberalisation and 
further reform in the political field as a result of embracing the Palestinian political 
parties and the Palestinian elite in the political process. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
P O L I T I C A L C U L T U R E 
3.1 Introduction 
Political participation is linked to three major elements which constitute the political 
environment for general elections; the economic and social situation of the citizens, 
the laws governing elections, and the prevailing political culture. Chapter three 
discusses the political culture as a factor in and precondition of democratic change, in 
addition to exploring the major factors affecting the formation of a political culture in 
Jordan. 
Political attitudes and political culture are important concepts, as these factors have a 
strong influence on human behaviour, which plays an extremely important role for the 
stability and performance of a political system. Since the evolution of the science of 
politics and the emergence of the behavioural movement, the world has paid more 
attention to human behaviour, attitudes, beliefs, customs and traditions. Therefore, 
political culture in any society relies on certain values, beliefs, practices and 
psychological attitudes among a country's citizens. 
There have been many trends in the study of political culture. Some authors have 
focused on the historical experience of the industrial societies and have felt that the 
political culture responds to changes in political, economic and social circumstances; 
others have stressed the analysis of political trends in communist societies by 
demonstrating the continuity and stability of certain aspects of the political culture in 
the face of changes. In the Arab World, studies have shown the importance of culture 
in economic and political behaviour, and that the Arab democratic experiences reflect 
99 i 
political patterns which in turn are affected by religious and cultural factors. 
2 2 1 Al-quraan, al-Thaqafah al-Siyasiyyah ft al-Reef al-Urduni, [Political Culture in the Jordanian 
Countryside] (2005) p. 5 
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3.2 The Concept of Political Culture 
Elkins and Simon stated that "political culture is one of the most popular and 
seductive concepts in political science; it is also one of the most controversial and 
confused."222 The term 'political culture' did not appear until 1956, when Gabriel 
Almond attempted to introduce this term in his Article 'Comparative Political 
Systems'. He stated that "every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of 
orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as political 
culture".2 2 3 Almond added that the political culture "does not coincide with a given 
political system or society. Patterns of orientation to politics may, and usually do, 
extend beyond the boundaries of political systems".224 For Almond, the political 
culture is part of the general culture in society, despite being characterized by a degree 
of independence and, as described by Almond, "it is a differentiated part of the culture 
and has a certain autonomy".225 
The spread of democracy within the past decade has positive implication for political 
culture studies, but political scientists are divided on the relevance of political culture. 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba carried out an important empirical study and 
survey of political attitudes in five countries, which was published in their work, The 
Civic Culture (1963). They define political culture as "the political system as 
internalized in the cognition, feelings, and the evaluations of its population". Here, 
political culture refers to "the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward 
politics among the members of a political system; attitudes towards the political 
system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system. 
Orientation refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships". 
Lucian Pye defines political culture as a set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that 
give order and meaning to the political process and provide stable rules governing the 
2 2 2 Obeidi, Political culture in Libya (2001), p. 8 
2 2 3 Almond, Comparative political Systems, Journal of politics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (August, 1956), pp. 391-
409. 
2 2 4 Almond (1956), p.396 
2 2 5 Almond (1956), p.396 
2 2 6 Almond and Sidney, The Civic Culture : political attitudes and democracy in five nations (1963), p. 
13. 
2 2 7 Almond and Bingham, Comparative Politics: A Development Approach (1966), pp. 16-17. 
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behaviour of the political system's members. In 'The Individual and the 
Government in Islamic Political Culture' Dawood Feirhi defines political culture as a 
set of values, beliefs and ideals that show the conditions under which political 
activities can take root. Moh'd Almagreebi defines political culture as authorized 
9T0 
patterns of orientation and adaptation to the political activities in any society. 
Mohammad Berroween adds that political culture is the sum of beliefs, values, and 
patterns exercised by citizens in a particular community, concerning political affairs 
and the system of governance in the State. 
Despite some differences, all of the above definitions share the idea that all of the 
values found in the political system are part of the political culture. Moreover, the 
term political culture refers to the political orientation and attitudes toward the 
political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the 
system. As Verba wrote, political culture "regulates who talks to whom and who 
9-59 
influences whom". 
3.3 Types of Political Culture 
Each country has its own form of governance and political system that affect the 
nature and concepts of its political culture, due to the fact that any political system 
needs to build a particular political culture in order to be sustained. In a democratic 
country where the political system is based on the rule of law, the system needs a 
political culture that stresses the democratic values of equality, participation, justice, 
and freedom. Under authoritarian rule, however, the political culture is centred on the 
fear of power, a lack of inclination to participate in the political process, and the 
oppression of political opposition. 
Pye, Aspects of Political Development (1966), p. 104 
2 2 9 Feirhi, Dawood., al-Fard wa al-Hokumah fi al-Thaqafah al- Siyasiyyah al-Islamiyyah, [The 
Individual and the Government in Islamic Political Culture], on 
http://feirahi.com/ar/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=33 
2 3 0 Almgeerbi,, al-Arab bayn Thaqafat al-Tasllut wa Thaqafat al-Demoqratiyyah ,[Arabs Between the 
Culture of Dictatorship and the Culture of Democracy], on 
http://www.kwtanweer.com/Articles/readArticle.php?ArticleID=266 
2 3 1 Berroween, Thaqaftona Alsyasyah , [Our Political Culture], on H:\political cu l tureW"^ 1 
INTODUCT10N.htm. 
2 3 2 Verba, Comparative Political Culture in Pye and Verba (eds), Political Culture and Political 
Development (1960), p. 517 
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Almond and Verba assert that the orientations of individuals towards the political 
system can be measured through awareness, sentiments, and assessment to four 
aspects of political life: Firstly, the system in general through its components, 
elements, and constitutional forms. Secondly, input cognition refers to an awareness 
and understanding of politics and political issues in the society. Thirdly, the output 
cognition, or the citizens' knowledge of the results of the government action, includes 
the ability of individuals and their effectiveness in the political life, in addition to how 
to develop and implement public policies in the community; finally, the individual 
himself (what is the role of the individual in political life? the extent of his knowledge 
about his rights, duties, political abilities and how to participate in political life). 
According to these four variables Almond and Verba identify three typical types of 
political culture and three corresponding citizenship orientations; parochial, subject 
and participant political cultures. 
3.3.1 Parochial Political Culture 
This type of political culture is associated with citizens who have no real 
understanding of their political system or are ignorant about politics in general. The 
parochial citizen tends to be unaware, or only dimly aware, of the political system in 
all its aspects, having no knowledge of how the political system works, no effective 
orientations, and as a result a lack of political participation.234 The best example of 
this type of culture is isolated tribes, whose presence or survival is not affected by 
central government decisions.235 Therefore, it is impossible for this type of political 
culture to lead to democratic stability. 
3.3.2 Subject Culture 
In this type of culture the citizens are characterized by high levels of political 
knowledge. They are aware of and oriented to the political system, furthermore, there 
is a high frequency toward a differentiated political system and toward the output 
aspects of the system, but are low in terms of input and show resentment towards 
2 3 3 Almond and Verba (1965), p. 15 
2 3 4 Almond and Verba (1965), p. 19 
2 3 5 Al-Rashed Abdullah., al-Thaqafa al-Siyasiyyah, [Political Culture] ,at H:\political c u l t u r e \ * ^ 
!»j£ i _ i l a j j l iXjlnTio - ^uiUuill.htm, 
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political participation. It is essentially passive relationship. Furthermore, in this 
political culture citizens perceive themselves to be uninvolved in the political process, 
but instead as subordinate and subject to authority, as is the case with people living 
under a dictatorship. Thus, this type of political culture is considered inefficient in 
building stable democracy, since citizens have no understanding of their democratic 
political power. 
3.3.3 Participant Culture 
The citizens in this culture are oriented to the system as a whole that encourages them 
to participate in political affairs. In this culture it is assumed that the citizen is 
educated and has a positive sense about the political system in which they live. It is an 
active and influential culture, which means that citizens participate in and are affected 
9151 
by the political process. It can be argued that participant political culture is 
inefficient because in such a culture the combination of high levels of political 
knowledge and participation might produce a danger of "democratic overload" which 
could lead to political instability.2 3 9 
These patterns or models are theoretical models or ideals, and there is no society 
controlled by one of these cultures in full . However, the three types of culture can 
exist in all human societies, and one can determine the political culture of any society 
by measuring the distribution of these patterns in the community, and whichever is the 
controlling or dominant, taking into account the existence of individuals or groups 
within the same community with any one of the other types of political cultures along 
with the prevailing culture. 
Almond and Verba assert that these three types of political culture can combine to 
create the most effective political culture to promote political stability. This is the 
"civic culture" which is a type of political culture that mixes the best elements of 
subject and participant types with high levels of political knowledge and a feeling of 
2 3 6 Ben-Dor, Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics, Internal ionalJournal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1. (Jan, 1977), pp. 43-63 
2 3 7 Al-Rashed, al-Thaqafa al-Siyasiyyah , [Political Culture] 
2 3 8 See Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (1963). 
2 3 9 Huntington, Crozier and Watanuki, The Crises of Democracies (1975). 
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effective political power among citizens. This culture, therefore, is the most 
favourable culture for the maintenance and development of democracy because it is 
based on the congruency of political culture with the political structure.240 
3.4 The Democratic Political Culture 
The modern democratic system is the outcome of general intellectual, social, 
historical and political transformations which came together to establish guidelines 
and limits for the behaviour of citizens and political leaders, enhance the legitimacy of 
political institutions, and articulate the thoughts and feelings of the majority of the 
population. Therefore, democracy is much more than the relevant formal institutions: 
a party system, a parliament, and universal suffrage. Democracy requires a special set 
of basic values of tolerance, political pluralism, practices and political orientations 
and free speech. 
The democratic political culture involves cognitions and feelings toward the basic 
democratic principles such as political tolerance, an appreciation of liberty, support 
for the norms of democracy, realization of civil and political rights, support for an 
independent media and support for free, fair and competitive elections.241 
Accordingly, democratic citizens should also recognize that they have responsibilities 
as well as rights, believe in political tolerance and individual liberty, be aware of their 
political rights and able to make choices and decisions and participate in competitive 
elections to govern themselves democratically.242 
Democracy is about genuine freedom and the empowerment of the individual, in 
addition to a participating public with a reasonable understanding of the political 
process. The democratic political culture, as a set of values, attitudes and behaviours 
influenced by substantive changes in society, plays a crucial role in a democracy 
which shapes human behaviour, and it is considered to be an important factor in 
Strazay, The Incongruent Culture? Nationalist-populism and Democratization of Post-Communist 
Central Europe, 2003 online text http://www.newschool.edu/tcds/Tomas%20Strazay.pdf 
2 4 1 Gibson, Reymond and Kent .Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union, The 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2,9May, (1992), pp. 329-371. 
2 4 2 Verba, Nie, Kim, Participation and Political Equality (1978), p. 71. 
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establishing guidelines and legal parameter for the behaviour of citizens and political 
leaders.243 
The present researcher adopts definition, which does not differ in essence from many 
common definitions of the concept of culture, which is looking to this concept as a 
pattern of values, attitudes and behaviours acquired by individuals as members of the 
community. The political culture then, is the dominant culture in the community 
concerning the relationship between community members with the political system 
whether direct or indirect. Furthermore, the political culture is affected by, and at the 
same time affects, the nature of the prevailing culture and it is considered as a sub-
component of that culture. 
3.5 The Political Culture in Jordan 
Each country has its own cherished values and special cultural features which differ 
from those of other countries and from one time to the next. Furthermore, these values 
are dynamic phenomena which change over time and may be replaced by new values. 
Alternatively, previously-held values may be reverted to, perhaps due to socio-
economic changes. The historical framework and the current economic, social or 
political reality have played an important role in the formation of the political culture 
in Jordan. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on those factors that have most shaped 
the existing political culture in Jordan. This entails an analysis of economic 
characteristics, the roles of religion, and the role of social institutions such as the 
family and tribe, in addition to the political characteristics of Jordanian society. 
3.5.1 The Economic Characteristics of Jordanian Society 
Social, economic, and political characteristics have a profound impact on the nature 
and structure of the political system, and therefore democratic governance needs a 
political and democratic culture just as it needs economic prosperity, fairness in the 
distribution of wealth, the expansion of education, and the maturity of political 
awareness. 
2 4 3 Leis, Reflections on Popular Education, 2005 online text at http://www.iiz-
dvv.de/englisch/Publikationen/Ewb_ausgaben/64_2005/eng_leis.htm. 
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The economic level of Jordanian citizens is low, particularly in the countryside. 
Therefore, many people try to abandon agriculture for other governmental 
occupations such as military and administrative jobs. That is because they aspire to a 
stable source of income, and turn against the low economic capacity and lack of 
motivation to stay in the countryside, in addition to the negative cultural attitudes 
towards manual labour.244 
Although Jordan has enjoyed one of the highest rates of human development in the 
Arab World in terms of levels of education and health, it is facing the problem of 
worsening unemployment. This affects young people in particular, and is threatening 
to have serious consequences. Experts attribute this to both internal and external 
causes and events. The most important is the shame culture (Thaqafat al-'ayeb) 
through which society views certain professions as inferiority especially those 
involving manual labours. Many families and young people desire to work only in 
professions with higher status such as medicine, engineering, and law. 
For example, Jordan has achieved the highest rate of education and literacy in the 
Arab world, according to a report released by the United Nations Development 
Program in 2000. It has doubled the rate of literacy from 47% in 1960 to 87% in 1995, 
and also provides 67% of Jordanian families with medical services close to their 
places of residence.245 
But this positive picture is combined with a massive unemployment crisis, with 
official figures showing a current rate of around 15%. Moreover, unemployment rates 
are higher for females than males and much higher among young people under 24 
years, who account for about 60% of the total unemployed. One of the most serious 
repercussions of unemployment is its effect on the system of social and moral values 
that might lead to deviations as a result of looking for ways to satisfy material needs 
such as drug abuse and trafficking, gambling, fraud and theft. 
" Abu Jabir, Shabeeb S, al-Mujtama ' al-Urduni, Dirasah Ijtima'yyia Tarbawiyya, [The Jordanian 
Society, A Social-Educational Study (1979), pp. 61-62 
2 4 5 See report at http://www.undpjordan.org/JordanHumanDevelopmentReport/tabid/81/Default.aspx 
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The continued decline in economic conditions and a widening gap between per capita 
income levels and real purchasing power as well as the worsening unemployment 
crisis have led to serious weaknesses in the institutional and real political 
• • • 246 
participation. 
3.5.2 The Role of Religion 
Religion is a dynamic force in the lives of many peoples of different races, 
nationalities, and ethnicities. It interacts with the socioeconomic and political spheres 
and influences patterns of social change.247 It can be argued that the greatest influence 
on Jordanian society historically has been that exerted by religion. It significantly 
affects the structure, values and attitudes prevalent in Jordanian society because it 
forms the primary unit of loyalty and identity. Furthermore, whether as an ideology or 
a model of social organization, Islam plays an important role in the life of the 
individual in Jordan throughout his life, including his personal relationship to the 
universe, private and social affairs, customs and ceremonies, and ritual prohibitions. 
However, the Jordanian state has not been religious in the sense that others have been 
such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which was established in the same period, or the 
Islamic Republic of Iran founded in 1979, or Pakistan based on Islamic nationalism in 
1947. The state of Jordan was founded in 1921 based on a religious legitimacy derived 
from the leadership of the Sharif of Mecca, Al Hussein Ben Al i , to Arab revolution on 
the Ottoman State during the First World War. Islam was the major reference point 
for the government, culture and traditions of the state, and for King Abdullah Bin Al 
Hussein, the founder of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.248 
Generally, the role of religion in Jordanian society has created features which can be 
identified in people's beliefs, patterns of behaviour, and values. Hammam Saeed 
executive officer of the Islamic Action Front Party (Hizb Jabhat Al-Amal Al-lslami) 
has asserted that "we do not differentiate between a political party and a religious 
2 4 6 Islamic Action Front: A National Program to Protect Jordan Report (2003). 
2 4 7 Abootalebi, Islam and Democracy: State-Society Relations in Developing Countries, 1980-1994, 
(2000), p. 55 
2 4 8 Gharaibeh, al-Urdun...al-Dawlah al-Marji'iyyah wa al-Harkat al-Islamiyyah , [Jordan .. State, 
Authoritative source and the Islamic Movements]. 17/05/2006 at www.aljazessra.net 
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party. In Islam, there is no separation between religion and politics, because Islam has 
comprehensive guidelines for all aspects of l i f e" . 2 4 9 
3.5.3 The Role of Social Institutions 
Each society reflects the prevailing culture among its citizens. That culture developed 
according to the sets of values, concepts and knowledge gained through the historical 
and cultural heritage, geographical reality, the social structure, and the nature of the 
political and economic system. Unlike in Western societies, traditional social 
institutions such as the family and tribe in Jordan, as in most Arab countries, have 
played and continue to play a significant role in political culture. Focusing on the 
social structure and characteristics of Jordanian society is therefore useful in 
understanding the role of social institutions and how they influence the elements of 
political culture. 
3.5.3.1 The Social Characteristics of Jordanian Society 
According to the General Census of Population and Housing 2004 , Jordan's 
population was estimated at 5,323,200 persons (2,628,717 of whom were male 
(51.5%) and 2,472,264 (48.5%) female) distributed among the various governorates 
of the Kingdom. Furthermore, Jordan has one of the world's highest population 
growth rates. According to government statistics, the national population growth rate 
between 1994 and 2004 was about 2.52 per cent, with an annual rate of increase of 
3.96 per cent.251 
Like many other developing countries, Jordan has a very young population; about 
37.3 per cent of the total population was under 15 years of age in 2005 (constituting 
42.5 percent of the total male population and 43.0 per cent of the total female 
population), and 59.4 percent of the total population was aged between 15-64 years. 
Persons over 65 years of age constitute 3.3 percent. 
http://www.ammannet.net/look/Article 
0 The latest census in Jordan 
1 Department of Statistics, 2004 at http://www.dos.gov.jo/home_e.htm 
2 Department of Statistics, 2004 at http://www.dos.gov.jo/home_e.htm 
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Jordanian society can be classified according to several criteria, such as lifestyles, 
social class and religion. According to lifestyle Jordanian society has been divided 
into three divisions: the urban population, the rural population, and the population in 
the desert (the Bedouin who live in Badiyah). 
• The urban population is inhabitants of the major cities in Jordan such as 
Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, al-Karak, Ma'an and other Jordanian cities. The 
proportion of urban population in Jordan was 36% of the total in 1952, 
increasing by 1961 to 44%. Currently over 82.3% of the population live in 
urban areas. Over 63% of the population reside in the central provinces, about 
28% in the provinces of the Northern Territory, and 9% in the governorates of 
the South. Amman is the most populated province, where about 38% of the 
population is concentrated, followed by Irbid Governorate (18%), and in Zarqa 
(15%), the least populated provinces is in the Governorate of Al-tafilah about 
(1.5%). 2 5 3 
Urban life is characterized by stability and work in the field of industry and 
trade, and standards of living are better than those of the rural population and 
Badiyah. Jordan is one of the fastest urbanizing countries of the world, due to 
rapid population growth, internal migration from rural and Badiyah to the 
main cities especially Amman, and external migration to Jordan from 
neighbouring countries such as the migration of Chechens, Circassians, 
Armenian, and the Druze, in addition to the Palestinian migrations since the 
establishment of Israel in 1948. The majority of these migrants preferred to 
settle in major cities and large conurbations, thus leading to rapid population 
growth there.254 
• The rural population live in villages and work in agriculture. The rural 
population is less stable and fortunate than urban dwellers. According to 
government statistics the rural population in Jordan constituted about 41.5% of 
the national total in 1979. But this percentage has subsequently decreased to 
Department of Statistics, 2004 at http://www.dos.gov.jo/home_e.htm 
Al-Khatybeh and Bani Nasor, al-Mojtama' al-Urduni. [The Jordanian Society], (2005), pp. 96-98. 
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about 17.7 percent due to the shifts of the rural population to urban areas 
where the level of services provided is higher. In addition to standards of 
living and incomes are much higher for urban residents. 
• The Badiyah population live in the Jordanian desert in tribes outside of the 
urban and rural areas. Their nomadic lifestyle is distinguished by mobility and 
constant travel in search of water and food. Therefore, they live in tents which 
are easily transported from one place to another, and rely mainly on herding 
cattle and sheep. Standards of living among this social group are lower than 
those of the urban and rural populations in Jordan. 
In The Closed Unites: the Family, Clan and Tribe, Ahmad Rabayah mentions that the 
population of rural and Badiyah have been reintegrated due to the government's 
policies encouraging the settlement through its sedentarization campaigns and a 
variety of other techniques. The Bedouin lifestyle has changed as a result of the 
engagement of the vast majority of the Bedouins in agriculture, and so that their 
mobility as a fundamental aspect of nomadic life has declined.256 The percentage of 
nomads has therefore decreased from 8% in thel960s to less than 3%. 
In terms of religion, more than 92% of Jordanians are Sunni Muslims, and about 6% 
are Christians who live mainly in Amman, Madaba, Karak and Salt. The majority of 
Christians belong to the Greek Orthodox Church, but there are also Greek Catholics, a 
small Roman Catholic community, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian 
Orthodox and a few Protestant denominations found mostly in Amman. In addition, 
there are Circassians, the descendants of Muslim refugees from the Tsarist Russian 
invasion of the Caucasus in the 19th century, and a much smaller group of Chechens. 
Jordan also has a small Armenian population, and several small Shi'a and Druze 
I C O 
populations can also be found. 
According to 2004 census. 
2 5 6 Al-Rabay'eh, al-Wihdat al-Qaribah: Osra wa 'Ashirah wa Qabilah, (al-Sukkan wa al-Hayah al-
Ijtima'yyah) [The Close Unites: the Family, Clan and Tribe (Population and Social Life)] (1991), p. 74 
2 5 7 Haddad, Culture and State in Jordan: Religious Freedom and Citizenship, Ecumenical Review, Vol. 
50. October, 1998. 
2 5 8 See more details on http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/people.html 
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3.5.3.2 Social Structure in Jordanian Society 
The social structure in Jordan is affected by historical lifestyles, where the vast 
majority of Jordanian society remains attracted to the social patterns of the nomadic 
life, especially in the social relations among members of the family, or between 
people in general. Therefore, Jordanian society is dominated by the culture of the 
Bedouin community, and the most important characteristic of the Jordanian family is 
the continuation of the basic patterns of tribal relations in the organization of the 
family and its relationships. 
Jordanian society is a patriarchal society, where power is concentrated in the father's 
hands, and he is responsible for the maintenance and supervision of the affairs of his 
family. In addition, the social structure is based on the ramification of patrilineal ties 
among men. As in other Arab societies, Jordanian society includes two major 
elements in its social structure: the family and the tribe. 
3.5.3.2.1 The Family 
Jordanian society has two types of families: the large extended family and the small 
nuclear family. The traditional Jordanian family is a parental and extended family 
consisting of husband, wife and their children; male and female married and 
unmarried and other relatives such as uncles, nephews or cousins, grandfathers and 
grandmothers. Al l of the family members reside in the same housing and constitute an 
economic, social, and political unite. 
Furthermore, the absolute and inherent power in the family is concentrated in the 
father's hands, as he is at the top of the pyramid of authority. He makes important 
decisions, supervises the distribution of work among the members of his family within 
certain criteria based on gender, age and social status. This authority demands the 
absolute obedience, submission and loyalty by all the family members.259 
Al-Rabaye'h and Hamoudeh, al-Sukkan wa al-Hayah al-fjtima'yyah, [Population and the Social 
Life], (1991), pp. 51-52. 
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The Jordanian family has been exposed to many changes in size, structure, and social 
relations between its members, and there is a continuing shift from the pattern of the 
extended family to the nuclear family pattern. This has resulted from several factors 
such as migration, whether from the countryside to the city or abroad, increasing the 
demand for education for both males and females. Urbanization has led to a greater 
independence of children from their extended families in forming their own nuclear 
families. In addition greater diversity in the forms of economic activities has led to 
greater social mobility for individuals, who may not need to rely on their extended 
families to meet their basic needs.260 
Moreover, the authority of the father over family members is moving toward 
democracy and children now enjoy some freedom and independence in discussing 
some family and social matters. More importantly, marriage patterns have undergone 
profound changes. It is no longer a family affair determined and planned by the 
family, as was traditional, but has become a matter for the individual parties. In other 
words, there is a new direction towards marriage from outside the lines of kinship to 
which the person belongs. 
Although the family has faced a number of challenges, it still plays a prominent role 
in education and in the socialisation of its members. Moreover, in a society where 
family and tribal roots are highly valued, the family remains a vital means of 
preserving and transmitting social and cultural values, including those concerning 
religion and social heritage. Despite the changes from the extended family to the 
nuclear family, the Jordanian family still maintains strong familial, clan, and tribal 
ties, particularly in the economic, social and political fields. 
3.5.3.2.2 The Tribe 
The tribe system is a social unit and an extension of the family. It links a group of 
individuals and descendants of the 10th grandfather who is said to have founded the 
tribe. The tribe usually inhabits certain territories, speaks one language and has among 
2 6 0 Al-Khatybeh and Bani Nasor (2005), pp. 124-125. 
2 6 1 Al-Rabaye'h and Hamoudeh (1991), p-p. 61-62. 
2 6 2 Khazaleh, Muqaddimah li Dirasat al-Mujtama' al-Urduni, [An Introduction to the Study of 
Jordanian Society] (1999), pp. 78-79. 
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its members a common culture. This participation among tribal members in one 
location, language and culture facilitates social interaction and creates a sense of 
belonging to one community dominated by the manifestations of friendship, 
cooperation, and social cohesion.263 
Each tribe has a leader (sheikh) who represents his tribe and supervises the tribe's 
political, economic, and social affairs. The sheikh can be selected in several ways; 
often genetically moving from father to son or brother. In addition, the sheikh might 
be another close relative, the most experienced member or one who has special 
features such as strength, wealth, or a reputation for his ability to inherit the title of 
sheikh. 
The tribal system in Jordan has had to confront great social, economic, and political 
challenge such as the greater government presence in welfare provisions, and the 
migration of people from rural to urban areas. However, the tribe still has an 
important role in the life and behaviour of individuals and continues to play a crucial 
role in forming identities. Moreover, the Jordanian monarchy bases its political 
legitimacy on tribal connections. 
3.5.3.3 The Structure of Jordanian Society and its Diversity 
Jordan historically has been, and is still, influenced by the multi-rooted nature of the 
population in terms of national, ethnic, religious and cultural dimensions. Until 1948 
Jordanian society consisted of two main segments: the rural segment which were 
mainly dependent on agriculture; and the Badiyah segment mainly dependent on 
grazing and moving in search of water and food. In both segments the basic social 
unit was the tribe. This is in addition to a number of towns and small cities such as 
Amman, Irbid, Al-Salat, and Al-Karak which included different urban agglomerations 
and proportions of Chechens, Circassians, Syrians, and Palestinians.264 
Following the establishment in 1948 of the state of Israel and the Arab-Israeli War, 
and after the annexation of the West Bank by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
2 6 3 Al-Khatybeh and Bani Nasor (2005), pp. 135-136. 
2 6 4 Nusairat, al-Shakhsiyyah al-Urduniyyah Bayn al- Bu'dal- Watani Wa al-Bu'd al-Qawmi,[The 
Jordanian Character Between the Native and National Dimensions] (2002), pp. 33-34. 
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Jordanian society changed dramatically in 1950 when the population doubled to one 
million due to the immigration of Palestinians. Moreover, not only were the external 
and internal policies of Jordan radically affected by these events, but the country 
become one with a bilateral identity; both Jordanian and Palestinian. 
This development led the political system to become more democratic, and the most 
important manifestations of this were the modern constitution of 1952, a law 
regulating political parties introduced in 1953, and the emergence of new political 
parties representing leftist, nationalist, and religious tendencies, in addition to the 
election of eight representative councils between 1950 and 1967. 
After the 1967 war, Jordanian society was deeply affected by the stressful relationship 
between the state and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In the 1970s the 
emergence and devote of Palestinian identity at the Jordanian arena that was regarded 
as a considerable challenge to the Jordanian political system. These events reflected 
not only on the PLO's relationship with the state but also on the relationship between 
the state and Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin. 2 6 5 Therefore conflicting 
identities led to political instability in Jordan and the resulting conflict led to 
dissolution of parliament and resort to martial law. Civil society institutions were 
paralyzed and prosecuted and the movements of their leaders restricted. 
Consequently, these developments raised several issues; firstly, the electoral 
constituencies' weight with the population density from Palestinian origin compared 
with the constituencies that enjoy a majority of citizens of Jordanian origin. Secondly, 
the possibility of enacting a fair electoral system which achieves equality between 
citizens on the basis of percentage of population. 
In addition to the bilateral Palestinian-Jordanian national identity, Jordanian society is 
deeply pluralist and diverse in terms of its ethnic, religious, and cultural conditions. 
This pluralism required translation into a democratic system. This raises important 
issues about the need to adopt quotas for some ethnic minorities such as Circassians 
2 6 5 Al-Hourani, al-Tajrubah al-Demoqratiyyah fi al-Urdun bayn al-Tatallu'at wa al-Mu'awwiqat, [the 
Democratic Experiment in Jordan between Aspirations and Constraints] in Impediment to Democratic 
Transformation in the Arab world (1997), p. 208 
2 6 6 Al-Hourani (1997), p. 211 
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and Chechens, and religious minorities such as Christians, and cultural groups such as 
the Bedouins. 
At the same time Jordanian society has a very young population and high levels of 
education and higher education. These advantages raise many questions. The most 
important of these is the contradiction between a modern social infrastructure and the 
old laws and regulations. This is reflected in the increase in the number of civil 
society organizations and the diversity of their activities, which may conflict with 
laws restricting their activities and the governmental control mechanisms in their 
work. 2 6 7 
3.5.4 The Concept and Reality of Political Culture in Jordan 
Democracy is a political system based on human rights and the devolution of power. 
Without doubt these features are totally inconsistent with the rule of the individual 
which is reflected in the absence of a state of law and institutions, a lack of respect for 
the opinion, and lack of democratic human rights such as freedom of association, 
parties and freedom of movement. Therefore, democracy is not a set of regulations 
and laws, but it is a practice and a behaviour that must be with the person since 
childhood in the home, school, street, party and other civil institutions. 
The political culture is considered to be an indicator of the progress of political and 
democratic life and a reflection of political maturity, and participation in the political 
process. The first step in building democratic governance in Jordan requires changes 
in the nature of the prevailing political culture in society, in addition to removal of the 
values and behavioural patterns that interfere with building democracy. 
In order to be able to achieve these changes requires determining what the prevailing 
cultural stereotypes, and what is the reason for its existence. Therefore, the following 
sections shed light on the prevailing culture in Jordanian society and its values and 
behaviour patterns that affect political life. 
Al-Hourani(1997), pp. 211-212 
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3.5.4.1 The Cultural Awareness of Jordanian Citizens 
The first step in building an effective civil society is to raise awareness among people, 
so as to educate them about their rights. For that reason, some argue that the Jordanian 
citizen enjoys advanced political awareness and abroad political culture due to the rise 
in the proportion of education in Jordan, and the proliferation of schools, institutes, 
and universities, in addition to the margin of freedoms available and the stable social 
and political environment. On the other hand, others argue that the objective 
indicators do not support that viewpoint stressing instead that the political culture of 
the Jordanian citizen in general is shallow. 
Khalid Suleiman argues that the Jordanian citizen does not have a mature political 
awareness. He provides many examples to prove his argument. For example 26 
parties out of 34 were recognized by no more than 5% of respondents in an opinion 
poll conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan. 
Suleiman added that 82.3% of total respondents opposed the idea of amending the 
current electoral law (SNTV), although there is near unanimity of politicians and 
observers dissatisfied with this law as it does not facilitates the participation of many 
political parties, representing a broad spectrum of interests and a variety of views. 
3.5.4.2 Culture of Doubt Towards the Jordanian Governments 
Jordanian citizens do not exhibit much confidence in governments, on the contrary 
tending to doubt, fear, and mistrust of government. Jamil Abu Bakr, Assistant 
Secretary-General of the Islamic Action Front stated in 2002 in live dialogue that there 
are many actions carried out by successive governments to marginalize the citizens' 
right to manage their own communities and their role in politics and other public 
decision making processes. That the government's acts against civil institutions were 
confirmed by the number of temporary laws that had reached more than one hundred 
in number during a one-year period. Moreover, many of these laws were aimed at 
important political and social forces such as political parties, student unions, and 
professional associations. He concluded that there is no doubt that these acts increased 
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4.10 Conclusion 
As a result of a long period in which the political parties were banned for about 30 
years394, the tribes were the most prominent political organizations and played the 
most decisive role in the formation of the new state. Accordingly, the state dealt with 
the society through the tribes as the most important channel for people to contact the 
authorities, offer services and to help them to solve their problems. In addition, the 
state supported the tribes' role in becoming the pillars of society and did not allow 
other institutions such as political parties to play the same role, instead keeping them 
outside of the political development process. 
Regarding the participation of the Islamic movements, despite the strong presence of 
the Ikhxvan in Jordanian elections, most of their candidates and even the IAF leaders 
still had to get support from their tribes. One of the things that drew attention in those 
elections was the number of partisan candidates who denied their partisanship and 
declared their tribal loyalty in order to gain a seat in parliament. This perhaps explains 
the resort of several parties to keeping their lists secret or undeclared and believing in 
the wisdom of the saying, 'The tribe's sword is sharper in the elections than the 
swords of political parties'. 
Some of the partisan candidates interpreted their failure to declare lists of candidates 
as electoral tactics. In some cases candidates in tribal regions could not announce that 
they belonged to particular parties, because that would affect their electoral chances. 
Even for the candidates for quota seats in the 2003 Parliamentary elections, tribal 
support had a major say in the voting process and five of the winner were fielded as 
tribal candidates.395 
Since the early 1960s until 1992. 
Sabbagh (2004). 
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CHAPTER F I V E 
Parties and Political Participation in Jordan 
5.1 Introduction 
A political party is an association created to enable citizens to participate in the 
political life of society by shaping and expressing their political wil l , participating in 
public and political events, gaining political power within a government, and also for 
representing the interests of citizens in the bodies both of state power and local 
government. Article 3 of the current Jordanian Political Parties Law defines a political 
party as follows "every political organization which is formed by a group of 
Jordanians in accordance with the Constitution and the provisions of the Law, for the 
purpose of participating in political life and achieving specific goals concerning 
political, economic and social affairs, which works through legitimate and peaceful 
means".396 
In almost all contemporary democratic systems, political parties are considered to be 
the fundamental mechanism for political participation (Musharkah), political 
pluralism {Ta'addudiyya), the rotation of power, and the creation of political elites. 
Moreover, political parties are considered vital for democracy to be stable and 
effective. On the other hand political parties have been organized to advance their 
own social and economic interests in the society and to support particular political 
figures. Therefore, the number, nature and constellation of political parties differ from 
one state to another and from one phase to another. 
Political parties in Jordan date back to the establishment of the state in 1921. They 
have gone through various experiences, phases of growth and turning points reflected 
also in the country's social structure and the conditions at the domestic, regional, and 
international levels. Accordingly, the experience of political parties in Jordan can be 
divided into fourth phases: 
Political Parties' Law Number 32 for the Year 1992. 
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• The first phase from 1921-1950, Traditional parties (discussed in chapter 
two). 
• The second phase from 1950-1967, Ideological parties (discussed in chapter 
two. 
• The third phase from 1967-1989, The Martial Law Period (discussed in 
chapter two. 
• The fourth phase from 1989-2003, The Initiation of Political Liberalization. 
5.2 The Initiation of Political Liberalization: 1989- 2007 
Economics has played an important role in the transition to democracy. Quintan 
Wiktorowicz stated that, "Most explanations of democratic reform in the Middle East 
link the process of political change to economic crises". At the end of the 1980s, 
Jordan's government opened its political system in the face of the repeated popular 
demands for political and democratic life, and as a result of other socio-economic and 
political changes. During the 1980s and 1990s Jordan (like other Arab countries such 
as Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria), lived beyond its means and the economy was 
eroded by an accumulation of high levels of foreign debt and inflation, which 
increased poverty and unemployment.398 These economic difficulties affected the 
country's ability to provide for basic needs goods and services and undermined what 
had become an accepted political right to economic security.399 
Consequently, the government began impressive efforts to implement economic 
reforms under World Bank supervision, which led to price increases in fuel leading to 
a popular uprising that erupted in Ma'an city in southern Jordan. A significant feature 
of these riots comes from the special importance of this city, because it has been one 
of the main tribal supports for the monarchy, and any disturbances in regime-tribal 
Wiktorowicz, Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan, Comparative Polilcs, Vol. 33, 
No. 1 .(Oct., 2000), pp.43 -61. 
3 9 8 Wiktorowicz (2000), p. 44 
3 9 9 Farson, Class Structure and social Change in the Arab World: 1995, in Sharabi, Hisham (ed), The 
Next Arab Decade : Alternative Futures (1988), p. 231. 
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relations, in a country where the Palestinian population comprises approximately 50% 
of the population could lead to completely uncontrollable problems.400 
In this context, community leaders from Al-Karak city submitted demands for the 
resignation of Zaid al-Rifa'i's government, changes to electoral law, and for 
democratization to be given a greater chance of implementation by granting broad 
civil liberties and freedom of political participation. These demands were endorsed by 
several cities, villages and professional organizations, and the demands were 
expanded to include the termination of martial law as the first step in political 
Al l of these events coupled with the climate of the first Palestinian uprising {Intifada) 
of 1987 just across the Jordanian river in the West Bank which embarked the region 
Palestinians, Jordanians, Arabs, and Israelis on a new phase of the Palestinian issue.402 
In addition to the disengagement from the West Bank on July 31, 1988 severed the 
legal and administrative ties between the two banks of Jordan.403 The disengagement 
resolution came as a response to the Arab Rabat Summit that called for the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian State under the leadership of the PLO. 4 0 4 
From 1967-1988 Jordan had not been able to hold any parliamentary elections while a 
major portion of its territory had been seized and was under Israeli occupation. 
However, the disengagement decision made it possible for Jordan to return to a full 
parliamentary life and for the democratic process to start, since a major barrier to the 
holding of general parliamentary elections had disappeared. 
In response to these severe internal and regional crises, the monarchy took important 
steps toward political liberalization in order to ensure its political survival, strengthen 
the regime, gain public support, and control the possibility of unmanageable changes. 
Richani, Political Parties, Justice Systems and the Poor: the Experience of the Arab States, Humman 
Development Report 2002 
4 0 1 Andoni, the Five Days that Shook Jordan, Middle East International, April 28, 1989, pp. 3-4. 
4 0 2 Al-khazendar (1997), pp. 57-58 
4 0 3 Robins, Shedding Half a Kingdom: Jordan's Dismantling of ties with the West Bank, British Society 
for Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. l6,No.2, 1989, p. 162. 
4 0 4 Address by His Majesty King Hussein I to the Nation, July 31, 1988 in American Society of 
International Law, Washigton, D. C , Vol. 27, No. 6, November, 1988. online: 
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/speeches_letters.html 
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These series of pre-emptive measures have been termed by Glenn E. Robinson a 
'defensive democratization'405, and described by other scholars as 'controlled 
pluralism', 'Managed liberalization', and 'Facade democracy' to explain that the 
impact on democratic change in Jordan has been limited for the stability of the regime 
surrounded by regional and economic challenges.406 
Political reform in that period was seen as a bargaining tool for the regime to outlast 
the strike period, and the regime refused to use force to quell the rioting. Moreover, 
by adopting reforms that would allow some political participation through general 
parliamentary elections, the regime wished to turn the tide of public criticism away 
from the head of the state to the legislative body. Kamel Abu Jabir4 0 7 stated in the 
New York Times on October 26, 1989, that "the King has come to the conclusion that 
he cannot control the country in the way he did in the 1960s and 1970s i f he 
wants to maintain the continuity of the regime, he must share power with the 
5.2.1 The Parties' Participation in the 1989 Elections 
On November 8, 1989, Jordanian voters went to the polls in the first general elections 
in twenty-two years. Their fairness was acknowledged by international observers, 
domestic monitors and by both winners and losers alike. Although political parties 
were still illegal, party members were allowed to stand in the elections although not 
on a party platform. 
Robinson, Defensive Democratization in Jordan, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 
30, No 3, (August 1998), pp 387-410. 
4 0 6 Timothy, Islam and Democracy in Jordan: the Limits of Political Inclusion, in Islam, Democracy 
and the Secularist State in the Post-Modern Area (Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, 
Second Annual Conference in Georgetown University , Saturday, April 7, 2001), p. 12 
4 0 7 served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan 
4 0 8 In Amawi, Abla, Democracy Dilemmas in Jordan, Middle East Report, No. 174, Democracy in the 
Arab World. (Jan.-Feb., 1992)pp. 26-29 
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5.2.1.1 Candidates' Platforms in the 1989 Elections 
The 647 candidates registered to contest the 1989 elections can be categorized in 
three major groups. The main political tendencies which actively participated in the 
elections were: the Islamists' representing the influential Muslim Brotherhood as well 
as Islamic independents410; and leftist and pan-Arab nationalists such as those 
affiliated to the Jordanian Communist Party (al-Hizb al-Shiyu'i al-Urduni), the 
Jordanian People's Democratic Party (Hizb al-Sha'b al-Dimuqrati al-Urduni, Hashd), 
and other independent leftists.4 1 1 Loyalist politicians, ex-ministers and tribal leaders 
formed a third or centrist trend. 4 1 2 
Generally, in spite of the different platforms of the 1989 elections candidates, their 
campaigns concentrated on the same issues relating to political reform, political party 
legislation, the release of political prisoners, and economic issues such as 
unemployment and increases in prices. The 1989 elections were held under a multi-
vote system, in which voters could cast a number of votes equal to the number of seats 
designated in their districts, which gave voters the chance to cast ballots both tribally 
and politically affiliated candidates. The result was that Islamists won 40% of the 80 
parliamentary seats, as shown in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Distribution of Seats in the 1989 Election, by Political Affiliation 
Political Affiliation No of seats 
Muslim Brotherhood 22 
Islamist (Independent) 12 
Nationalist 8 
leftist 4 
Communist 1 
Centrist 33 
Total 80 
Source: Jordan times, 9-11 November, 1989. 
4 0 " Robins (2004), p. 56 
4 1 0 Timothy, Parliament, Politics, and Pluralism in Jordan: Democratic Trends at a Difficult Time, 
Middle East Insight, Vol. 1, Part 8, 1992, p. 40. 
4 1 1 Andoni(1989),p. 9 
4 1 2 Andoni(1989),p. 10 
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5.2.2 The Parties' Participation in the 1993 Elections 
The second landmark in the fourth phase of party life in Jordan was the 1991 National 
Charter (NC) {al-Mithaq al-Watani). This was a key element in the process of 
political reform, which laid the foundation for political pluralism in Jordan. Chapter 
two of the NC outlines the guidelines for the legitimizing of political parties' activities 
in Jordan, opening the way for multi-party competition in the next parliamentary 
elections.413 Accordingly, on August 31, 1992, the Political Parties' Law No. 32 was 
issued by Royal Decree to replace thel955 law. Party activities were allowed, and by 
June 2003 there were 31 licensed parties in Jordan, as table 5.2 shows. 
4 1 3 Text of the National Charter at http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/charter-national.html 
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Table 5.2: Jordanian Political Parties, 1989-2003 
Name of Party Year of 
formation 
1 Jordanian Arab Baath Socialist Party 1993 
2 Jordanian Communist Party 1993 
3 Islamic Action Front 1992 
4 Jordanian People's Democratic Party 1993 
5 Future Party 1992 
6 Jordanian Popular Democratic Unity Party 1993 
7 Progressive Party 1993 
8 Arab Baath Progressive Party 1993 
9 Arab Islamic Democratic Movement 1993 
10 National Action Party 1994 
11 Jordanian Constitutional Front 1994 
12 Freedom Party (Hizb al-Ahrar) 1994 
13 Jordanian Democratic Left Party 1995 
14 Jordanian Arab Ansar Party 1995 
15 Jordanian Peace Party 1996 
16 Nation Party 1996 
17 Arab Land Party 1996 
18 National Constitutional Party 1997 
19 National Popular Democratic Movement 1997 
20 Jordanian Labour Party 1998 
21 Jordanian Generations Party 1999 
22 Jordanian Arab New Dawn Party 1999 
23 Jordanian Renaissance Party 1999 
24 Jordanian Green Party 2000 
25 Jordanian Citizens' Rights Movement 2000 
26 Jordanian Communist Workers Party 2001 
27 Jordanian People's Committees Movement 2001 
28 Jordanian Rafah Party 2001 
39 Islamic Center Party 2001 
30 Jordanian Arab Party 2002 
31 Mission Party 2002 
Source: Majid (ed.), Building Democracy in Jordan, (2005), p. 78 
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5.2.2.1 Candidates' Platforms in 1993 Elections 
5.2.2.1.1 The platform of the Muslim Brotherhood (Islamic Action Front IAF) 
The Muslim Brotherhood had been established in order to liberate the Islamic world 
from foreign domination and to apply the Islamic Sharia. The MB goal, as stated by 
Brotherhood founder, Hassan al-Banna was to reclaim Islam's manifest destiny. He 
stated in his message to the fif th Conference of the Muslim Brethren in Cairo, 1938 
that "Some people think of us as a group of preachers, concerned only to call people 
to practice virtues and abstain from sins. Others believe it is a mystical trend. We are 
not any of these. We call to return to true Islam, which is a belief and an application, a 
home and a nationality, a religion and a state, a spirit and a body, and a Quran and a 
sword." 4 1 4 
The IAF the political arm of the MB was licensed on December 8, 1992. Its General 
Secretary is Zaki Bani Irshid. The most important objectives of this party as stated in 
its constitution are: 
Resuming Islamic life in the society and seeking to apply Islamic law 
(Sharia) in various fields of life. 
- Contributing in building the nation morally and materially, and 
preparing the nation for Jihad (armed conflict) against Zionist and 
Imperialist enemies. 
Seeking to achieve the national unity, and resistance to the colonial and 
foreign influence. 
Consolidating the national unity among citizens, and consolidating the 
principle of shura, and combating ethnic, tribal, regional, sectarian 
conflicts that threaten the national unity. 
- Fighting political, administrative and financial corruption in the state. 
- Establishing the Jordanian economy on Islamic principles, which 
ensures social justice, respect individual property, and fighting 
corruption, poverty and unemployment. 
4 1 4 Al-khazendar( 1997), p. 136. 
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Supporting the Palestinian issue, and fighting to liberate the whole of 
Palestine. 
Supporting women role in the development of society and allow them 
to participate in public life. . 4 I 5 
5.2.2.1.2 The Leftists' and Nationalists' Platform 
The leftists' and Arab Nationalists' platform generally concentrated on issues of fair 
distribution of wealth, Arab solidarity and social justice. The parties of the left share 
certain values, beliefs, and doctrines that shape their attitudes towards the Jordanian 
Government's domestic and foreign policies. This ideology provides these parties a 
guide for political activity and a socio-political programme. The most influential 
parties to be considered are the Ba'ath party with two divisions: one pro-Iraq (the 
Jordanian Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party), the other pro-Syria (The Arab Ba'ath 
Progressive Party); and the Jordanian Communist Party. 
5.2.2.1.2.1 Jordanian Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party (JABSP) 
The JABSP was founded on January 18, 1993, it is an Arab nationalist party with a 
socialist ideology. The main party principles and orientations is to achieve the Arab 
unity within the framework of a social economic system which secures justice and 
benefits the Arab nation and humanity as a whole. Moreover, the party beliefs that 
Arabs were one nation and that their existing political boundaries were artificial and 
inconsistent with the cultural boundaries.416 The JABSP spokesman summarised the 
main aims and objectives of the party as the following: 
" 1 . Arab nationalism is a firm reality and the relationship between the individual and 
Arab nation is sacred, and requires sacrifice and responsibility. 
2. The authority of the state derives from the people, and the people are the source of 
power. 
3. The party aims to enhance equality of rights and duties among citizens, regardless 
of religion, colour or race. 
4 1 5 http://www.jabha.net/body4.asp?field=doc&id=2 
4 1 6 Al-khazendar (1997), p. 103 
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4. The party believes in popular struggle for reviving Arab nationalism and building 
an economic, socialist, humanitarian order which realises social justice and fair 
distribution of wealth." 4 1 7 
5.2.2.1.2.2 The Arab Ba'ath Progressive Party (ABPP) 
The party was licensed on April 13, 1993 and was formally close to the Syrian Ba'ath 
party. Similar to the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, ABPP is a nationalist party struggle 
for: 
The supremacy and institutionalization of democracy prevalence of 
law and the constitution and the liberation of publics from exploitation 
and conducting political, economic reforms to serve the interests of the 
peoples. 
The party struggle for the Arab unity and the reflexion of the Arab 
peoples will and desire to live freely. 
- The party believe that the sovereignty belong to the people who alone 
are the source of every authority and leadership, and that the state 
should represent the popular w i l l . 4 1 8 
5.2.2.1.2.3 The Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) 
The main objective of this party is to unify the Arab peoples' struggle against 
conservatism and imperialism. The main aims and objectives of JCP can be 
summarized as the following: 
The consolidation of the country's political independence and the 
development of the Jordan economic independence. 
Realize the country's comprehensive and balanced progress through 
independent and balanced economic and social development to attain 
social justice. 
Raise and qualify society for building socialism as the most equitable 
system. 
4 , 7 A1-Sharah 1997, p. 262. 
4 1 8 http://www.arabdecision.org/show 
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Defend the interests of masses, voicing their inspirations and spreading 
consciousness within their ranks. 
Protecting and spreading democracy and political pluralism. 4 1 9 
It is worth mentioning that this party was subjected to various kinds of restrictions 
and consequently operated under different names. Abidi stated, "The Government's 
attitude towards the Communist Party has been consistently uncompromising and 
intolerant ...The Anti-Communist Law prohibited publication, issue or circulation of 
Communist Literature. The Anti-Communist Law was bases on the assumption that 
communism in Jordan aimed at replacing the existing Government in the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan by the system prevalent in the communist countries".420 
Furthermore, the JCP was the only opposition party which accepted UN Resolution 
181, a resolution which laid the legal foundation for the creation of the state of 
5.2.2.1.3 The Centrist Platform (Conservatives and traditionalist's) 
Conservatives and nationalists parties represent the traditional support group for the 
Jordanian state. This political grouping almost by definition represents Eastern 
Jordanian nationalists. These parties consist of the tribal and bureaucratic forces 
(former officials and loyalist politicians) who mainly share ideals, visions and 
approaches to participate in setting up a national reform current that fulfils public 
aspirations and is based on the political system vision for political advancement. The 
most effective parties to be considered are the Jordanian National Alliance Party, and 
the National Constitutional Party. 
5.2.2.1.3.1 The Jordanian National Alliance Party (JNAP) 
JNAP was legally registered on December 1, 1992 immediately following the 
legalization of political parties in Jordan for the first time since the 1950s.422 The 
Secretary General of this party is Mijhim al-Khraishah, a bedouin from the Bani 
4 1 9 http://www.arabdecision.org/show 
4 2 0 Abidi 1965, p. 207. 
4 2 1 Al-Khazendar 1997, p. 103. 
4 2 2 Al-Sharah 1997, p. 258. 
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Sakhor tribe. The JNAP is a coalition of central and southern Bedouin tribes, with a 
pro-establishment alignment. The main objectives and principles of this party 
summarised by the Secretary General as the following: 
" 1 . Defending the integrity of Jordanian land, national sovereignty, the Jordanian 
identity, adhering to the Constitution, protecting the constitutional institutions 
including the Hashemite regime, and preserving Jordan's security and stability. 
2. Emphasising and consolidating unity, harmony and brotherhood among all classes 
of Jordanian citizens, respecting human rights, and a commitment to democratic 
methods and political pluralism. 
3. Supporting the Jordanian Armed Forces and the Security Forces. 
4. Supporting the Palestinian issue as a national and an Arab issue. 
5. Respecting individual rights to ownership, work, freedom of opinion and 
expression, and giving care to the youth and protecting the rights of women." 4 2 3 
5.2.2.1.3.2 The National Constitutional Party (NCP) 
The National Constitutional Party formed in May 1997. Its president is Abdel Hadi al-
Majali (Speaker of the Lower House of the Parliament). This party is a merger of nine 
pro-government centrist parties: the Jordanian National Gathering Party, Popular 
Unity Party, al-Ahd (Pledge) Party, Progress and Justice Party, al-Yaqatha 
(Reawakening) Party, United Arab Democratic Party (al-Watan (Homeland) Party, 
Jordanian Arab Popular Party, and Jordanian Popular Movement Party. 
The main principles and orientations of this party as following: 
Stressing that national belonging is not restricted to any particular 
group , region or ethnicity. 
Jordan is an indivisible and inseparable part of the Arab nation and the 
Arab unity is a firmly established reality for the protection of the 
nation and the guarantee for its development. 
Al-Sharah 1997, pp. 258-259. 
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- Underlining the fact that Islam is the religious of the majority of the 
Arab society, and the Sharia' is capable of assimilating new 
developments in human civilization. 
- Democracy is the method and way of life that enable people to exercise 
their sovereignty and make the ruling power expressing their will and 
achieving their aspirations. 
Everybody is entitled to decent and free life and everybody has the 
right to enjoy sovereinty, independence, the right to self determination 
and the choice of the governing system.424 
The 1993 elections took place in a different political and economic atmosphere in the 
Arab and wider worlds. At the international level, as a result of the end of the Cold 
War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself the sole 
international leader declared the advent of a 'New World Order'. Consequently, 
America found itself engaged in multiple overseas military interventions, wars of 
liberation, and wars against terrorism that led to its intervention in the Gulf War. 
As a consequence of the second Gulf War, about four hundred thousand Jordanian 
citizens who had been working in Gulf States returned to the country, which increased 
the unemployment in Jordan from 16.8 to 18.8 percent.425 Furthermore, the population 
of the country increased by 10%, and the number of registered voters increased after 
about 100,000 returnees registered to vote. 4 2 6 Most of the returnees were 
businessmen, professionals, and technicians whose vote tended to be cast for liberal 
and moderate candidates.427 
The New World Order also provided the United States of America with the basis to 
restart the Middle East peace process negotiations in Madrid culminating in the 
signing of the peace treaty between Palestinians and Israelis followed by the 
establishment of diplomatic negotiations for a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. 
4 2 4 http://www.arabdecision.org/show 
4 2 5 Annual report, Ministry of Labour, 1991, p. 18 
4 2 6 Amawi, the 1993 Elections in Jordan (1994). 
4 2 7 Al-Sharah, Political liberalization in Jordan: A study of the Democratization Process 1989-1993, 
(1997), p278 
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The Jordanian opposition parties opposed this strongly. More importantly, the 1989 
election results surprised the government, when the opposition parties together won 
some 60% of parliamentary seats.428 The government responded by changing the 
electoral law to a one-man one -vote formula in a multi-candidate district system that 
forced the voters to choose between the tribal affiliation and political candidates.429 
Although the 1993 parliamentary elections were the first multi-party elections since 
1956, the results saw the Islamists losing nearly half their seats while independent 
centrists won 50 of the 80 parliamentary seats,430 as table 5.3 shows. 
Table 5.3: Distribution of Political Party Candidates and Representatives in the 
1993 Elections 
Political Party Trend No of No of Percentage 
candidates representat 
ives 
The Islamic Action Front Islamist 36 22 27.5 
Jordanian National Alliance Centrist 8 3 3.75 
Party 
Future Party Centrist 4 3 3.75 
Reawakening Party Centrist 4 1 1.25 
Jordanian Democratic Leftist 3 1 1.25 
Socialist Party 
Jordanian Democratic Leftist 4 1 1.25 
Popular Unity Party 
Jordanian people's Leftist 4 1 1.25 
Democratic Party 
Total 63 32 40 
Source: Dirassat fi al-Intikhabat al-Niyabiyah al-Urdunniyah 1997',[Studies in the 
Jordanian Parliamentary Elections 1997], Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center 
(UJRC), (Amman: Dar Sindibad lil-Nashr, 2002)., pp. 167-168 
Curtis and Schwedler, Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?:The 2003 Elections in 
Jordan, Middle East Policy, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 138-151 
4 2 9 Schank , Is Jordan's Islamic Action Front Next?., Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies, 
September 2006. online 
http://www.eicds.org/english/publications/civilsociety/06/september/isjordan.htm 
4 3 0 Russell , Deliberalization in Jordan, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1, (January 2003), pp. 
137-144 
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5.3 The Electoral Law Amendments and Distribution of the Electoral Districts 
After Jordan embarked on the gradual process of liberalization in 1989, when the 
regime started holding regular and periodic competitive elections, some level of 
pluralism and the emergence of opposition political parties and civil society groups 
was observed. However, since 1994, when Jordan signed the Jordan-Israel peace 
treaty, the regime has shown increasingly less tolerance of the level of pluralism that 
had spread across the country since 1989-1993.431 
Accordingly, as the electoral system has a powerful impact on the nature and structure 
of parliament, the government amended the electoral laws several times. In 1986, the 
House of Representatives Election Law no. 22, 1986 was issued, and this was 
amended four times in 1988, 1989, 1993 and 1997 to change the number of 
parliament seats or the criteria for eligibility to vote. However, the most important 
changes that affected election results were those to the electoral system itself, 
particularly concerning electoral district boundaries. Such amendments enabled the 
government to keep the parliamentary elections' results and the parliament councils 
under its control. 
5.3.1 The Electoral Law Amendments 
"The electoral system is considered to be one of the most important pillars of the 
democratic structure in any state",432 and the means by which the electors choose 
between candidates, thus enabling voters to reflect their views. Moreover, all electoral 
systems that claim to produce more representative systems, and therefore more 
democratic legislatures, and free expression and participation should respect certain 
fixed principles such as free and fair elections reflection of the level of democracy 
achieved. 
The issue of electoral system has obviously been the subject of one of the most heated 
debates in Jordan since multi-party competition for elected legislatures was initiated 
4 3 1 Curtis and Schwedler (2004), pp. 138-139 
4 3 2 Majed(ed) (2005), p. 103 
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and the political parties have had limited access to the media and some degree of 
participation in parliamentary elections. 
Accordingly, election law has undergone important changes and amendments that 
have affected significantly on the basic legislature functions of representation, 
lawmaking, and oversight, the essential elements and qualities of democratic 
governance. A wide range of questions have arisen concerning whether Jordanian 
election law serves the democratic process and encourages political party 
participation, or is instead used to support pro-government candidates. In other words 
these amendments have been designed as cosmetic window dressing for the benefit of 
government, or have they had a real impact on democratic life in Jordan? 
The 1989 elections were significant because they were the first since the initiation of 
the liberalization process and, to date, the last conducted under the Block Vote 
electoral system (BVS). In this system voters could choose as many candidates as 
there were open seats to be filled within their district. Voters in the 1989 elections cast 
some votes for candidates with whom they had close relationships based largely on 
kinship or family ties, and others cast for Muslim Brotherhood candidates433. 
Therefore, opposition voices won a clear majority in the 11 t h Jordanian parliament, as 
noted above in table 5.1. Accordingly the government discovered that the (BVS) gave 
advantages to opposition parties and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, as they 
were the most organized movement. For that reason election law was changed just 
months before the 1993 elections to a one-person one vote formula. 
Unfortunately, the period between 1993 and 1997 elections witnessed a decline in 
political freedoms as a result of the major amendments that the government 
introduced to the press and publications Law. 4 3 4 These amendments, accompanied by 
the IAF's poor showing in 1993, denied them to bloc the passage of the peace treaty 
with Israel.4 3 5 So, in the 1997 elections, eleven political parties headed by the IAF 
boycotted the elections on the basis that the law discriminated against political parties. 
4 3 3 Reynolds et al., Jordan, in Electoral System Design: The New International I D E A Handbook, 
(Stockholm: International I D E A , 1997). 
4 3 4 Curtis and Schwedler (2004), p. 142. 
4 3 5 Jordan Times, Saturday, October 23, 1999, By Suha Ma'ayeh. 
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They demanded the redrafting of the Election, and Press and Publication laws and an 
end to normalization with Israel.4 3 6 
5.3.1.1 Electoral District Boundaries Changes 
In 1989 elections and according to article two of the provisional law No. 23 which 
amended the electoral law to redrawn the East Bank constituencies only as a result of 
disengagement from the West Bank. Jordan has been divided into twenty electoral 
districts, but the seats were not allocated proportionally. 
The major Jordanian governorates in the 1989 elections were: Amman, with an 
estimated population of 1,207,838 comprising 40.5% of Jordan's population; Zarqa 
with 494,680 and Irbid with 414,769.437 These cities had an urban population of 
around 2,117,187 accounting 63% of the total population. These governorates 
received only 36 seats about (45%) out of the total of 80 parliamentary seats. The 
capital city Amman was divided into six districts, and the number of registered voters 
in the second district of Amman was 73,435. However, they received only three seats, 
while Tafieleh district, with 21,908 registered voters obtained the same number of 
seats, and Ma'an district with 27,981 registered voters received five seats. 
In the 2003 Parliamentary election, the number of registered voters in the second 
district of Amman was 209,025, receiving the same number of seats as in the 1989 
elections, while Ma'an district with 32,822 registered voters received four seats (see 
table 5.4). At the same time when the government increased the number of seats for 
the 2003 election from 80 to 110 seats, the new seats were concentrated in districts 
where support for the regime was strong, as the table 5.4 shows. So Amman, for 
example, has roughly one parliament member for each 40,286 voters, while the 
district of Karak has a member for each 12,217 voters. 
The distribution of seats in terms of the ratio of candidates to the population depends 
on two major factors. Firstly, the Palestinian factor is used as a proxy for the 
distribution of the seat district. As a large proportion of refugees and Jordanians of 
^Jordan Times, newspaper October 23, 1999. 
4 3 7 KJiazaileh (1996), pp. 94-95 
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Palestinian origin are concentrated in the urban constituencies, therefore the 
percentage of candidates of Palestinian origin in these districts is high. For example, 
in the 1997 elections in the second district of Amman, 11 candidates out of 15 (73%) 
were Palestinian in origin, and in the first district 12 out of the 19 (63%) are 
Palestinian in origin. In Karak, 3 of 40 candidates (7, 5%) were Palestinian in origin, 
with about 6% in al-Tafielah.4 3 9 
Table 5.4: Parliamentary Seats Distribution in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections 
Governorate No of No of Muslim Seats for Seats for Total 
registered districts Circassian Christian 
votes 
Amman 926,575 7 20 2 1 23 
Irbid 516,975 9 15 0 1 16 
Balqa 201,935 4 8 0 2 10 
Karak 122,164 6 8 0 2 10 
Ma'an 32,822 3 4 0 0 4 
Zarqa 375,378 4 8 1 1 10 
Mafraq 75,050 1 4 0 0 4 
Tafieleh 41,953 2 4 0 0 4 
Madaba 72,476 2 3 0 1 4 
Jerash 72,500 1 4 0 0 4 
Ajloun 72,658 2 3 0 1 4 
Aqaba 30,279 1 2 0 0 2 
North Badiyah 45,494 1 3 0 0 3 
CentralBadiyah 32,458 1 3 0 0 3 
South Badiyah 34,639 1 3 0 0 3 
Seats for women - - - - 6 
Total 2,843,483 45 92 3 9 110 
Source: Hourani, Hani, et al, Who is who in the Jordanian Parliament: 2003-2007, 
(Amman, Sind bad Publishing House, 2004), p. 195, p. 199. 
4 Faisal, and Urbina, Jordan's Troubling Detour, Los Angeles Times, July 07, 2003 online: 
http://www.merip.org/newspaper_opeds/ior oped070603.html 
4 3 9 Hourani et al, Who is who in the Jordanian Parliament: 1997-2001 (1998. p. 207 
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Secondly, the government concentrated the new seats in the districts where the 
regime's support was strong. Moreover, the government alleged that the system of 
distribution adopted was a device to enable the government to treat the demands from 
underprivileged areas of the country on an equal footing with those from more 
privileged areas. For example families living below the poverty line represented 
39.5% of the total in Al-Karak governorate, and 39,3% in al-Mafraq governorate, 
while only 20.9% in Amman. 4 4 0 
5.3.2 The Parties' Participation in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections 
The 2003 parliamentary elections were held on 17 June, 2003 after a 2-year cessation 
of parliamentary l i f e 4 4 1 , and were the third elections held after the issue of the 
Political Parties' Law. The 14 th parliamentary elections occurred under the new 
election law that was issued by Royal Decree on July 22, 2001 as a response from the 
government to the Muslim Brotherhood's call for a repeal of the election law and a 
fundamental review of electoral districts. The changes that were adopted by the 
government were said to be just to simplify the voting and counting processes, but 
without any fundamental changes to the voting system or distribution of districts.4 4 2 
The controversial one-person one-vote formula was retained. 
The rate of participation in the 2003 elections was 58.9%. 4 4 3 Only ten of 31 existing 
political parties ran in the elections with a list of candidates numbering 75 who won 
33 out of the 110 seats (30%) (see table 5.5). Independent candidates representing 
tribes, clans, ex-government, businessmen and retired military officers won the 
majority 84 of the seats. 
Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdome of Jordan., (Washington, D .C) , Domestic Politics and reform, 
at http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/aboutjordan/ph4.shtml 
4 4 1 While parliament was suspended (between June 2001-June 2003) 
4 4 2 Choucair, Illusive Reform: Jordan's Stubborn Stability, Middle East Series, Carnegie Endowment 
for international Peace, No. 76 December 2006. p. 14. 
4 4 3 Hourani, et al, Who is who in the Jordanian Parliament: 2003-2007 (2004), p. 197 
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Table 5.5: Political Party Participation in the 2003 Elections 
Political Party No of No of Percentage 
candidates seats 
Islamic Action Front 30 17 51.5% 
National Constitutional Party 13 11 33.3% 
Jordanian Democratic Leftist Party 4 2 6.1% 
Islamic Moderate Party 9 2 6.1% 
Popular Committee Movement Party 3 1 3.0% 
Welfare Party 2 0 0 
Communist Labour Party 1 0 0 
Arab Land Party 1 0 0 
Arab Party 1 0 0 
Democratic National Movement 11 0 0 
Total 75 33 100 
Source: Hourani, et al, Who is Who in the Jordanian Parliament: 2003-2007 
(Amman, Sind bad Publishing House, 2004), p.l 15, p. 201 
5.3.3 The New Political Parties' Law 
Later the Jordan upper house of parliament has been approved the amendments of the 
long-awaited political parties' law that endorsed by the lower house of parliament on 
March 19, 2007. The new Political Parties Law amended article five of the 1992 
Political Parties' Law, which stipulates that "The number of the founding members of 
any party shall not be less than fifty persons".444 According to the amendments, the 
number of founding members required for political parties increased from the current 
number of 50 up to 500 in order to receive an official license. Moreover, the founding 
members of the party should come from at least five governorates.445 
In addition, the new draft law stipulates for the first time in the kingdom's history that 
the licensed parties will get funds from the government. However, the law requires 
parties to rely on known local sources, and it imposes government monitoring of their 
4 4 4 Text of The Political Parties Law, Number 32 for the Year 1992, available at 
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/pol-parties.html. 
4 4 5 Text of The Political Parties Law, Number 19 for the Year 2007 available at 
http://www.pm.gov.jo/arabic/index.php?page_type=gov_paper&part=3&id=4821 
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accounts. Moreover, the new law transfers supervision of political party activities 
from the Ministry of Political Development to the Ministry of Interior, and according 
to this law political parties are able to set up partisan media outlets without prior 
permission but it has been kept under the jurisdiction of the interior ministry as set out 
in 1992 law. 4 4 6 
This draft has raised a heated debate concerning whether these changes will improve 
political participation in Jordan or are considered an obstacle to the political reform 
process. Some argue that, the amendments especially that related the increase in the 
number of the founding members required-which is the most controversial 
amendment- threaten the existence of two-thirds of the existing political parties in 
Jordan that are already weak, marginalized and struggling with low levels of 
popularity. 
The Minister of Political Development stated that "this law is a crime against 
Jordan"447, because by such amendments few of the existing political parties would 
survive. As a result of these amendments many parties would leave the political arena 
without this being accompanied by the emergence of large parties, because none 
except the Muslim Brotherhood case would be able to meet the requirements of the 
law in the existing political climate. 
On the other hand, some consider that the new draft of the Parties' Law will 
encourage the existing parties to consolidate together to form large parties that might 
have a wider popular base. This might ultimately be a healthy development, 
particularly since many of the existing political parties lack a solid base of public 
support. Therefore, these amendments are said to be designed to make political parties 
more financially and politically viable. IAF secretary Zaki Bani Irshid replied to this 
argument, saying that "The government wants to enforce a merger in parties, but you 
cannot impose mergers, it has to happen by choice".448 
1 4 6 Political Parties' Law No. 19, 2007 
1 4 7 Wardam.The Law for Political Party Darwinism in Jordan, Jordan Watch, Thursday, 
March 22, 2007. On http://www.iordanwatch.net/archive/2007/3/l 81616.html. 
1 4 8 Jordan Times, Apr 12, 2007 
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Regarding the new draft, the Interior Ministry would have a considerable degree of 
control over political parties, which is seen as a negative step from their members' 
point of view towards political reform and democracy. The relationship between 
political parties and the state already suffers from a lack of trust. Deputy Abdullah 
Akaileh stated that "We have a very bad experience with the Ministry of Interior in 
handling opposition parties", and he noted that, "Jordanians are already shunning 
political parties for fear of prosecution".449 Deputy Zuhair Abu Ragheb stated that 
"The Ministry of Interior has a dark history in dealing with political parties. The law, 
as it is, would enhance people's belief that the government is not serious about 
political reform we should encourage people to take part in political life not 
discourage them". 4 5 0 
Jordan Times, March 15, 2007 
Jordan Times March 15, 2007 
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5.3.4 The Parties' Participation in the 2007 Parliamentary Elections 
The most recent parliamentary elections in Jordan were held on 20 November, 2007. 
A total of 880 candidates, including 199 women (the highest participation of female 
candidacy the country has seen to date), competed for the lower house's 110 seats, six 
of which are designated for women under a quota system adopted in 20 03. 4 5 1 The 
average turnout was 54%, slightly lower than at the elections of 2003 (58%). 
Approximately 2.4 million out of the 3.4 million eligible to vote registered for the 
elections, and the highest turnout was in the villages and Bedouin districts. The 
highest turnout was in Al Tafieleh with 82%, and the lowest in Amman with 32% (see 
table 5.6). 4 5 2 
Table 5.6: Percentages of Votes in Urban, Rural and Bedouin Constituencies 
Percentages of Votes in Amman, Percentages of Votes in rural and 
Irbid and Zarqa in the 2007 Bedouin Districts in the 2007 
elections elections. 
District % of total votes District % of total votes 
Amman-Ist 35% Ma'an 74% 
district 
Amman-2nd 32% Badu al-Shamal 79% 
district 
Zarqa 36% Al-Karak 72% 
Irbid-Ist district 47% Al-Tafilah 82% 
Source: International Fact Newspaper avialble at 
http ://www. factj o .com/fullnews .aspx?id=21 
Although Jordan's Interior Minister declared that the elections were free and fair, the 
Islamic Action Front stated that they were framed. According to their own 
impressions, the Islamic Action Front should have won 16 seats compared to the 
outcomes of the elections. IAF spokesman Jamil Abu Bakr called for a rerun of the 
poll in constituencies where, he said, fraud had occurred: "This is an electoral 
massacre... violations by far exceeded even the last elections... it will have harmful 
repercussions on the country's political progress. It wil l force us to reconsider our 
participation in future elections". 4 5 3 
Ministry of Interior 
Jordan Times, Wednesday, November 21, 2007 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL2171443520071121 
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In term of the electoral campaigns in 2007 election, and as a result of the economic 
situation of the Jordanian citizen. Jordanians showed more interest in their daily 
affairs rather than being concerned with the thorny political files relating to the 
situation in the Middle East. Therefore, the economic issues dominated most 
candidates' campaigns, and the majority of candidates for the parliamentary elections 
preferred to campaign with slogans related to the daily lives of Jordanian citizen 
contrary to the past when the Palestinian issue and the liberation of the occupied Arab 
territories and Iraq was occupying large areas in the programmes of the candidates in 
Jordan. However, apathy, disillusionment, and lack of trust in the parliamentary 
council are rife among Jordan's 2.5 million eligible voters. One voter justified his 
decision for not participating in the 2007 election said "I'm not voting for anyone 
because they're all liars - Islamists and all the others ...They just want to grab seats in 
parliament and will forget about us and our needs."454 
Moreover, the 2007 election results were a disappointment to politicians and the 
Jordanian political parties, since tribal and pro-government candidates strengthened 
their grip on Jordan's parliament, winning the vast majority of its 110 seats. 
Meanwhile, the political parties won only seven seats all won by the Islamic Action 
Front (IAF). The size of IAF presence in parliament however, was reduced from 17 
seats previously.4 5 5 This means that most of the 2.4 million Jordanian voters cast their 
ballots along family and tribal lines. 
However, the officially results as follows: tribal candidates and candidates of 
conservative social forces achieved an important victory by winning a total of 96 
parliamentary seats, while leftist and nationalist political parties (the Democratic 
Block and the National Democratic Current) failed to win any seats in the 
parliament.456 The IAF won 7 seats457. While women 's seats rose to a record of 
seven, six of them winning under the quota system, as table 5.7 shows. Compared to 
the elections of 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2003 there was a clear decline in the 
representation of the IAF and the leftist and nationalist parties. 
4 5 4 B B C News "Jordan holds parliamentary vote", 20 November, 2007. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/7102974.stm 
4 5 5 Jordan Times, Wednesday, November 21, 2007 
4 5 6 http://www.europeanforum.net/country/jordan_update 
4 5 7 http://www.islamonline.net 
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Table 5.7 Distribution of Seats in the 15th Parliament, 2007 
% of votes Number of seats 
Islamist 5.5% 7 
Leftists and Nationalists 
political parties 
0% 0 
Independents and Tribal 
representatives 
89% 96 
Women 5.5% 7 
Total 100% 110 
Source: Jordan Embassy to the U.S 
5.4 Conclusion 
Generally, the importance and distinctiveness of political parties spring from their 
useful role in political life, whether through transmission of the needs preferences of 
the public to the government when they participate in government formation, or by 
playing an effective role in drawing up government policies that bolster the 
democratic structure of civil society. In Jordan's case, although political parties have 
existed since the establishment of the country as discussed earlier, they still have a 
limited impact in political life. There are several reasons for this, some of which are 
related to the legal environment and social factors and some to the parties themselves. 
The legal environment that has surrounded the political parties can be described as 
more of an impediment than a help to party work. Since the establishment of the 
Emirate of TJ until the mid-1950s when all political parties were banned until the late 
1980s parties worked under laws that determined how they could demonstrate, set out, 
and carry out their functions and pursue their activities. In such a legal environment 
the parties were not able to articulate political objectives. In addition, the law had a 
negative impact on their ideological performance and on their relationship with both 
society and the state. 
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In terms of the relationship between political parties and society, the successive 
governments designed their policy to deal directly with populace and to listen to its 
concerns and problems through the tribes, who have been the most important channel 
for people to contact the authorities, be offered services and in helping them to solve 
their problems. Meanwhile, society itself has also preferred dealing directly with the 
state. These policies led to the absence directly dealing with the political parties and 
weakened the communication between society and political parties. In addition, the 
parties themselves failed to build a credible alternative to the tribes. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Introduction 
Research methods concern the methods of used to collect information. Direct or 
indirect contact is made with the subjects of the study such as (individuals, 
organizations, communities) by using systematic methods of measurement such as 
questionnaires and interviews. Methodology is concerned with: what data the 
researcher collects, how often that data gets collected, why these data are collected 
where they are collected, and how did it is analysed.458 Johnson defined methodology 
as referring to "the practices and techniques used to gather, process, manipulate, and 
interpret information that can then be used to test ideas and theories about social 
l i f e " . 4 5 9 
Therefore, the researcher in any study will be unable to draw conclusions or 
comparisons unless he has adequately designed the study to answer the research 
questions. Oppenheim stated that "research design is concerned with making our 
problem researchable by setting up our study in a way that will produce specific 
answers to specific questions. Good research design should, above all, make it 
possible for us to draw valid inferences from our data in terms of generalization, 
association and causality".460 
Moreover, the methodology adopted in any study must be properly structured, and 
highlight the proposed objectives of the study. Frankfort & Nachmias stated that 
"research design is the program that guides the investigator as he or she collects, 
analyzes, and interprets observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the 
4 5 8 Collis and Hussey, Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Postgraduate 
Students (2003), p. 55 
4 5 9 Johnson, The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, A user's guide to sociological language (2000), p. 
192. 
4 5 0 Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement (1992), pp. 81 -82 
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researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under 
investigation".461 
6.2 Research Methodology 
As tools and instruments used by researchers to collect and investigate data, method 
can be classified in several ways based upon different criteria. For example there are 
two main sources of data, primary and secondary, based upon status of evidence 
classifies research as historical, descriptive, and experimental. Olayan in Scientific 
Research: Its Basics, Methods and Procedures classified research into four categories: 
(1) Experimental studies to evaluate interventions; (2) Historical studies; (3) 
Descriptive Studies; and (4) developmental studies462. Based upon the type of data 
collected research is classified as qualitative research relies on qualitative data and 
quantitative research relies on quantitative data. In social sciences there are two main 
types of research orientations: the quantitative approach focuses on testing theories 
and correlations, and the qualitative approach focuses on generating data463. 
Accordingly, there are different types of data collection methods that can be used in 
any study, and each has its advantages and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses. 
Therefore, the researcher must choose methods in light of particular factors such as 
the questions involved and the nature of the study. Brannen states that "where the 
research issue is clearly defined and the questions put to respondents require 
unambiguous answers, quantitative methods such as a questionnaire may be 
appropriate, By contrast, where the research issue is less clear-cut and the questions to 
respondents are likely to result in complex, discursive replies, qualitative technique 
such as in-depth interviewing may be called for" . 4 6 4 Table 6.1 shows a comparison 
between qualitative and quantitative methods. 
1 Frankfort, and Nachmias, Research Method in Social Science (5 t h edition), (1996), p. 98 
2 Olayan .R. M , Scientific Research: Its Basics, Methods and Procedures (2001), p. 41 
3 Miller and Brewer, The A-Z of Social Research (2003), p. 192. 
4 Brannen, Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research (cl992), p. 5. 
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Table 6.1: A Brief Comparison of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 
Focus of Research Qualitative Quantitative 
Key Concepts Quality (nature, essence) 
Quantity (how much, how 
many) 
Sampling 
Meaning, understanding, 
description 
Statistical relationships, 
prediction control, 
description, hypothesis 
testing 
Date 
Non-representative, small, 
purposeful 
Large, random, 
representative, stratified 
Methods 
Field notes, people's own 
words 
Measures, counts, numbers 
Instruments 
Observations, interviews, 
reviewing documents 
Experiments, surveys, 
instruments 
Data Analysis 
Researcher, tape recorder, 
camera, computer 
Inventories, questionnaires 
Findings 
Onging, inductive (by 
researcher) 
Deductive (by statistical 
analysis) 
Advantages 
Comprehensive, holistic, 
richly descriptive 
Precise, numerical 
Flexibility, emphasis on 
understanding large 
groups, hard-to-explain 
anomalies 
Controlling intervening 
variables, 
oversimplification 
Sources: http://www.mnsu.edu/student/assessment/methods.html 
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6.2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of Interviews 
Qualitative data collection methods most commonly used to analyze and evaluate data 
can be classified in three broad categories: in-depth interviews, observational 
methods, and document reviews. Byren states that definitions of qualitative research 
would be elusive, vague, and imprecise, because the term qualitative encapsulates 
such a broad umbrella of research methods. However, he attempted to define 
qualitative research as "inquiries of knowledge that are outside the framework 
prescribed by the scientific method, as well as assumptions of inferential statistics".465 
The qualitative interview seeks to describe and understand the meaning of central 
themes in the life world, in addition to understanding the story behind participants' 
experience466. Rubin and Rubin identify several types of information which can be 
obtained from interviews: narratives, accounts, fronts, stories, and myths. 4 6 7 
Furthermore, interviews can be categorized into two main methods: structured; and 
semi-structured interviews. The aim of structured interview (also known as a 
standardised interview or a researcher-administered survey) is to ensure that each 
interviewee is presented with the same questions in exactly the same format. Semi-
structured interview styles are flexible enough to allow new questions to be brought 
up during the interview that lead interviewees to "develop ideas and speak more 
widely on the issue raised by the researcher".468 Interview research methods have 
various advantages and disadvantages (see table 6.2). 
4 6 5 Byrne, Linking Philosophy, Methodology, and Methods in Qualitative Research, AORN 
Journal,200\b, Vol. 73, Issue 1, p. 207 
4 6 6 Kvale, Interviews: An introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (cl996),p. 1 
4 6 7 Rubin& Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (1995), pp. 24-27 
4 6 8 Denscombe, The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects (2 n d ed.) (2003), P. 
167. 
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Table 6.2: Advantages and Disadvantages of Interviews 
Advantages Disadvantages 
1. Usually yield richest data, details, 1. Expensive and time-consuming 
new insights. 2. Need well-qualified, highly 
2. Permit face-to-face contact with trained interviewers. 
respondents. 3. Interviewee may distort 
3. Provide opportunity to explore information through recall error, 
topics in depth. selective perceptions, desire to 
4. Allow interviewer to experience please interviewer. 
the affective as well as cognitive 4. Flexibility can result in 
aspects of responses. inconsistencies across interviews. 
5. Allow interviewer to explain or 5. Volume of information too large; 
help clarify questions, increasing may be difficult to transcribe and 
the likelihood of useful responses. reduce data. 
6. Allow interviewer to be flexible in 
administering interview to 
particular individuals or 
circumstances 
Source: Westat, The 2002 User Friendly Handbook for Project Evaluation, 
(NSF,2003), p, 52. 
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6.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Questionnaire 
Quantitative data collection methods are characterized by Bryman as "entailing the 
collection of numerical data and as exhibiting a view of the relationship between 
theory and research as deductive, a predilection for neutral science approach ....and 
having an objectivist conception of social reality". 4 6 9 
The questionnaire is the most commonly used method of gathering information 
because it is easy to prepare and analyse. Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, defined the 
questionnaire as "a widely used and useful instrument for collecting survey 
information, providing structured, often numerical data, being able to be administered 
without the presence of the researcher".470 Moreover, it is worth noting that each 
method of research has advantages and disadvantages, but which method the 
researcher uses depends on the research question, the researcher, the participants, the 
goals, and the available resource. Scholars have listed some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of questionnaires, as shown in table 6.3.4 7 1 
4 6 9 Bryman, A. Social Research Methods (2 n d ed) (2004), p. 62 
4 7 0 Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, Research Methods in Education (2007), p. 317 
4 7 1 These principles cited in Aldolaimi, Investigating the Effectiveness of Training in the Public 
Section in Saudi Arabia: Case Studies of the Ministries of Education and the Institute of Public 
Administration (2006), pp. 115-116. 
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Table 6.3: Advantages and Disadvantages of Questionnaires 
Advantages Disadvantages 
1. Cost effective. 1. Low response rates. 
2. Relatively easy to analyse. 2. Inability to probe responses. 
3. Familiar to participants. 3. Inflexible. 
4. Can reduce bias by: 
• Uniform question presentation. 4. Not advised for sensitive topics 
• No middle man bias. 
• Not influence by researcher's 
opinions. 5. The intended respondent may not 
• No verbal or visual clues to complete the questionnaire due to 
influence respondents. reading ability, or language skills, or 
a relative or someone completely 
5. Less intrusive than other methods. different might fill it in. 
6. Respondents can take their own 6. Questions may not reflect the 
time. respondents actual concerns 
7. Usually anonymous. 
8. Preserve Confidentiality. 
9. Response implies consent 
10. Large amount of data can be 
gathered 
11 Do not usually require a great 
deal of interviewer training 
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There is a large range of types of questionnaire, and the most common can be 
described as closed-ended structured questionnaires or open-ended structured 
questionnaires.472 Closed-ended questions limit the range of respondents' answers to 
the survey. The participants are allowed to choose from either a pre-existing set of 
dichotomous answers, or a set of multiple choices with an option for "other" to be 
filled in. The most common ranking scale used for answers is called the Likert scale. 
The closed questions are quick to answer and easy to code.473 On the other hand, the 
respondents in close-ended questions are unable to add any comments or explanations 
to their answer474. Open-ended questions are useful i f the possible answers are too 
many or unknown or the questionnaire for explanatory purposes.475 Furthermore, open 
ended questions allow participants to explain and add comments and explanations to 
their answers.476 
There are certain principles of questionnaire design that should be considered when 
producing a questionnaire formalizing the objectives of the survey.477 Researchers are 
advised to follow several principles when formulating questionnaires: 
• Clarity. The questions must be carefully designed "The best questionnaires are 
constantly edited and refined until they have clear questions and instructions, 
47ft 
laid out in a logical order". Furthermore, the researcher should consider 
whether the respondents can understand the question, will be willing to answer 
the question, and are able to answer the question.479 
• Ensure that questions are without bias. The researcher must avoid putting 
questions in such a way as to lead respondents to specific answers. 
• Simplicity. Questions should be short and simple. The researcher should avoid 
confusing and ambiguous questions. In addition the researcher should keep the 
Cohen, Louis, Manion, Lawrence, and Morrison, Keith, (2007), p. 320 
4 7 3 Wilson and McClean, Questionnaire Design: A Practical Introduction, (Newtownabbey: University 
ofUlster,cl994),p. 21 
4 7 4 Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement (1992), p. 115. 
4 7 5Bailey, Methods of Social Research (cl994), p. 120. 
4 7 6 Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2007), p.321. 
477http://www.b2binternational.com/files/08-market-research-ch8.pdf 
4 7 8 http://www.b2binternational.com/files/08-market-research-ch8.pdf 
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questionnaire as short as possible to improve response rates and the quality of 
data. 
• Avoid ambiguous words such as usually, frequently, and words with no 
specific meanings. 
• Avoid embarrassing questions, dealing with private or personal matters. 
6.3 Data Collection Instrument for the Questionnaire Survey 
• As a result of the political difficulties in having an open discussion because of 
the politically sensitive nature of the topic, and the sensitive nature of the 
questions posed. Therefore, disclosure of identifiable data might lead either to 
negatively affect the respondents' willingness to be interviewed and refrain 
from publicly expressing their political views and criticizing the political 
system or respondents by interviews might express views they thought the 
political system would like to hear. 
• Because the survey questions address sensitive issues (e.g., measuring levels 
of political freedoms, freedom to criticize the government, and exposure to 
security consequences due to criticizing the government), respondents may 
perceive that public expressions of their political opinions are circumscribed 
by the government and might be exposed to negative consequences for 
answering the study questions frankly and expressing and criticizing the 
government's practices and policies. 
• Thus, it was decided in order to measure political freedoms openly, motivate 
respondents to respond truthfully, and allow an honest assessment of data and 
the results of the study questions, and at the same time to preserve 
confidentiality to the respondents that collecting quantitative questionnaire 
data was the most appropriate method available. 
• Furthermore, as Wimmer and Dominick state "In qualitative research, sample 
sizes are commonly too small to allow the researcher to generalize the data 
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beyond the sample selected for the specific study". As already mentioned in 
chapter one, the main objective of this study is to explore properly the reality 
of political participation in Jordan, and therefore the use of a questionnaire has 
a considerable advantage because it can produce more representative results. 
6.4 Questionnaire Design 
The aim of the questionnaire in this study is to collect the necessary data from the 
study sample to explore the reality of political participation in Jordan and identify the 
main barriers to real and effective political participation by citizens in political life in 
general and in parliamentary elections in particular. 
The data collection instrument used in this research was a questionnaire developed by 
the researcher. The questionnaire was designed using mainly closed-ended questions 
and three open-ended questions (see appendix A). Closed ended questions were used 
because these are quick to answer and provide respondents choices among possible 
answers. Respondents were asked to rate their responses to close-ended questions on a 
five point Likert scale from strongly disagree (scale=l) to strongly agree (scale=5). 
This type of question may not offer sufficient choices to the respondents to express 
their real feelings and opinions, and therefore open-ended questions were included to 
allow respondents to add more information, such as feelings and attitudes. 
Consequently this allowed the researcher to have better access to the respondents' 
opinions. Moreover, this type of question gives respondents feelings that they have an 
opinion on the study issue. 
Questions have to be in language familiar to the respondents, preferably in their 
mother tongue. Thus, special steps were taken by the researcher in designing the final 
draft of the questionnaire. The first draft was designed in English, and it was then 
necessary to translate the English version into Arabic because all of the study's 
sample are Jordanians. Therefore, the draft was submitted to a professional interpreter 
to translate it into Arabic language. The final draft was then also translated from 
Arabic to English by the professional interpreter. 
4 8 0 Cited in Niemann, Use. Stratgic Integrated Communication: Implementation towards A South 
African Conceptual Model (2005), p. 185. 
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6.5 Study Sample 
Selection of the Sample. The quality of the sample often determines the quality of the 
data. Moreover, the most important factors that determine the appropriate sample for a 
survey are its survey topic and the nature of the questions posed in the questionnaire. 
The sample of the current study was drawn from the political elite in Jordan. There 
are various definitions of the concept of political elite, but in Mind and Society, 
Vilfredo Pareto distinguished between two divisions of political elite in a society. 
"The governing elites" consist of those who play a key role directly or indirectly in 
government, exercise power, and make decisions and rules that run the society, and 
the "non governing elites" are composed of groups with special capacities, and an 
appreciable influence on political affairs in the society; they might be intellectuals, 
professionals, partisans or might be individuals who have an economic influence in 
The sample in this study was drawn from the non-governmental elite, represented in 
five categories selected randomly from the political elite in Jordanian society. These 
categories were selected to represent purposefully the members of society who are 
interested, observers, and have a considerable influence on political affairs and the 
social structure in Jordanian society. Most of the study sample members are known in 
the community in which they work whether at the level of political party or 
associations or in politics in general. 
The study sample is divided to five categories: (1) members of political parties, (2) 
academics, (3) professional council members, (4) journalists, and (5) human right 
organization members (see detail of the list of respondents in appendix B). The total 
number of research sample members was 237 individuals, of which (183=77.2%) 
were male, and (54=22.8) female, figure 6.1 depicts the distribution of the study 
sample according to the main field. 
4 8 1 Beardsley, Mr. Bumham on the "Elite", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 40, No. 16, (Aug. 5, 1943), 
p. 439. 
177 
Figure 6.1: The Respondents' Main Field 
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6.6 The Pilot Study (Pre-testing questions) 
A pre-test or a pilot study is the process of conducting a preliminary study to identify 
potential problems in the proposed study and to make sure that questionnaires are 
understandable and clear to the study sample members. Bryman states that "the 
desirability of piloting such instruments is not solely to do with trying to ensure that 
the survey questions operate well; piloting also has a role in ensuring that the research 
instruments as a whole function wel l" . 4 8 2 
Why do we carry out a pre-test or pilot study? 
A pilot study has several functions that allow problems in the proposed study to be 
identified, which may mean revising the method or instruments before starting the 
actual fieldwork. Some of these functions stated in Research Methods in Education: 
• To check the clarity of the questionnaire items 
• To gain feedback on the validity of the questionnaire items. 
• To eliminate ambiguities or difficulties. 
• To gain feedback i f the sequence of questions is logical. 
4 8 2 Bryman (2004), p. 159 
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• To make sure that translation is accurate. 
• To identify misunderstood or uncompleted items. 
• To identify how motivating, non motivating, sensitive, or offensive items 
might be. 4 8 3 
Accordingly, the researcher distributed seven questionnaires to academics at Yarmouk 
University in the Social and Political Sciences departments and at Jordanian 
University in the Centre for Strategic Studies. Five more were distributed to PhD 
politics students, ten to journalists, five to political party members, and five to 
members of professional associations. The aim of this pilot study was to assess the 
clarity and acceptability of the questions, and the willingness of the respondents to 
answer the questions. Moreover, the pilot study was used to assess i f there were any 
poorly worded questions that might lead to confusion for respondents. However, the 
results showed that the questionnaire covered the important issues, and the completed 
responses showed that the questionnaire was understood clearly. Some modifications 
were needed, and some questions were rephrased, and one personal sensitive question 
was deleted. 
6.7 Questionnaire Distribution 
The questionnaire was distributed by personally delivering copies to respondents. 400 
questionnaires w ere given to five members of the groups; political parties (100) 
questionnaires, journalists (100) questionnaires, academics (100) questionnaire, 
members of human right organization (50) questionnaires, and members of the 
professional associations (50) questionnaires. 
The questionnaire was distributed in Jordan from May 1, 2007 to July 10, 2007. 237 
questionnaires were returned directly to the researcher. It should be noted that this 
method achieved a reasonable response rate of about 60%. Moreover, it is clear from 
the figure 6.2 that the highest responding rate from the research sample is that of 
Journalists reaching (80%), and respectively, members of HRO at (72%), members of 
Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2007), p.341. 
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political parties at (64%), members of PCM at (42%), and the lowest responding rate 
was for academics (36%) see figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2: Overall Response Rate for the Study Sample 
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6.8 Format of the Questionnaire 
Each questionnaire was accompanied by a covering latter explaining the purpose 
of the study, and the researcher's personal details (name; address and telephone 
number) so that the respondents were able to contact him to clarify the questions 
or for any other reasons. 
The questionnaire was divided into five sections as follows: 
Section A of the questionnaire was composed of questions related to biographical 
data, including age, gender, religion, place of birth, marital status, and level of 
education. 
Section B of the questionnaire was composed of questions relating to political 
freedoms in Jordan. 
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Section C of the questionnaire included questions relating to the main internal or 
external obstacles to political participation in Jordan. 
Questions in section D of the questionnaire related to the performance of political 
parties in political life. 
Section E of the questionnaire concerned the respondent's participation in the 
2003 parliamentary elections and the main motives behind their participation. 
Section F of the questionnaire was composed of questions relating to evaluations 
of the current electoral system (SNTV). 
6.9 Confidentiality and Anonymity 
Before distributing the questionnaire, all respondents were assured that the 
information given would be used only for the purpose of this study and that their 
responses would remain confidential and wil l be used to generate frequencies and 
percentages to be discussed in the research only, and that only summaries of results 
without any personal identification would be published. Moreover, it was stressed that 
the information collected could not be linked to a particular respondent since the 
respondent's name was not required on the completed questionnaire. 
6.10 Difficulties and Limitations 
The researcher faced various difficulties during the distribution of the questionnaire, 
and the main ones were as follows: 
• The problem of time. The researcher distributed 400 questionnaires personally 
to the study sample in order to gain a high return rate and save money as the 
researcher is self supporting. Therefore, data collection took more time about 
10 weeks. 
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One of the main practical limitations was that many respondents did not have 
much time available to answer the questionnaire. Because the members of the 
study sample were from the political elite, they were very busy, and much time 
had to be spent to arrange for a suitable time to deliver the questionnaire and 
collect it. 
Some members of the study sample hesitated to answer the questionnaire 
fearing that the researcher (who is Jordanian) might be conducting the research 
on behalf of the state security agencies. Therefore the researcher again insisted 
to all respondents that the main aim of this questionnaire is for academic 
study, and their responses would remain confidential. 
Most secondary references used were small articles, and few scholars have 
written in detail about political participation in Jordan and the main factors 
associated with it. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Data Analysis and Findings 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the primary data collected from the 
questionnaire survey which was the main research instrument used in this study. The 
statistical analysis conducted in this chapter is considered to be the first stage in the 
process of data analysis in this research. This study is a set of stages started by 
problem definition, research design, data collection methods, sampling, fieldwork, 
and ended by analysis of data and discussion of the results. Therefore, the following 
chapter discuss the results in detail. 
7.2 Data Analysis 
The statistical analysis in this chapter is divided into two sections: 
• The characteristics of the study sample 
• Descriptive analysis of answers the research questions which will be discussed 
in five sections. 
1. Indicators of political freedoms in Jordan. 
2. Obstacles of political participation. 
3. The performance of political parties. 
4. The motives for participation in parliamentary elections. 
5. Evaluation of the current electoral system. 
7.2.1 Characteristics of the Study Sample 
The characteristics of the study sample include: 
• Demographic characteristics of the research sample 
• Study sample distribution 
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7.2.1.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
The first part of the questionnaire survey collected data on demographic 
characteristics of the study sample. The analysis in this section covers age, sex, level 
of education, religion, and place of birth. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a total 
of 400 questionnaires were distributed to five categories of respondents from the 
political elite in Jordan, and a total of 237 questionnaires were returned, a response 
rate of 59.25%. 
7.2.1.1.1 Respondents' Age 
The sample was divided into five age groups as shown in figure 7.1. The first group 
was between 18-30, which comprised 19.9% of the total sample. 30.1% were between 
31-40 years, 19.9% between 41-50 years, 24.2% between 51-60 years and 5.9% were 
61 years and above. This indicates that the respondents in the 31-40 years age group 
are involved in political activities more than other age groups, while the oldest group 
showed little interest in being involved in political activities. 
Figure 7.1: Distribution of the Study Sample According to Age 
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7.2.1.1.2 Gender Distribution 
It can be seen from figure 7.2 that the overwhelming majority (77.2%) of the 
respondents were male, and 22.8% were female. As shown in figure 7.2, the 
proportion of female respondents was 33.3% in human right organizations, 26.3% of 
journalists, and 21.9% who participated in this survey were members of political 
parties. The lower proportion of women's participation was because women are, on 
the whole, more marginalized or less involved in political activities than men. 
Figure 7.2: Respondents' Gender 
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7.2.1.1.3 Respondents' Educational Levels 
In relation to education level, respondents were given five choices: 
• Below secondary education 
• Diploma 
• Bachelors degree 
• Masters degree 
• PhD 
185 
Figure 7.3 shows that 198 respondents who participated in this study (83.5%) had a 
bachelors degree or higher. It is clear that the majority of the respondents (110) held a 
bachelors degree (46.4%), whereas 45 held a master's degree (19.0%), and 43 held a 
PhD degree (18.1%). Therefore, it is obvious that the majority of the respondents 
were highly educated. 
Figure7.3: Level of Education of Respondents 
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So that result reflects, on average, the characteristics required of the population from 
which the sample was drawn. The researcher aimed at eliciting the respondents in his 
sample to be educated, knowledgeable, and aware of social and political affairs and 
the reality of political participation, in addition to having an impact on social and 
political life. Accordingly, these respondents' characteristics enable the researcher to 
assess properly the reality of political participation in Jordan and generalize the results 
of the research. 
7.2.1.1.4 Religion 
Data concerning the religion of the respondents can be seen in figure 7.4. 92% of 
respondents were Muslims, whereas 8% were Christians. This reflects the nature of 
the structure of Jordanian society in terms of religion, where 92% of Jordanians are 
Sunni Muslims, and about 6% are Christians according to the 2004 census. 
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Figure 7.4: Respondents' Religion 
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7.2.1.1.5 Place of Birth of Respondents 
The researcher asked the respondents to identify their place of birth to ensure that the 
data reflected all geographical segments of Jordanian society. Moreover, place of birth 
gives an indication of their geographical affiliation and the area represented by them 
in the study sample. In this question the respondents were given three choices to 
reflect the lifestyles of Jordanians: 
1. Urban 
2. Rural 
3. Badiyah 
It is worth mentioning that the proportion of the respondents, who live in urban areas 
(69.2%) as figure7.5 shows, is close to the proportion of the urban population in the 
main cities of Jordan which is (63%). And the same goes for the respondents who live 
in rural and badiyah areas. 
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Figure7.5: The Place of Birth and Distribution of Jordanian Population 
According to their Lifestyle 
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7.2.2 Descriptive Analysis of the Research Questions 
The following sections discuss the results of the descriptive analysis of the research 
questions. The first section presents the answers to the first five questions concerning 
levels of political freedoms in Jordan. The second group of questions asked the 
respondents about the effect of internal and external issues on political participation, 
in order to identify the main obstacles that prevent real and effective political 
participation in Jordan. The third section represents the respondents' evaluations of 
the role and performance of Jordanian political parties in political arena. 
The fourth section of the analysis concerns the respondents' participation in the 2003 
parliamentary elections and the main reasons behind their level of participation. In 
relation to voters' behaviour in Jordanian parliamentary elections the researcher will 
represent in section five the respondents' evaluation of the main motives for 
participation. The final section of the analysis concerns the respondents' evaluations 
of current electoral law. 
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7.2.2.1 Indicators of Political Freedom in Jordan 
It is necessary to determine the political elites' belief concerning the levels of political 
freedom in Jordan as one of the most important signs of political development. The 
questionnaire asked the respondents a series of questions about equality and the levels 
of political freedom guaranteed by the constitution, the Political Parties' Law, and the 
Press and Publications Law. Furthermore, these freedoms are closely related to 
political participation, and the expansion of these freedoms is considered to be 
synonymous with political participation. Respondents were asked to indicate how 
strongly they agreed or disagreed that the following freedoms are guaranteed in 
Jordan: freedom of opinion; freedom to participate in political demonstrations; 
freedom to join political parties; equality of citizens' rights regardless of their 
religion, ethnic origin, and tribal affiliation; freedom to criticize and disagree with the 
government in public without being subject to security consequences; and freedom to 
participate in peaceful oppositional political activities without being subject to 
security consequences. 
The results revealed that the freedom to join political parties was considered the most 
guaranteed freedom by 57.4% of the respondents, compared to 30.8% who disagreed 
that this freedom was guaranteed, and 11.8% were neutral, as shown in table 7.1. It is 
worth mentioning that 51.6% of political party members agreed or strongly agreed 
that freedom of membership in political parties is guaranteed. The second guaranteed 
freedom is freedom of speech with 37.6%, compared to 54% of the respondents who 
believed that the freedom of speech was not guaranteed in Jordan. 
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Table 7.1 Indicators of Political Freedoms in Jordan 
Political Freedom SD D N A SA Total 
F % F % F % F % F % 
Freedom of opinion 45 19 83 35 20 8.4 82 34.6 7 3 237 
Participate in political 
demonstrations 
54 22.9 80 33.9 24 10.2 75 31.8 3 1.3 236 
Joining political 
parties 
30 12.7 43 18.1 28 11.8 109 46.0 27 11.4 237 
Equality of citizens 
rights 
65 27.5 65 27.5 24 10.2 62 26.3 20 8.5 236 
Criticizing the 
government 
65 27.4 88 37.1 24 10.1 53 22.4 7 3 237 
Participation in 
peaceful political 
activities 
45 19.1 84 35.6 25 10.6 71 30.1 11 4.7 236 
SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree 
The percentage of journalists who believed that freedom of speech was not guaranteed 
is 46.3%, compared to 43.7% who agreed or strongly agreed that the freedom of 
speech was guaranteed in Jordan, whereas 10% were neutral. With regard to freedom 
to criticize and disagree with the government in public without being subject to 
security consequences, 64.5% of the respondents believed that this freedom was not 
guaranteed, where 25.4% thought it was. 
Approximately 55% of the respondents believed that the freedom to participate in 
political demonstrations and peaceful political activities was not guaranteed, whereas 
about 33% agreed that these freedoms were guaranteed. Regarding the equality of 
Jordanian citizens, a total of 55% of respondents reported that they disagreed or 
strongly disagreed that there was equality of rights for all Jordanian citizens 
regardless of religion, ethnic origin, and family or tribal affiliations. 
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Accordingly, the ranking of political freedoms in Jordan being considered guaranteed 
according to the data as follows: 
1. Freedom to join political parties (57.4% of respondents) 
2. Freedom of opinion (37.6%) 
3. Participation in peaceful political activities (34.8%) 
4. Equality of citizens' rights regardless of religion, and ethnic origin (34.8%). 
5. Freedom to participate in political demonstrations (33.1 %) 
6. The freedom to criticize or disagree with the government (25.4%). 
Based on the data presented in table 7.1 only approximately one-third of respondents 
believed that political freedoms are guaranteed in Jordan, with the exception of the 
freedom to join political parties. 
The fourth question of the questionnaire attempted to explore i f the respondents had 
ever been subject to security or living consequences due to criticizing the government. 
The results of this question show that 134 respondents (74.4%) stated that they had 
never been subject to security consequences, while 25.6% stated that they had as 
figure7.6 shows. 
Figure 7.6: Respondents' Answers to the Question: "Have you ever been subject 
to security consequences due to criticizing the government?" 
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It is worth noting that (42.2%) the highest rate from respondents who answered yes 
were political parties' members followed by journalists (26.0 % ) , and the third group 
was members of human rights associations. However, in practice, members of human 
right associations, journalists, and members of political parties tend to criticize the 
government and its policies more often than do others. 
Table 7.2 Respondents' Answer to the Question: "Have you ever been subject to 
security consequences due to criticizing the government?" by group. 
choice 
Political 
Parties Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
Yes F 27 5 2 20 6 60 
% 42.2% 13.9% 9.5% 26.0% 16.7% 25.6% 
No F 37 31 19 57 30 174 
% 57.8% 86.1% 90.5% 74.0% 83.3% 74.4% 
Total 64 36 21 77 36 234 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Question 5 of the questionnaire asked the respondents who answered (yes) to the 
previous question to identify the types of punishment they were subject to due to 
criticizing the government. The respondents were given five choices: custodial 
sentences, physical punishment, restriction or loss of civic and other rights, others, 
and refusal to answer. 
Table 7.3 shows the frequencies and percentages of respondents' answers concerning 
the type of punishment they had been subject to. The results indicate that 63.3% had 
custodial sentences, 16.1% suffered restrictions or loss of civic and other rights, and 
4.8% suffered physical punishment. A small percentage of respondents (4.8%, n=3) 
mentioned another type of punishment, that of dismissal from their job. Six 
respondents (9.7%), who were exposed to punishment refused to identify its type. 
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Table 7.3: Respondents' Answer to the Question: "What type of punishment 
have you been subject to?" 
Punishment 
GROUP Total 
Political 
Parties Academics PCM Journalists HRO 
Custodial 
sentences 
F 17 3 1 16 3 38 
% 65.4% 60.0% 50.0% 69.6% 50.0% 63.3% 
Physical 
punishment 
F 0 1 0 2 0 3 
% .0% 20.0% .0% 8.7% .0% 4.8% 
Restriction or 
loss of civic 
and other 
rights 
F 6 0 0 2 2 10 
% 
23.1% .0% .0% 8.7% 33.3% 16.1% 
Others F 3 
11.5% 
0 
.0% 
0 
.0% 
0 
.0% 
0 
.0% 
3 
4.8% % 
refused to 
answer 
F 0 
.0% 
1 
20.0% 
1 
50.0% 
3 
13.0% 
1 
16.7% 
6 
9.7% % 
Total F 26 5 2 23 6 60 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
7.2.2.2 Obstacles to Political Participation in Jordan 
There are many obstacles to political participation in Jordan. These obstacles may 
relate to internal issues such as corruption, economic status, tribalism and the current 
election law, which have all been frequently mentioned as obstacles to democracy and 
political participation. Also international and regional events may impede political 
participation. Therefore, in order to measure the political elite's opinions regarding 
the main obstacles that impede political participation in Jordan respondents were 
asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that internal factors and 
international events were considered as obstacles to political participation. 
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7.2.2.2.1 Respondents' Views about Internal Issues 
Question 6 of the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement 
or disagreement to explore to what extent internal problems form an obstacle to 
political participation. According to the results, the majority of the respondents 
(76.8%) agreed that internal factors are an obstacle to political participation in Jordan. 
Of the remaining respondents, 13% disagreed and 10.2% were neutral as shown in 
figure 7 .7. 
Figure 7.7: Level of Respondents' Agreement that Internal Issues were 
Considered Obstacle to Political Participation 
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In addition respondents were asked to identify the most important of the various 
internal issues which constituted the biggest obstacle to creating a stable environment 
for political participation. Therefore, the question provided respondents with five 
main reasons, in addition to an open-ended choice to mention other reasons: 
1. Administrative and financial corruption in Jordan. 
2. The economic status of Jordanian citizens. 
3. Lack of government seriousness to achieve democracy 
4. Tribalism. 
5. The current electoral system. 
6. Other reasons (please specify). 
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Table 7.4 shows that the largest obstacle, according to 36% of respondents, was the 
spread of administrative and financial corruption. 
Table 7.4 Respondents' Views about the Most Important Obstacle to Political 
Participation 
Main obstacles F % 
administrative and financial corruption 64 36 
Lack of government seriousness to achieve 
democracy 
54 30.3 
Economic status of Jordanian citizens 26 14.6 
Tribalism 13 7.3 
Current electoral system (SNTV) 11 6 
Other reasons 11 6 
Total 178 100 
The second most important internal obstacle, according to the 30.3% of respondents, 
was a lack of government seriousness to achieve democracy and to open the way for 
professional associations, political parties, and the media to participate freely in the 
political sphere. The results revealed also that 14.6% of respondents saw the 
economic status of the Jordanian citizens as the most important obstacle to political 
participation. 7.3% saw tribalism as the main obstacle, and 6% cited Jordan's current 
election law. 
As table 7.4 indicates, a few respondents (6%, n = l l ) mentioned other obstacles to 
political participation. (3.9%, n=7) of them declared that the low level of political 
culture to Jordanian citizens was an obstacle to political participation, and (2.2%, n=4) 
mentioned security reasons. 
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7.2.2.2.2 Respondents' Views about International and Regional events 
Question 8 in the questionnaire aimed to find out the possible impact of dramatic 
international events on the Jordanian political arena. Moreover, the question aimed to 
explore whether it was the perceptions of respondents that regional events had a 
negative impact on political participation in Jordan. 
The respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that 
international and regional events could be considered an obstacle to political 
participation. 56.1% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that international and 
regional events were an obstacle as shown in figure 7.8, compared to 33.3% of 
respondents who disagreed. Overall, then, 76.8% of respondents saw the internal 
issues as obstacles, while 56.1% considered international and regional events as 
obstacles. 
Figure 7.8 Respondents' Opinion Concerning whether or not International and 
Regional Events were Considered as Obstacles to Political Participation 
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The respondents were asked to give their views regarding which of five possible 
international and regional events or situations were most important in affecting 
political participation: 
1. The ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
2. Present and ongoing conflicts and crises in Iraq. 
3. The September 11th attacks and the war against terrorism. 
4. The unwillingness of certain parties or states to achieve stability in the region. 
5. The unwillingness of certain parties or states to achieve true democracy in the 
Arab World. 
6. Other reasons (please specify). 
As can be seen from table 7.5, the largest perceived barrier was the ongoing 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict (41.2%), whereas the unwillingness of certain parties or 
states to push up democracy in the Arab World also scored highly (23.7%), while 
21.4% saw the unwillingness of certain parties or states to achieve stability in the 
region was the main obstacle. Only 7.6% thought that the ongoing war in Iraq was an 
obstacle. In addition, (2.3%, n=3) of respondents have considered the American 
attacks on the region as the main regional factors that affects political participation in 
Jordan. 
Table 7.5 Respondents' Opinions Concerning "What is the most important 
reason in your point of view?" 
Main obstacles F % 
The ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 54 41.2% 
Present and ongoing conflicts and crises in Iraq 10 7.6% 
The September 11th attack and the war against 
terrorism 
5 3.8% 
The unwillingness of certain parties or states to 
achieve stability in the region 
28 21.4% 
The unwillingness of certain parties or states in 
presence of true democracy in the Arab World. 
31 23.7% 
Other reasons 3 2.3% 
Total 131 100 
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7.2.2.3 Political Participation through Political Parties (Evaluation of the Role of 
Jordanian Political Parties). 
Political parties became important in Jordanian democratic practice as early as the 
1990s when Jordan was in transition from martial law to democratization. In 1989 the 
regime lifted both martial law and the longstanding ban on political parties as part of 
the process of democratization allowing the legalization and participation of political 
parties in political life. As many as 33 parties emerged between 1992 and 2003 to 
participate in political life and parliamentary elections. The third group of questions in 
the questionnaire assessed the views of the respondents regarding the performance of 
political parties. 
The questionnaire aimed to assess participation through membership in political 
parties, the issues of concern of them, their performance and ability to form a 
government in Jordan. Question 10 of the questionnaire asked the respondents i f they 
belonged to political parties. 
The findings in table 7.6 show that the majority of the respondents (63.5%) are not 
members of political parties. It is worth noting that, with the exception of political 
party members, only 14.5% of the respondents were members of political parties, 
while 85.5% of the other respondents did not belong to political parties. 
Table 7.6 Respondents' Answers to the Question: "Do you belong to a political 
party?" 
Choices Political 
party 
members 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
F % F % F % F % F % F % 
Y E S 60 93.8 7 19.4 5 23.8 10 13.5 2 5.7 84 36.5 
NO 4 6.3 29 80.6 16 76.2 64 86.5 33 94.3 146 63.5 
Total 64 100 36 100 21 100 74 100 35 100 230 100 
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Furthermore, the results revealed that the members of the professional councils 
(23.8%) were more likely than other groups to belong to political parties. 19.4% of 
academics belonged to political parties, and 13.5% of journalists were party members, 
while members of human right associations had the lower membership in political 
parties (5.7%). 
Those who said that they were not party members were then asked that i f they 
intended to join any political parties in the future, which of the current political parties 
would represent their political aspirations so that might join it. I f they did not intend 
to join political party, they were asked to mention the main reason for this. 
Table 7.7 below shows that 80.5% of respondents said that they did not intend to join 
political parties. Only 19.5% answered they would join political parties in the future. 
Not only were members of professional councils the most likely to belong to political 
parties, but also the proportion of their members who did not belong to political 
parties but intended in the future was also highest, at 52.9%. 
Table 7.7 Respondents Answer to the Question, "Do you intend to join a political 
party in the future?" 
Choices Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
F % F % F % F % F % F % 
Y E S 1 25 5 17.5 9 52.9 9 13 5 17.1 29 19.5 
NO 3 75 24 82.8 8 47.1 60 87 29 82.9 124 80.5 
Total 4 100 29 100 17 100 69 100 35 100 153 100 
Then respondents who intended to join political parties in the future were asked in 
question 12 to indicate which of the current political parties represented their political 
aspirations so that they might join. (41.4%, n=12) said that IAF the party who 
represented their political aspirations, and (24.2%, n=7) said that the Arab Socialist 
Renaissance (Ba'ath) party represented their political aspirations and that they might 
join it in the future. Ten respondents (34.4%) said that none of the current political 
parties represented their views or political aspirations. 
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On the other hand, the respondents who did not intend to join political parties were 
asked to mention the main reasons behind their decision. From 124 respondents who 
answered (no) in question 11, (48.4%, n=60) answered this question. The majority of 
these respondents (70%, n=42) declared that they had no confidence in the current 
political parties and their programmes as they did not offer clear proposals to address 
the country's main problems. Seven respondents (11.6%) indicated that they feared of 
the security consequences i f they joined political parties. Another seven said that the 
absence of democracy was the main reason, and one respondent justified his lack of 
interest in joining political parties due to his harsh prior experience with political 
parties and the government. 5% declared that they were not interested in political 
participation. 
Respondents were then questioned about their views about the issues of concern to 
political parties and whether or not their performance had been successful in the 
political field. Question 14 of the questionnaire asked respondents i f the current 
political parties in Jordan worked in the service of the people and society. Table 7.8 
shows that 49.2% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this, while 36% 
of respondents believed that the political parties did work in the service of the people 
and the society. 
However, it is worth mentioning that 28.8% of the political party members did not 
believe that political parties work in the service of people and society, as shown in 
table 7.8. 71.4% of members of professional councils also replied in the negative and 
63.9% of members of HRO similarly disagreed or strongly disagreed, as did 52.8% of 
academics and 21.4% of journalists. 
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Table 7.8 Respondents' Opinions about Whether or not the Current Political 
Parties in Jordan Work in Service of the People and Society" 
Statement Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
SD F 3 5 7 9 11 35 
% 4.8 13.9 33.3 12.5 30.6 15.4 
D F 15 14 8 28 12 77 
% 23.8 38.9 38.1 8.9 33.3 33.8 
N F 2 6 2 18 6 34 
% 3.2 16.7 9.5 25 16.7 14.9 
A F 30 9 3 15 7 64 
% 47.6 25 14.3 20.8 19.4 28.1 
SA F 13 2 1 2 0 18 
% 20.6 5.6 4.8 2.8 0 7.9 
Total F 63 36 21 72 36 228 
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree 
Question 15 of the questionnaire aimed to explore further the respondents' thoughts 
and opinions regarding the political parties' goals and practices. Therefore, 
respondents were asked i f the current political parties in Jordan worked in the service 
of their leaderships. Table 7.9 shows that 54.9% of respondents believed that the 
current political parties work in the service of their leaderships. Only 26.2% of 
respondents opposed this opinion, and 18.9% were neutral. It is also noteworthy that 
35.9% of political party members saw political party leaders as concerned only with 
their own interests, and further 14.1% did not answer the question. 
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Table 7.9 Respondents' Opinion on the Statement "The current political parties 
in Jordan work in the service of their leaderships" 
Statement Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
SD F 10 1 1 3 4 19 
% 15.6 2.8 4.8 3.9 11.1 8.2 
D F 22 4 4 8 4 42 
% 34.4 11.1 19 10.5 11.1 18 
N F 9 7 4 15 9 44 
% 14.1 19.4 19 19.7 25 18.9 
A F 16 16 5 32 10 79 
% 25 44.4 23.8 42.1 27.8 33.9 
SA F 7 8 7 18 9 49 
% 10.9 22.2 33.3 23.7 25 21 
Total F 64 36 21 76 36 233 
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree 
As can be seen from the table 7.9 above, a total of 67.1% of the members of PC, 
66.6% of academics, 65.8% of journalists, and 52.8% of members of HROs agreed or 
agreed strongly with the statement that political parties work in the service of their 
leaderships. 
Question 16 then asked respondents to indicate their degree of agreement or 
disagreement regarding the performance of political parties in the political field. As 
table 7.10, shows, the level of satisfaction regarding political party performance was 
very low. Only 14.2% of respondents who agreed, and 3.4% of respondents agreed 
strongly, that political parties were successful in the political field. 
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A notable majority of the respondents (64.7%) believed that political parties were 
unsuccessful in their political performance. From the data presented in the table 7.10 
it should be noted that about half of the political party members were not satisfied 
with the political performance of parties, when with 46.8% of them disagreeing or 
strongly disagreeing with the statement. Moreover, apart from political party 
members, approximately three-quarters (71.5%) of other respondents were also not 
satisfied with the political parties' performance. 
Table 7.10: Respondents' Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current 
Political Parties 
Statement Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
SD F 7 11 9 19 15 61 
% 10.9 30.6 42.9 25.3 41.7 26.3 
D F 23 14 6 33 13 89 
% 35.9 38.9 28.6 44 36.1 38.4 
N F 13 4 3 16 5 41 
% 20.3 11.1 14.3 21.3 13.9 17.7 
A F 17 6 1 6 3 33 
% 26.6 16.7 4.8 8 8.3 14.2 
SA F 4 1 2 1 0 8 
% 6.3 2.8 9.5 1.3 0 3.4 
Total F 64 36 21 75 36 232 
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree 
Respondents were then asked i f any of the current political parties would be qualified 
to form a government. It can be seen from table 7.11 that slightly over half (51.5%) 
of the respondents believed that the current political parties were not qualified to form 
a government, while 30.9% of respondents thought that some of the current parties 
were qualified to form a government. 17.6% of respondents were neutral on this 
question. 
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56.3% of political party members believed that some parties were qualified to form a 
government, while 32.9% thought not and 10.9% were neutral. On the other hand, a 
majority of other groups' respondents (58.5%) disagreed with the idea that political 
parties were qualified to form a government, with only 21.3% thinking that some 
parties were qualified. It is worth noting that a notable proportion of these respondents 
(20.1%) were neutral on the question. 
Table 7.11: Degree of Respondents' Agreement with the Statement "Some of the 
current political parties are qualified to form a government" 
Choices Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
SD F 9 6 8 24 14 61 
% 14.1 16.7 38.1 31.6 38.9 26.2 
D F 12 13 5 17 12 59 
% 18.8 36.1 23.8 22.8 33.3 25.3 
N F 7 7 2 17 8 41 
% 10.9 19.4 9.5 22.4 22.2 17.6 
A F 25 6 5 14 2 52 
% 39.1 16.7 23.8 18.4 5.6 22.3 
SA F 11 4 1 4 0 20 
% 17.2 11.1 4.8 5.3 0 8.6 
Total F 64 36 21 76 36 233 
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree 
For those 72 respondents who supported the idea that some of the current political 
parties were qualified to form a government, the questionnaire in question 18 asked 
them to identify these parties, 64 respondents answered this question. 
These respondents mentioned seven political parties in their answers, while some 
suggested that a new coalition could form a government. It is clear from table 7.12 
below that a majority of respondents (64.1%) named the Islamic Action Front as the 
party qualified to form a government. On the other hand there was a considerably 
lower confidence in other parties, and 9.4% of respondents suggested a new coalition 
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between leftists and nationalists could form a government. The Islamic Centrist Party 
named as qualified to form a government by 6.3% and 4.7% of respondents said that 
the Jordanian Arab Ba'ath was qualified. 
Table 7.12 Respondents' Answer to the Question: "If did you agree in question 
17 could you please mention these parties" 
Political Party Frequency Percentage 
IAF 41 64.1 
Leftists and Nationalists* 6 9.4 
Islamic Centrist Party 4 6.3 
The Jordanian Arab Ba'ath 3 4.7 
Renaissance Party 2 3.1 
The Jordanian Democratic Unity 
Party (HASHD) 
1 1.6 
Jordanian National movement41 1 1.6 
The Jordanian Communist Party 1 1.6 
National Constitution Party 1 1.6 
Total 64 100 
* Suggestions for new coalitions 
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The general perception is that tribalism in Jordan is predominant in the political 
process, urging the researcher in this study to explore the influence of tribalism on 
political parties in particular and the political spectrum in general. Therefore, 
respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they felt that tribalism in Jordan 
constituted an obstacle in bringing political activists and party members into 
parliament. 
The overwhelming majority of respondents (82.3%) saw tribalism as an obstacle to 
political party members and activists in reaching parliament. Only 13.7% of 
respondents believed that tribalism was not an obstacle, as is clear from table 7.13. It 
is also worth mentioning that 87.5% of political party members believed that tribalism 
is an obstacle preventing their members from gaining seats in parliament. 
Table7.13 Respondents Agreement with the Statement that "tribalism is 
considered an obstacle to political activists and party members in reaching 
parliament" 
Choices Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
SD F 3 3 1 2 2 11 
% 4.7% 8.6% 4.8% 2.9% 5.6% 4.9% 
D F 3 1 1 11 4 20 
% 4.7% 2.9% 4.8% 15.7% 11.1% 8.8% 
N F 2 2 1 4 0 9 
% 3.1% 5.7% 4.8% 5.7% .0% 4.0% 
A F 27 12 8 31 19 97 
% 42.2% 34.3% 38.1% 44.3% 52.8% 42.9% 
SA F 29 17 10 22 11 89 
% 45.3% 48.6% 47.6% 31.4% 30.6% 39.4% 
Total F 64 35 21 70 36 226 
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree 
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7.2.2.4 Participation in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections 
The parliamentary elections in Jordan raised many problematic and challenging issues 
concerning the electoral system, elections management, the results of the elections, 
and the degree of citizen participation. Therefore, respondents were asked about their 
participation in the 2003 parliamentary elections, the main reason behind their vote, 
voting for women in Jordanian parliamentary elections, the voters' behaviour, and 
their evaluations of the electoral system. 
Question 19 of the questionnaire asked respondents i f they had voted in the last 
elections to explore their participation in parliamentary elections. Respondents were 
given two choices: 
1. Yes (please move to question 20) or 
2. No (please move to question 21). 
As shown in table 7.14 a majority of the respondents (77.4%) had voted in the last 
parliamentary elections compared with a ratio of 22.6% who did not participate. It can 
be also noted from the table that the ratios of those who participated in the last 
elections among professional councils' members (85.7%) and political party members 
(84.4%) were higher than those in other groups of the sample. 
Table 7.14 Respondents' Participation in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections 
Choices Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
F % F % F % F % F % F % 
Y E S 54 84.4 25 69.4 18 85.7 59 75.6 26 72.2 182 77.4 
NO 10 15.6 11 30.6 3 14.3 19 24.4 10 27.8 53 22.6 
Total 64 100 36 100 21 100 78 100 36 100 235 100 
In general, the participation rate of respondents was around three-quarters, ranging 
from a low of 69.4% academics to a high of 85.7% of PCM. On the other hand, the 
ratios of those who did not participate in the last elections ranged from 14.3% of 
PCMs to 30% of academics. 
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Question 20 of the questionnaire asked respondents who said they had voted to 
identify the main reason behind this decision. The respondents were given five 
choices: 
1. National duty and constitutional right, 
2. Tribalism and social ties, 
3. To put the right person in the right position, 
4. To enhance democracy in Jordan, 
5. Others (please specify) 
However, it is clear from table 7.15 below that national duty and constitutional rights 
represented the main priority for many of the sample. Over half of the respondents 
(52.2%) declared that this was the most important reason behind their decision to vote 
in the last elections. 
Table 7.15: Respondents' Reasons for Participating in the 2003 Parliamentary 
Elections 
Main reason Frequency Percentage 
National duty and constitutional 
right 
95 52.2% 
To enhance democracy in Jordan 33 18.1% 
To put the right person in the right 
position 
27 14.8% 
Tribalism and social ties 22 12.1% 
Other reasons 5 2.7% 
Total 182 100% 
Only 18.1% of respondents supported the issue of enhancing democracy in Jordan, 
and putting the right person in the right position was third with 14.8% of responses. 
Tribalism and social ties was cited by 12.1%, and 2.7% of the respondents declared 
that their participation was a partisan decision. 
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Question 21 asked respondents who did not participate in the last elections about the 
main reason for their decision not to vote. The respondents were given five choices: 
1. I am not satisfied with the ability of the Parliamentary councils, 
2. I'm not satisfied with elections' results, 
3. I'm not satisfied with the candidates available, 
4. I am not interested, 
5. Other reasons (please specify) 
45.3% of respondents said that they did not participate because they were not satisfied 
with the ability of the parliamentary councils to play an effective role in political life. 
18.9% of respondents were not interested in the election process in general, as shown 
in table 7.16. 
Table 7.16 Respondents' Reasons for Non-participation in the 2003 Elections 
The main reason Frequency Percentage 
I am not satisfied with the ability of 
the Parliamentary councils 
24 45.3% 
I am not interested 10 18.9% 
lam not satisfied with elections' 
results 
6 11.3% 
I am not satisfied with the candidates 
available 
7 13.2% 
Other reasons 6 11.3% 
Total 53 100% 
11.3% of these respondents declared that they did not participate because they are not 
satisfied with election results. The respondents who did not participate due to their 
dissatisfaction with the candidates available in their districts totalled 13.2%. Six 
(11.3%) of respondents gave other reasons for not voting. Four respondents said that 
they boycott elections, and another two were below voting age in the 2003 
parliamentary elections. 
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7.2.2.4.1 Voting for Women Candidates in Jordanian Parliamentary Elections 
The number of women candidates for Jordanian parliamentary elections has increased 
steadily since women won the right to run for parliamentary elections in 1980s. But it 
will also be noticed that the increase in the number of women candidates has not 
accompanied by an increase in the number of women MPs. 
To explore the problematic relationship between the number of women candidates and 
women MPs, the respondents were asked two questions to provide an overview about 
the reality of women participation in parliamentary elections. Question 22 of the 
questionnaire aimed at finding the reality of voting for women in the 2003 elections. 
Based on data presented in figure 7.9 the results revealed that an overwhelming 
majority of the 234 respondents (84.2%) had not voted for women, compared with 
only 15.8% who had. 
Figure7.9 Respondents' Voting for Women Candidates in the 2003 
Parliamentary Elections 
• Total F 
• Total % 
g g g 
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100 
u -
YES NO Total 
• Total F 37 197 234 
• Total % 15.8 84.2 100 
79.6% of the respondents who had participated in the last elections but did not vote 
for women candidates, compared with 20.4% who did. It is also worth noting that the 
ratio of respondents who did not vote for women in different groups of sample study 
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ranged from 79.7% of political party members to 88.9% of HRO members as shown 
in table 7.17. 
Table 7.17 Voting for Women Candidates in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections by 
Group 
Choices Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
F % F % F % F % F % F % 
YES 13 20.3 5 13.9 3 14.3 12 15.6 4 11.1 37 15.8 
NO 51 79.7 31 86.1 18 85.7 65 84.4 32 88.9 197 84.2 
Total 64 100 36 100 21 100 77 100 36 100 234 100 
More importantly, the results revealed that the ratio of women who voted for women 
candidates was very low (18.9%) compared with 43 women respondent (81.1%) who 
did not vote, as figure 7.10 shows. 
Figure 7.10: Respondents' Answer to Question 22 According to Gender 
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As a consequence of concern at the low rates of voting for women candidates in 
Jordanian parliamentary elections, as shown in the figure above, question 23 of the 
questionnaire aimed at discovering an explanation for women's low representation in 
parliament, asking respondents for their main reason for not voting for women 
candidates. Respondents were given five main choices: 
1. Lack of women experience in political affairs. 
2. Social obstacles (culture and traditions) 
3. Religious dimension (for example urging women to be more conservative and 
calling for the separation of the sexes in the workplace). 
4. Women do not have enough experience in public affairs 
5. Tribal dimension (women could not get support from their tribes) 
6. Other reasons (please specify) 
Table 7.18 sets out the main reasons respondents gave explaining their decisions to 
not vote for women. A majority of respondents (43.8%) concluded that the absence 
of women candidates with political experience was the main reason for their decision. 
Women not having enough experience in public affairs in general was the second 
most common reason (17.3%), and 6.1% cited social obstacles, 5.1%, the tribal and 
4.1% the religious dimension. 
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Table 7.18: Respondents' Reasons for Not Voting for Women Candidates 
Statement Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
lack of women F 22 17 9 29 9 86 
experience in 
political affairs 
% 
42.0% 54.8% 50.0% 44.6% 28.1% 43.8% 
Women do not have 8 4 3 12 7 34 
enough experience 
in public affairs 
% 
14.0% 12.9% 16.7% 18.5% 21.9% 17.3% 
Social obstacles F 5 1 1 2 3 12 
(community's % 
culture and 10.0% 3.2% 5.6% 3.1% 9.4% 6.1% 
traditions) 
Tribal dimension F 4 1 1 1 3 10 
(women could not % 
get support from 8.0% 3.2% 5.6% 1.5% 9.4% 5.1% 
her tribe) 
Religious dimension F 4 1 2 0 1 8 
(religion urging % 
women to be more 8.0% 3.2% 11.1% .0% 3.1% 4.1% 
conservative) 
Others F 
9 7 2 21 9 46 
% 
18.0% 22.6% 11.1% 32.3% 28.1 23.5 
Total F 50 31 18 65 32 196 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Moreover, 46 respondents (23.5%) cited five other reasons for not voting for women 
candidates. 22 (11.2%) stated that there were no women candidates in their electoral 
districts, and 10 (5.1%) indicated that they were committed to their tribal candidates. 
Some respondents (3.5%, n=7), said that they opposed the quota system and therefore 
they did not vote for women candidates, and another four respondents (2%) declared 
213 
that there were no partisan women's candidates in their districts. The current electoral 
law cited by (1.7%, n=3) of respondents as a reason not to vote for women candidates. 
It is also important to note that 42% of political party members who did not vote for 
women believed that women do not have enough political experience to be elected to 
parliament. In addition, 54% of academics, 50% of PCMs, and 44.6% of journalists 
gave the same reason for not voting for women. More importantly, table 7.19 shows 
that 50% of women respondents who did not vote for women candidates justified their 
decision in terms of lack of women's experience in political affairs. 
Table 7.19 Respondents' Reasons for Not Voting for Women Candidates, by sex 
Statement Men Women 
lack of women experience in 
political affairs 
F 64 21 
% 41.6% 50.0% 
Women do not have enough 
experience in public affairs 
F 30 3 
% 19.5% 7.1% 
Social obstacles (community's 
culture and traditions) 
F 9 3 
% 5.8% 7.1% 
Tribal dimension (women could not 
get support from her tribe) 
F 8 2 
% 5.2% 4.8% 
Religious dimension (religion 
urging women to be more 
conservative) 
F 6 2 
% 
3.9% 4.8% 
Others F 37 11 
% 24.0% 26.2% 
Total F 154 42 
100.0% 100.0% 
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7.2.2.5 Voters' Motives for Participation in Parliamentary Elections 
When voting takes place in parliamentary elections one important basic question is 
why do voters vote? In other words do voters vote according to their personal interests 
or for the interest of the community? In order to produce a clearer picture of 
parliamentary voting behaviour in Jordan the respondent were asked in questions 25 
and 26 about voting behaviour in Jordan. 
In question 25 respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement "Voting behaviour in Jordan is directly linked with the 
primary affiliations (tribal or familial) of voters". As figure 7.11 shows, nearly all 
respondents (91%, n= 211) either agreed or strongly agreed that voting behaviour was 
linked to tribal and familial affiliation. Only 15 respondents (6.5%) disagreed, and 6 
(2.6%) were neutral. 
Figure7.11 Respondents Opinion Regarding Voting Behaviour in Jordanian 
Parliamentary Elections 
• Frequency 
• Percentage % 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Disagree Neutral 
• Frequency 
Si Percentage % 
215 
In Question 26 the respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or 
disagreement with the statement. 'The service dimension in the relationship between 
voters and candidates and the proximity of the latter from the authorities and the 
centres of power lead voters to vote for one candidate over another". In figure 7.12 the 
results reveal that about four-fifths (77.9%, n=180) of the respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed that the service dimension plays an important role and has a strong 
effect on voters' choices in the elections. 10% of respondents disagreed with the idea, 
and 12.1% were neutral. 
Figure 7.12 Respondents' Opinions with Regard to the Effect of the Service 
Dimension on Voters' Preferences. 
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7.2.2.6 Evaluation of the Jordanian Electoral System (SNTV) 
The electoral system issue has become the subject of the most heated and 
controversial debate in Jordan since the return of multiparty politics in the 1980s. The 
major political changes started with the reintroduction of multi-party parliamentary 
elections in 1989 following the adoption of a new electoral law (the (BVS). However, 
after these elections the electoral law underwent several further changes. In 1993 the 
government issued a new electoral law for the subsequent elections, and the new 
formula (SNTV) has been used until the parliamentary elections in 2007. 
Accordingly following set of questions aimed to explore the evaluations of 
respondents of the current electoral law; whether or not suitable for political parties, 
women, and Jordanian society in general. Furthermore, the questions aimed to 
evaluate i f the current electoral system was thought to enhance democracy through 
encouraging political participation by all segments of society. 
In the first item of this section (question 27), respondents were asked to assess the 
suitability of the current law for the Jordanian society by stating their level of 
agreement or disagreement with the statement that, "The current electoral law 
(SNTV) is suitable for the structure of Jordanian society". As can be seen in table 
7.20, 44.8% of respondents strongly disagreed with the statement, and another 22% 
disagreed; this compares with only 23.7% who agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement. It appears that the majority of respondents 66.8% think that this law is not 
suitable. 
Moreover, the results also revealed that 81% of members of professional councils 
indicated that the current electoral law is unsuitable for Jordanian society, and 0% of 
them were neutral and 0% agreed strongly with the statement. In addition to 82.8% of 
political party members, and 62.6% of journalists, however, lower proportions of 
academics (55.6%), and HRO members (50%) indicated that they disagreed with the 
statement. On the other hand, 41.7% of members of HROs indicated that the current 
law is suitable for Jordanian society. 
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Table 7.20 Respondents' Evaluations of the Suitability of the Electoral System 
for Jordanian Society. 
Choices Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
SD F 43 10 11 28 12 104 
% 67.2% 27.8% 52.4% 37.3% 33.3% 44.8% 
D F 10 10 6 19 6 51 
% 15.6% 27.8% 28.6% 25.3% 16.7% 22.0% 
N F 2 5 0 12 3 22 
% 3.1% 13.9% .0% 16.0% 8.3% 9.5% 
A F 6 6 4 11 15 42 
% 9.4% 16.7% 19.0% 14.7% 41.7% 18.1% 
SA F 3 5 0 5 0 13 
% 4.7% 13.9% 0% 6.7% .0% 5.6% 
Total F 64 36 21 75 36 232 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree 
In the second item of this section the respondents were asked to identify their opinions 
regarding the fairness of current electoral law to women. The results indicate that 
slightly less than half of respondents 48.9% thought that the current electoral law is 
unfair to women compared to 37.8% who thought that the quota system is fair as table 
7.21 shows. 31 (13.3%) of respondents were neutral on this question. 
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Table 7.21: Respondents' Opinions Concerning the Current Electoral Law and 
the Quota System being Fair to Women" 
Choices Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
SD F 17 8 4 12 5 46 
% 26.6% 22.2% 19.0% 15.8% 13.9% 19.7% 
D F 21 11 10 20 6 68 
% 32.8% 30.6% 47.6% 26.3% 16.7% 29.2% 
N F 5 6 2 15 3 31 
% 7.8% 16.7% 9.5% 19.7% 8.3% 13.3% 
A F 19 8 2 22 17 68 
% 29.7% 22.2% 9.5% 28.9% 47.2% 29.2% 
SA F 2 3 3 7 5 20 
% 3.1% 8.3% 14.3% 9.2% 13.9% 8.6% 
Total F 64 36 21 76 36 233 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree 
The majority of women respondents (48.1%) believed that the current law is fair to 
women, whereas 40.4% disagreed as figure 7.13 shows. On the other hand 51.4% of 
male respondents believed that the quota system is unfair to women, whereas 34.8% 
believed that electoral law is fair to women. 
219 
Figure 7.13: Respondents' Opinions Concerning the Fairness of Current 
Electoral Law and the Quota System to Women, by sex 
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The electoral system has important consequences for the political system in general, 
and on the electoral fortunes and representation of political parties in particular. 
Therefore, the next question aimed at assessing the respondents' views regarding the 
fairness of electoral law to political parties. 
Question 29 of the questionnaire asked the respondents to identify their level of 
agreement or disagreement with the statement that, "The current electoral law 
(SNTV) is fair to political parties in Jordan". The results in table 7.22 show that 
almost three-quarters of respondents (70.8%, n=165) opposed the idea that the current 
electoral law is fair to political parties, compared with only 25.5% (n=36), who 
supported the idea that the current law is fair to political parties. 
It is also worth pointing out that nearly all political party members (90.7%) believed 
that the current electoral system is unfair to parties. Only 7.9% of political party 
members believed that the current law is fair. 
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Table 7.22: Respondents' Opinions Regarding the Statement "The current 
electoral law (SNTV) is fair to political parties in Jordan" 
Choices Political 
parties 
Academics PCM Journalists HRO Total 
SD F 44 13 7 32 11 107 
% 68.8% 36.1% 33.3% 42.1% 30.6% 45.9% 
D F 14 11 8 17 8 58 
% 21.9% 30.6% 38.1% 22.4% 22.2% 24.9% 
N F 1 6 1 17 7 32 
% 1.6% 16.7% 4.8% 22.4% 19.4% 13.7% 
A F 4 4 4 10 8 30 
% 6.3% 11.1% 19.0% 13.2% 22.2% 12.9% 
SA F 1 2 1 0 2 6 
% 1.6% 5.6% 4.8% 0% 5.6% 2.6% 
Total F 64 36 21 76 36 233 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree 
In the final item of the questionnaire the respondents were asked to indicate their 
views about the most suitable electoral system for Jordanian society. Respondents 
were provided with a list of electoral systems to choose from or they could suggest 
another system: 
1. One-vote System (SNTV) 
2. Multi-vote system (BV) 
3. Two votes system, one vote for the district and one vote for a national 
candidate (TVS) 
4. Proportional Representation (PR) 
5. Other (please specify) 
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7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a descriptive analysis of the data collected through an 
empirical study through the research instrument used in this study, a self-administered 
questionnaire. This survey aimed to discover the political elite's opinions and factual 
information relating political participation in Jordan. 
The study sample in this survey provided important and valuable information 
regarding political participation in Jordan, the main elements that affect it, the main 
barriers that confront real and effective participation in Jordan, the role of political 
parties in political life, voting behaviour, and the role played by electoral law. In view 
of these responses, the following chapter will present discussion and evaluation of the 
research results in order to provide answers to the research questions in this study. 
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CHAPTER E I G H T 
DISCUSSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results of the survey of a limited sample drawn from the 
political elite in Jordan, to characterise the sphere of political participation in Jordan 
and to identify and summarize the main challenges facing political participation, and 
especially the participation of political parties as one of the main elements of 
democracy. In addition, it evaluates the electoral system, which is one of the most 
important institutional arrangements in a democracy, in addition to its having a 
profound effect on political life. 
Furthermore, this chapter aims to identify the greatest challenges Jordanian women 
face in political participation, and the barriers faced in implementing and safeguarding 
their political rights. Finally, this chapter interprets the respondents' answers to 
questions concerning the degree to which the present obstacles particularly external 
and internal obstacles at the national level affect the Jordanian political environment. 
8.2 Political Freedoms in Jordan 
Understanding the status of political participation in Jordan requires an understanding 
of the political context in which political participation takes place. This involves, in 
particular, the elements of basic human rights and freedoms i f these are guaranteed 
and protected by the constitution, and legislations concerning political parties, and 
media and expression. Importantly, the Jordanian constitution, as described in chapter 
two, entitles 'the rights and duties of Jordanians' guarantees the rights of Jordanian 
citizens, including freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of religion, 
freedom of the press, academic freedom, and the right to elect parliamentary and 
municipal representatives. 
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On the other hand, those rights and freedoms are closely allied with individual rights, 
and therefore very important for the exercise of all rights relating to political 
participation. These rights and freedoms include freedom of expression and speech, 
freedom of assembly, freedom of association and membership of political parties, 
equality between all citizens, and the freedom to participate in demonstrations. 
8.2.1 Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of expression and ensuring the protection of the expression of opinions from 
abuse, are the root of all other freedoms at all times, to all peoples and in all societies. 
Most constitutions in the world regulate freedom to express opinions and provide 
some protection of this freedom. The Jordanian constitution states that, "The State 
shall guarantee freedom of opinion. Every Jordanian shall be free to express his 
opinion by speech, in writing, or by means of photographic representation and other 
forms of expression".484 
Moreover, this freedom is guaranteed in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which states that, "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers" 4 8 5, and this is also guaranteed in article 19 of the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights. 4 8 6 
Unlike the other forms of political freedoms, the importance of freedom of expression 
stems from the fact that this freedom is considered in itself as a form of political 
participation and at the same time it is important in engaging in other forms of 
political participation. For example, at the level of electoral participation and voting 
which is the most frequently used form of political participation, elections without 
free speech would have no meaning since voters and candidates need the right to 
communicate and convey consistent messages to each other. 
Constitution, Article 15. 
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm 
' http://www.unhchr.en/html/menu3/b/a ccpr.htm 
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Furthermore, in term of the participation of political parties in political life, parties 
should be able to communicate with the public in order to inform them of their views 
and platforms relating to specific domestic issues and foreign policy matters which 
must be dealt with. This communication strengthens political parties through citizens' 
support for their agendas and platforms. Consequently, the political parties will get 
more support from citizens for their candidates in elections, in order to elect 
candidates who can advance the parties' platforms. 
In Jordan there is a fierce debate concerning whether or not freedom of speech, 
especially without fear of punishment, really exists and, i f it exists, what are the limits 
of this freedom. As seen in the previous chapter, 37.6% of questionnaire respondents 
agreed that freedom of opinion is guaranteed. This result indicates that freedom of 
speech exists and is guaranteed to a certain extent. 
The government generally respects the rights of its citizens, at least in some respects. 
However, in practice the government places some restrictions on freedom of speech. 
Generally individuals in Jordan are able to express their opinions and criticize the 
government privately without reprisals. However, citizens are tending to criticize the 
government in public less. The government imposes certain restrictions which impede 
political criticism, particularly on opposition political activists, and members of 
political parties, and other groups (such as journalists, and members of human rights 
organizations) who criticise the governments' policies and practices. 
Furthermore, the restrictions on the level of freedom to criticise and disagree with the 
government in public without being subject to security consequences are varying from 
group to another according to their practice of criticising and opposing the 
governments' policies, in addition to the effect of this criticism on the public. 
Therefore, i f those who criticise the government, such as the members of political 
parties and journalists have wide popular support they tend to face more limits and 
restrictions than others, as figure 8.1 shows. In its annual human rights report released 
2007, Amnesty International published reports highly critical of government policy 
and practice to restrict civil liberties particularly freedom of expression. The report 
indicated that "There were new violations of the rights to freedom of expression and 
association. The Public Assemblies Law was invoked to deny permission for some 
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demonstrations, including those in opposition to Israel. Several people were arrested, 
apparently after exercising their right to freedom of expression. Some of these were 
arrested for criticizing the king and inciting sectarian or racial strife". 4 8 7 
Figure8.1: Percentages of Respondent Groups who Agreed that Freedom of 
Speech is Guaranteed 
Journalists 
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The results also revealed that the members of political parties who believed that the 
government does not guarantee freedom of speech in Jordan had been subjected to 
security consequences more than other groups, where 42.2% of them declared that 
they had been subjected to security consequences as a result of criticising the 
government in public. In addition 26% of journalists were subjected to security 
consequences due to their criticism of the government's policies, as had some 
members of human right organizations. In addition, some respondents who had not 
been subject to security consequences explained that they had never exercised this 
freedom; in other words they believed that they could not criticise the government in 
public without anticipating punishment. 
The Jordanian governments have shown intolerance of public criticism, as evidenced 
by the series of amendments to Press and Publications Laws in 1993, 1997, 1998, and 
1999. Al l of these amendments gave the authorities sweeping powers to reduce the 
degree of press freedom. The temporary 1997 law which were ratified by royal decree 
4 8 7 For more details see http://report2007.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-
Africa/Jordan. 
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without parliamentary debate, give the government broad powers to fine, suspend, or 
permanently close newspapers found to be in violation of the new law's provision, 
and also impose on publications arbitrary and discriminatory financial obligations. 
According to the current law, it is prohibited to publish any information, news, 
cartoons, or commentaries about Jordan's armed forces and security services, offends 
the King and the royal family, harm national unity, general ethics, religion, security 
apparatus, and insults the head of Arab and friendly states. This is in addition to the 
last controversial amendment that allowed the jailing of journalists who break the 
press law. 
Moreover, under the new law, weekly newspapers were required to increase their 
capital from 15,000 to 300,000 JD. These requirements forced many of Jordan's 
critical weeklies, which had a circulation of just a few thousand, to fold. Additionally, 
Jordanian publications and research institutions are not allowed to accept funding 
from foreign sources. Although government research centres have been permitted 
to accept foreign funding from the same resources, in 2000 and 2001 four journalists 
Nidal Mansour, a journalist and Director of the Centre for the Defence and Protection 
of Press Freedom, Mahsen Imam, George Hawatmeh, and Bilal Tal were detained for 
questioning concerning the acceptance of foreign funding of their research centre. In 
2001 Nidal Mansour was interrogated and banned from writing for one year for 
receiving foreign funding. 4 8 9 Furthermore, the press law provides for the government 
licensing of publications, and these licenses may be revoked for a number of reasons 
such as i f the license conditions or requirements related to specialization, are 
breached.490 
In conclusion, without free speech no political reform is possible, and no resistance 
concerning domestic issues is possible such as the financial and administrative 
corruption which the country is suffering from. Furthermore, free speech is very 
important for any government claiming a serious commitment to enhancing 
democracy and political participation in order to know what the people actually feel 
and think. 
4 8 8 Press and Publication Law (1999), Article 40. 
4 8 9 Kialni, Sa'ada . Press Freedoms in Jordan. Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, p. 23. 
www.euromedright.net/english/Download/press%2book-eng-work%20version.doc 
4 9 0 Press and publication Law (1998), Articles 12, 15, and 17. 
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8.2.2 Freedom to Join Political Parties 
Political parties are the only political organizations able to provide comprehensive 
national views and agendas about the challenges facing society. More importantly, the 
way that political parties deal with these challenges enables citizens to choose among 
them concerning what meets their aspirations and interests. In addition, joining 
political parties enables citizens to influence the political process and deepen political 
participation to a greater extent than just casting the ballot every four years. 
With regard to the freedom of assembly and the right to join political parties in 
Jordan, the Jordanian constitution guarantees the right of citizens to set up and join 
political parties: 
(i) "Jordanians shall have the right to hold meetings within the limits of the 
law. 
(ii) Jordanians are entitled to establish societies and political parties provided 
that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, their methods 
peaceful, and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the 
constitution".491 
Moreover, this right was confirmed by Article 4 of the Political Parties' Law No 32 
for the year 1992 which repealed the 1955 law and stated that, "Jordanians have the 
right to form political parties and to voluntarily join them according to the provisions 
of the Law". 4 9 2 The sample surveyed in this study confirmed this right when 57.4% of 
the respondents agreed that the freedom to join political parties is guaranteed. On the 
other hand, although this right is guaranteed by constitution and law, the results 
showed that although the freedom to join political parties was considered the most 
guaranteed freedom, Jordanians are reluctant to join political parties. T he results 
revealed that, excluding political party members, 85.5 % of the sample had not joined 
political parties. Moreover, 80.5% of them did not intend to join political parties in the 
future. This reluctance of Jordanians to join political parties is discussed below in the 
evaluation of political party participation. 
4 9 1 Constitution, Article 16. 
4 9 2 On line http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/pol_partiesl-14.html 
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8.2.3 Free Participation of Jordanian Citizens in Demonstrations and Peaceful 
Oppositional Political Activities 
As discussed in chapter four, political participation is defined by most political 
scientists as any kind of behaviour which aims at helping citizens to play a role in 
political life and to influence the public decision making process. The level of 
political participation varies from one political system to another, according to the 
political development achieved by the system. Accordingly what might be relevant in 
one political system might be completely irrelevant or even illegal in another. What 
might be guaranteed to a large extent in one political system might be guaranteed only 
to a little extent in another. 
Generally, there are many limits and restrictions on the freedom of Jordanians to 
participate in oppositional political activities without being subject to security 
consequences. After the dissolution of the Jordanian parliament in June 2001, the 
Jordanian political system postponed parliamentary elections twice before they finally 
took place in June 2003. This step was taken in order to avoid election campaigns and 
demonstrations which would have concentrated mainly on the topics of the Palestinian 
Intifada, peace and normalization with Israel; in addition to other political events in 
the Arab and international arenas, particularly after the events of September l l l h 
2001. 
By dissolving parliament and postponing the elections the Jordanian government 
violated the constitution and disrupted parliamentary life, in circumstances which did 
not warrant such actions. The Jordanian constitution identifies these circumstances as 
a "force majeure", in article 73, paragraph 4. 
This violation was followed by a series of other violations, starting with the Prime 
Minister's resolution on October 6, 2000 (which is still in force) to prevent political 
marches as a result of the demonstration that swept Jordanian streets supporting the 
intifada and demanding the closure of the Israeli embassy in Jordan. Moreover, as a 
result of the dissolution of parliament and the postponement of elections, the 
government created a political and legislative vacuum. Consequently, in the absence 
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of a Jordanian parliament the government enjoyed absolute power and began issuing 
temporary laws which the constitution permits only in cases of strong necessity. 
One of these temporary laws issued by the government during this period and adopted 
by parliament in February 2004 was the Public Gatherings Law. According to this law 
the Ministry of Interior clamped down on the right of citizens to freely assemble, 
whether gathering in public demonstrations or in smaller group meetings. The new 
temporary law that was issued on August 22, 2001 by Abu Ragheb's government, 
which issued more than 200 temporary laws in two years, stated that the Ministry of 
Interior must give its written approval for any public gatherings or meetings debating 
political issues at least three days prior to their scheduled start. Moreover, the 
government's decisions concerning specific meetings are often made without giving 
reasons, and are not subject to appeal. In addition, the government has the authority to 
use force to disperse even an officially approved meeting as well as to punish or 
suspend those taking part from the practice of their profession, and to impose prison 
terms or fines on those violating the law. 4 9 3 
Beside these temporary laws affecting basic freedoms, they also seriously affect the 
protection of human rights. Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East Director at Human 
Rights Watch, declared that "This law is a naked attempt to silence the vocal and 
often critical public debate that the professional associations foster. It is a major step 
backwards in Jordan's commitment to human rights". 4 9 4 
When the survey sample were asked about the level of freedom to participate in 
public demonstrations in Jordan, the respondents confirmed that this freedom is 
guaranteed to only a certain extent. 56.8% of respondents disagreed that this freedom 
is guaranteed. Moreover, none of the political party members, journalists, or 
professional council members and a total of only 3 out of 236 respondents strongly 
agreed that this freedom is guaranteed. It is clear from figure 8.2 below that members 
of groups who engage in demonstrations, or hold meetings and other political 
4 9 3 The Public Gatherings Law (2004), Articles 3-4. 
4 9 4 For more details see Human Right watch at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/06/jordan 10430.htm 
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activities, opposed the idea that this freedom is guaranteed more strongly than 
academics, who might be expected to be less engaged in political activities. 
Figure 8.2 Evaluations of Study Groups of the Level of Freedom to hold Political 
Demonstrations 
Academics 
Journalists 
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Additionally, 54.7% of respondents also confirmed that freedom to participate in 
oppositional political activity without being subject to punishment is not guaranteed. 
Although the question specified the peaceful nature of these activities, the majority of 
respondents still disagreed with the statement. These results also revealed that the 
Jordanian government has applied the Public Gatherings Law to prevent political 
activists from the right to assemble peacefully, to hold meetings and demonstrations 
in order to prevent its critics from publicly assembling. According to this law political 
parties, professional associations, journalists, or other professional groups do not have 
the right to criticize the government, hold a meeting or arrange demonstrations 
without government permission. 
8.3 The Main Obstacles to Political Participation in Jordan 
Contrary to what some have argued, the present study's results have established that 
the obstacles to political participation in Jordan essentially stem from within 
Jordanian society. As for external factors, the impact of regional and international 
events is secondary. Therefore, the obstacles facing political participation in Jordan 
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can be divided into two categories. Internal obstacles and challenges have arisen from 
within the society, such as barriers facing many development projects due to financial 
and administrative corruption, and lack of trust in government commitment to 
achieving democracy and taking serious steps to encourage citizens to participate in 
the decision making process. Meanwhile, external regional and international events 
and situations surrounding Jordan affect society as a whole. 
8.3.1 Internal Obstacles Facing Effective Political Participation in Jordan 
The study's findings showed that 76.8% of survey respondents attributed lack of 
effective political participation to internal issues and their consequences. The results 
also identified these internal obstacles and challenges that deter Jordanian citizens 
from participating in political life. These obstacles are economic, political, social, and 
legal. 
8.3.1.1 Administrative and Financial Corruption 
Financial and administrative corruption ranked as the most important reason that the 
study sample considered an obstacle to political participation in Jordan. 35.4% of 
respondents stated that this reason constituted a major obstacle to political reform and 
participation. Jordanian society is a society based on family and tribal ties which 
control the various spheres of life and are considered as a major force in both 
Jordanian politics and society. Sometimes tribalism and social ties are held to be a 
major obstacle to democratization and the rule of law. Nepotism, favouritism, and 
intermediation (wasta) are the most common forms of administrative corruption in 
Jordan where the members of large families and tribes with influence can hold office 
and gain more benefits than others. Smuggling, tax evasion, counterfeiting, 
commercial fraud, and the manipulation of standards and specifications are the most 
common forms of financial corruption in Jordanian society. 
There is a close relationship between administrative and financial corruption and 
favouritism, nepotism and wasta. This has created a climate of distrust because of the 
adoption of personal and family ties rather than standards of competence, experience, 
and the proper evaluation of ability and suitability in recruitment for public office. 
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Therefore, such corruption has not only economic consequences, but also serious 
social consequences, because it leads to the disruption o f relations between the 
members o f community and establishing it on illegal basis. 
Therefore, the majority o f members o f human rights organizations (59.3%) considered 
corruption in its various forms to be the most common source o f human rights 
violations and a major obstacle to political participation. This is despite the provisions 
o f the Jordanian constitution which stipulate the principle o f equality o f Jordanians 
before the law in rights, duties, and equal opportunities. This equality assumes no 
person can gain public benefits at the expense of others. In practice, more than half of 
survey respondents disagreed that Jordanian citizens are equal in rights and duties 
before the law. 
There are many reasons behind the emergence and spread o f the phenomenon of 
corruption in Jordanian society. These include widespread poverty, unemployment 
and other diff icul t socio-economic conditions experienced by citizens; the rule o f 
traditional values and ties based on families and tribes; the control o f the executive 
authority over the legislative branch due to the weaknesses and lack o f independence 
of parliamentarians who seek to derive services and funds f rom government for their 
own voters, which leads to breaches o f the principle o f control and encourages 
corruption; the lack o f government commitment to combating corruption by taking 
serious preventive and punitive action; and inequality in the rights between citizens 
such as equal access to services, and the right to free competition for jobs. 
Accordingly, corruption is a phenomenon which has very negative implications and 
consequences that directly touch the l ife o f individuals socially, politically, 
economically, and culturally. This is because nepotism, wasta, and other forms of 
corruption lead to unqualified people holding public office at the expense o f 
efficiency. Normally such corruption can be expected to increase budget deficits, 
leading to rises in foreign debt. These events put the country in an even more diff icul t 
economic, social, and political situation and eventually the ordinary life o f citizens is 
adversely affected, since they have to pay for these costs. 
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A l l o f this has led citizens to doubt the effectiveness o f the law, and eroded trust and 
confidence in the political system which disregards such important issues, and 
consequently this has led Jordanians to have less trust in the ability o f political parties 
and parliament to resolve national problems. Disappointment and frustration prevail 
among ordinary Jordanians and cast a shadow on the process o f political participation, 
particularly participation in parliamentary elections. Elections have become a matter 
of voting based on criteria o f familial and social ties rather than concerning the 
substantive issues relating to democracy and political reform. 
8.3.1.2 Political Obstacles 
The second obstacle to political participation in Jordan, as the study's results have 
revealed, is a lack o f governmental seriousness in achieving democracy and 
increasing the participation o f Jordanian citizens in political l ife. 30.3% o f 
respondents said that lack o f government willingness to achieve democracy was one 
of the main obstacles to political participation. Jordanian citizens do not trust that 
successive governments have had the serious intention to adopt political reform. 
Because the political reform needed to achieve democracy and to restore public faith 
in government can be achieved only by adopting modern laws which include Political 
Parties' Law, law o f political freedoms, law permitting public gatherings, modern 
electoral law, in order to achieve political participation to all institutions o f civi l 
society. Furthermore, real political reform can be achieved also by activating the 
means o f political participation, as well as combating the sense of apathy and 
marginalisation felt by the great majority o f ordinary citizens. 
In fact, the situation is the opposite, as all indicators show that the successive 
governments are not serious in achieving political reform. The government has 
increased the restrictions upon civi l society in many ways as follows: 
• Insisting on the single vote system in parliamentary elections, even 
though most political parties and activists opposed this law and feel 
disadvantaged by it. 
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• The Public Gatherings Law prohibits public freedoms and peaceful 
public meetings without getting advance permission from the 
authorities. More importantly, activists know that i f they apply for 
permission to hold meetings or marches it w i l 1 be denied as such 
events have been routinely banned by the government. For example, 
" in September 2004, Amman's governor denied permission to hold a 
women's protest, organized by the IAF, in solidarity with women's 
right to wear the Islamic headscarf in France; In July 2006, Amman's 
governor denied the Unity Party (Hizb al-Wihda) permission to hold an 
artistic memorial on the 37 t h anniversary o f the death o f the literary 
figure Ghassan Kanafani; in May 2007 Amman's governor denied 
permission for a planned demonstration by 28 opposition parties 
against the proposed new Law on Political Parties; Most recently, in 
June 2007, the governor o f Balqa' denied the IAF permission to hold a 
demonstration marking the 40 t h anniversary o f Israel's occupation o f 
the West Bank and Gaza". 4 9 5 
• The new Political Parties' Law approved on March 19, 2007 added 
further restrictions, contradicts on political parties and undermines 
political pluralism. The new law raised the required number o f 
founding members o f parties f rom 50 to 500 in order to be registered, 
imposes government monitoring o f party accounts; puts political 
parties under the jurisdiction o f the Interior Ministry instead o f the 
Ministry of Political Development, and in addition sets a 10% 
minimum representation from at least five governorates. Jordanian 
political parties unanimously opposed the new law which was 
described by many as a death warrant for the country's political life. 
Accordingly, under such legislation the Jordanian citizens do not trust that the 
governments have a serious willingness to achieve political reform, as they feel that 
the democratic process has not moved forward in terms o f legislation or in providing 
more opportunities for Jordanian citizens to participate in political l ife. 
4 9 5 For more details see Human Right Watch wide web site on 
http://hrw.Org/reports/2007/jordanl207/2.htm#_ftn33 
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8.3.1.3 Economic Obstacles 
The rise in unemployment and growing poverty are threatening Jordan's society 
economically, socially and politically. Therefore, i f the government cannot address 
these challenges through a comprehensive reform process the society w i l l face a real 
threat to its social, economic, and political stability. Political frustration especially is 
linked to such unresolved problems in the economy. 
The economic status o f Jordanian citizens ranked as the third most important obstacle 
to political participation in the questionnaire survey. The economic status and 
conditions o f citizens constitute an obstacle to their playing a political role in their 
country, which has a significant impact on the local decision making process. 
Economic factors affect the process o f political participation, and particularly 
participation in the electoral process where the economic situation affects voters' and 
candidates' decisions. The increased incidence o f poverty and unemployment and 
poor living conditions experienced by many Jordanian citizens have led to a 
fundamental change in political behaviour. Citizens vote for candidates believed 
likely to provide personal services, leading, in effect, to the widespread buying and 
selling o f votes. 
Economic difficulties have led to the phenomenon of political apathy and a decline o f 
trust and engagement in political l ife and consequently in political participation. 
Therefore, many citizens have no intention o f voting because they conclude that 
nothing w i l l be changed. As a result many Jordanian citizens do not concern 
themselves wi th political participation and parliamentary elections due to this lack o f 
trust in the effectiveness o f the electoral process, which is believed incapable o f 
having a real and direct impact on their lives or in improving their economic 
conditions. 
The lack o f citizen trust and respect for the electoral process and its political 
importance has been reinforced by the weakness o f Jordanian parliaments and 
candidates, where the latter run for elections motivated by personal interests and 
benefits not necessarily linked to citizens' priorities and general social issues. Most o f 
the deputies in Jordanian parliaments f rom 1989 until 2007 could be categorized as 
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retired military officers, young businessmen, independent tribal representatives, and 
Islamists. Accordingly, some deputies reach parliament through political money 
(buying votes), some are elected by their tribes, some due to support f rom the 
government, and only a few after running on political platforms. 
As a result, Jordanian citizens believe that the Jordanian parliament remains a feeble 
body and unable to play an important role in the public policy making process or 
political reform, or even to express the people's interests and claims. Moreover, the 
government practises a certain amount o f control over the Jordanian parliaments and 
its MPs through many temptations and services to their voters. This has led to a 
further loss o f the legislature's prestige and reputation among the people. 
Furthermore, civi l society institutions such as political parties, and other organizations 
remain largely ineffective and extremely weak, as the regime consistently intends 
them to be. In addition, their role in supporting political reform is totally inadequate. 
Accordingly, Jordanian citizens do not trust these institutions either in terms o f their 
ability to play a pivotal role in public life and to improve the conditions of citizens. 
8.3.2 International and Regional Obstacles to Political Participation in Jordan 
International and regional factors were regarded by the survey respondents as another 
barrier which negatively influences the political participation process in Jordan. 
48.9% of respondents believed that international issues were an obstacle to political 
participation, while 48.8% declared that regional instability was considered an 
obstacle. 
8.3.2.1 Regional Instability 
Jordan has a unique strategic position and is in a special situation demographically 
politically and geographically which has created various dangers and disturbances. 
Regional security disturbances and the situations in Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon, in 
addition to pressures faced by some countries in the region after the launching o f the 
so-called war on terrorism and since the entry o f American forces into Afghanistan in 
2001 and Iraq in 2003, have all had a significant impact on the national security of 
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Jordan. Jordanians are in a permanent state of stress as a result o f the serious and 
continuing disturbances in neighbouring countries. 
8.3.2.1.1 The Ongoing Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 
The most significant situation that has had a profound impact on Jordan is the ongoing 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This conflict has led to successive waves o f Palestinian 
refugees entering Jordan since 1948. According to an off icial statement in 2002 
Jordan's population equally divided between Jordanians and Jordanians o f Palestinian 
origin. 
Since Jordan hosts the largest proportion o f Palestinian refugees, the repercussions o f 
Palestinian disturbances extends to the Jordanian arena. The study's results confirm 
this fact, when the majority o f respondents declared that the most regional obstacle 
which affects political participation in Jordan is the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. 
There is a considerable interaction between Jordanians and Palestinians not only 
socially and demographically but also politically and this interaction between the two 
banks o f the River Jordan has a great impact on Jordan, both in terms o f domestic 
issues and foreign policy. Domestically, the disturbances in Palestine particularly 
(Intifada) have created fears to the Jordanian governments and security agencies from 
rising popular unrest in Jordan. Furthermore, due to increased fears that the regional 
situation and economic recession might lead to the electoral success o f opposition 
parties, the government has suspended parliamentary life and postponed elections 
several times. Recently, the victory by Hamas (which has strong ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan) in the last Palestinian parliamentary elections and its 
formation o f a government encouraged the IAF (where Palestinians are heavily 
represented) to announce publically their readiness to form a government. 
This statement has led to an ongoing confrontation between the government and 
Islamists in Jordan which has also had a negative influence on political participation. 
IAF members and their supporters in urban areas that are heavily populated by 
Palestinians have suspected election fraud and claimed that the government wi l l 
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manipulate election outcomes to marginalize Islamist representation in municipal 
councils and parliament, so as to avoid the "Hamasisation" o f the IAF. Therefore, this 
has led to high levels o f voter dissatisfaction and consequently traditi onally low 
turnouts. Accordingly, Palestinian events and disturbances are not confined to the 
Palestinian territories but also eventually affect the Jordanian arena because o f the 
structure o f Jordanian society. 
8.3.2.1.2 The Iraq War 
Another serious regional disturbance is the series o f wars in the Gulf culminating in 
the present Iraq war, also known as 'Operation Iraqi Freedom'. Jordan is one o f the 
countries most affected economically, politically, and in terms o f national security due 
to its strategic and economic relationship with Iraq. According to the study's results 
the ongoing conflict in Iraq was considered the second most important regional issue 
that has affected political participation in Jordan. 
Economically, the Iraq War o f 2003 affected Jordan very negatively and has created 
many challenges and serious economic consequences. Jordan has limited natural 
resources, a high budget deficit, and high unemployment. The invasion o f Iraq by the 
United States disrupted traditional trade with Iraq, and spelled the end o f subsided oil 
that Jordan had previously received (in addition to an annual Iraqi oil grant to Jordan 
o f $350 mill ion). Moreover, as Iraq had been the market for about 2 1 % o f Jordanian 
exports, the Jordanian economy had long been linked to the Iraqi market because 
large numbers o f Jordanian manufactures had been created to meet its needs. 
As a result, the Iraq war has led to inflation in Jordan due to rising fuel and food 
prices, increased debt, poverty, and unemployment. In addition, large numbers o f 
Iraqi refugees have fled to Jordan, leading to even higher prices and unemployment. 
A l l o f these economic conditions and repercussions have reinforced political 
repression in Jordan. 
Politically, Jordan is squeezed between the most volatile countries in the Middle East: 
Israel and Palestine to the west and Iraq to the northeast. Moreover, Jordan's political 
development is strongly affected by regional disturbances, and conflicts and violence 
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sometimes spill over into Jordan. Jordan has also paid a high price for the political 
stand of the Jordanian government on the Iraq war and as a result o f the strong 
relationship between the Jordanian government and the USA that led Jordan to be 
among the first countries that adopted the slogan o f the 'war on terrorism' after the 
11 t h September attacks. This position increased popular opposition to the 
government's foreign policy. 
Accordingly, and as a result o f anti-American sentiment, Jordan has faced many o f the 
threats, for example in the events o f November 9, 2005 when three Iraqi suicide 
bombers linked to Al-Qaida attacked three international hotels in Amman, kil l ing 60 
people and injuring 115. These events gave the government justification to issue strict 
legislation to combat terrorism. The controversial new Prevention o f Terrorism Act 
(PTA) endorsed by parliament became law on November 1, 2006. This law negatively 
impacted on public freedoms and exposed the government to a high tone o f criticism 
and calls for amendments from human rights activists, political parties, lawmakers, 
and the media. 
The new law gave broad powers to security forces to arrest suspects without charge or 
trial for up to 30 days without access to a lawyer or juridical review. Moreover, 
Article 8 o f the anti-terrorism law gave the military courts rather than ordinary civi l 
courts jurisdiction over terrorism cases. This led to an expansion o f the role o f 
military courts which is contrary both to the constitution and human rights. 
More importantly, the definition o f terrorism in the law is vague and overbroad. It 
criminalises acts such as gatherings and demonstrations which should not be regarded 
as terrorism. Moreover, this law could be used to punish peaceful critics and 
opponents o f the government on the grounds that their activities - such as participation 
in peaceful demonstrations - resulted in minor property damage and could be 
considered a kind o f 'public disorder' or 'endangering public safety risk'. A l l of these 
acts fall under the definition o f 'terrorist acts' in the new law. In conclusion, the law 
restricts public freedoms and particularly freedom of expression which was already 
heavily restricted by other legislation. 
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8.3.2.2 International Events 
Regarding the impact o f international events on political reform and participation in 
Jordan, the study results revealed that there are two main international factors which 
affect the Jordanian political arena. These are the unwillingness o f certain parties or 
states to pursue true democracy and stability in the region, and the events o f l l l h 
September 2001 and their consequences. 
Political reform and real change towards democracy in the Arab World has become 
more necessary than ever before and is a major internal requirement. In addition, since 
September 11 t h events the Arab governments are under increasing international 
pressure to undertake political reform and relax their strict control over c ivi l society. 
However, although some Arab governments have taken tentative steps towards 
reform, these remain limited and did not live up to sensitive issues such as political 
power. Hence, restricted political participation remains a most prominent feature in 
Arab political l ife. 
Political reform and transition still faces diff icul t challenges. Arab regimes that enjoy 
absolute power and which rule without accountability are not really eager to improve 
civi l society. On the contrary, they are fighting back to protect themselves, their 
security, stability, and sovereignty. Therefore, some political regimes in the Arab 
world do not have real intention to reform or in other words they are reluctant to take 
serious steps toward political reform. Thus, governments resort to depriving 
opposition forces and political parties o f fu l l political participation and the 
opportunity to contest elections. In addition they pass emergency laws, institute 
military courts, and design le gislations that do not keep pace with time and the 
enhanced requirements. 
For example, on October 8, 2001 after the September 11 t h attack, the government o f 
Abu Ragheb amended the Jordanian Penal Code without any public or parliament 
debate. According to this amendment the government imposed more restrictions on 
the press and freedom o f expression as well as tougher penalties for breaking the law. 
The amendment threatens with prison anyone who writes or makes a speech that is 
intended to, or results in harming national unity, disturbing the society's political 
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situation through promoting delinquency or immorality; or stirring up sectarian or 
racial tension or strife among different elements o f the nat ion. 4 9 6 Consequently, four 
parliamentarians Muhammad Abu Faris, A l i Abu Sukkar, JaTar al-Hurani, and 
Ibrahim al-Mashukhi were charged under article 150 o f Jordan's Penal Code with 
inciting sectarianism after paying their condolences to the family o f Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi. 
External factor also play an important role in impeding political reform in Arab 
countries. 45 .1% o f the study sample declared that one of the international obstacles 
for political reform in Jordan and the Arab World in general was the unwillingness o f 
some parties, and especially the United States o f America, to pursue political reform 
or stability in the region. For example, the USA has used the issue o f reform in the 
Arab World as a pretext to achieve political and economic gains. 
The United States calls for reform came only after the events o f September 11 t h as part 
o f the American project to reform the Greater Middle East. This aims to achieve 
American control over this strategic part o f the world and to protect its close friends 
and partners in the region such as Israel and some of the Arab political states. 
Accordingly, these objectives necessarily entail calls for political reform in specific 
forms to be achieved. However, achieving the Western concept o f democracy in the 
Arab world might lead to the emergence o f popular elected leaderships mainly the 
Islamist trends, which have popular support in many Arab countries. Such leaderships 
would not be in favour o f America in the region, as Islamists tend to have strong anti-
American sentiments. 
As a result, the Arab populations are aware that their governments do not have a real 
intention to achieve political reform and effective political participation, because this 
threatens or contradicts their absolute power. In addition, democracy cannot be 
imposed f rom outside, but there is instead a need for it to be built f rom inside. 
Therefore Arab citizens doubt the motives and seriousness o f international initiatives 
for reform. In particular, the American policies in Iraq have undoubtedly confirmed 
the failure o f this method in achieving democracy and political reform. 
Penal Code (2001), Article 150. 
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8.4 Evaluation the Participation of Political Parties in Jordan 
Political parties are the cornerstone o f democracy-building, representing social 
interest and providing a structure for political participation. As Lipset noted in 
Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, "democracy in a complex society may be 
defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for 
changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest 
possible part o f the population to influence major decisions by choosing among 
contenders for political office, that is, through political parties". 4 9 7 
In fact, political parties engage in democracy building by taking part in parliamentary 
elections to elect candidates and then to achieve positions in legislatures and 
governments where the implementation of democratic reforms takes place. There is 
no doubt that Jordanian parliamentary elections are a strong indication to identify the 
actual position o f the political parties, and whether these parties are expressions of 
active political trends in the community or merely reflect the phenomenon of 
personal political allegiance by individuals or groups to achieve personal benefits. 
A t present there are more than thirty political parties in Jordan, but unfortunately, as 
the study's results reveal the impact o f most o f these parties on political life is still 
weak and they do not play a critical role in promoting political reform. Moreover, 
many o f these parties only appear at specific times such as for general elections, and 
give the same speeches and promote the same slogans and before disappearing again 
and not working actively in public life. 
8.4.1 Membership of Political Parties 
According to the present study's results, the freedom to jo in political parties in Jordan 
is considered to be one o f the most guaranteed freedoms. Jordanian citizens do have 
the right to jo in political parties. However, the results also clearly revealed that 63.5% 
of the respondents had not joined political parties. Furthermore, excluding party 
Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (1981), p. 27. 
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members, only 14.5% of other respondents were members o f political parties. Perhaps 
more surprisingly, 80.5% of respondents who were not political parties' members had 
no intention o f joining political parties in the future. 
The roots of partisan life in Jordan date to the founding of the state o f Jordan in 1921, 
and political parties have been allowed to work openly since 1992. Moreover, 
although the party political map in Jordan includes Islamists such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood ( IAF) and The Islamic Centre Party; leftist such as the Jordanian 
Communist Party; political parties which are an extension o f some Palestinian 
factions such as the Popular Front is an extension of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation o f Palestine and HASHD Party is an extension to the Democratic Front; 
and parties might be associated with parties in other countries such as the Ba'ath party 
(Syrian) and Ba'ath Party (Iraq). However, the political parties have not been able to 
achieve significant political and parliamentary gains and are unable to attract 
Jordanian citizens to j o i n them in adequate numbers. 
8.4.1.1 Reasons for the Reluctance of Jordanian Citizens to Join Political Parties 
The reluctance o f citizens to jo in political parties is one of the most important 
obstacles to political development in the country. It stems from various reasons; some 
of which are related to the political parties themselves and their performance in the 
political arena. Other reasons relate to political obstacles, given the narrow margin of 
political freedoms and the fact that the government does not allow them to participate 
in the formation o f government. There are also legal obstacles under the election law 
which does not give adequate opportunity for parties to have access to parliament; and 
some social obstacles relate to social and cultural factors and the relationship between 
the parties and society. 
8.4.1.1.1 Reasons Related to the Political Parties Themselves 
As shown in the previous chapter the majority o f survey respondents disagreed with 
the statement that Jordanian political parties work in the service o f citizens and the 
society. Moreover, even some party members thought that the current political parties 
did not work in the service o f society and its citizens. In addition, 54.9% of 
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respondents overall supported the idea that the political parties work in favour o f their 
leaderships, and 35.9% o f political parties' members also supported this idea. 
The motives o f citizens to jo in any political party are linked to the ability o f these 
parties to provide political and economic programmes to meet the hopes and 
aspirations o f members. This is reflected therefore in the primary desire o f citizens to 
jo in parties and in the loyalty o f their members. Accordingly, since some Jordanian 
political parties are deemed incapable o f providing such programmes, citizens were 
reluctant to j o in them. In addition, even party members may feel dissatisfied, disloyal, 
to their parties i f they are unable to achieve the desired ambitions. Therefore, loyalty 
to and membership o f these parties may be influenced by personal interests. 
The surve y r esults revealed that some Jordanian political parties suffer f rom the 
phenomenon o f 'personalization', where the personal interests o f the leaders or the 
founders o f the parties override the national and citizens' interests. Moreover, the 
loyalty o f party members may be to their leaders and not to the party's espoused 
principles or objectives. This led Shteiwi to argue that the parties' exercise o f internal 
democracy is weak. He backed this up by adding that, " 1 . There has been continuity 
in their leadership for long periods o f time (except in the IAF , whose internal 
regulations forbid the Secretary General from serving for more than two consecutive 
terms). 2. Schisms have emerged, particularly between top leaders, which could 
indicate that splitting o f f to form a new party is the only way for members to express 
themselves and achieve change". 4 9 8 
There are two major ideological trends in the Jordanian political arena: Nationalists, 
and Islamists. However, the personalization phenomenon has led to the emergence o f 
many political parties which are very similar to each other in objectives and 
principles. The period f rom 1992-2003 witnessed the establishment of thirty-three 
political parties, which represents an annual average o f about three new parties per 
year. However, even i f the number o f political parties increased, the size o f their 
membership is still very low. Some political parties did not even exceed the minimum 
number o f 50 members required to form a political party under political parties' law. 
Majid (2005), p. 91 
246 
Some political parties reflect or represent the interests only o f their leaderships and do 
not offer policies and programmes to revive political life and to encourage the spirit o f 
participation and interaction between all members o f the community. Therefore, some 
political parties are known only by the names of their Secretary-Generals or founders 
who are already high-level governmental and political figures. Some other parties are 
hardly known to the citizens at all. For example, 26 parties from 33 were recognized 
by no more than 5% of respondents in an opinion poll conducted by the Centre for 
Strategic Studies at the University o f Jordan in 2003. The Islamic Action Front Party 
was the most recognized but only by 14.7% o f respondents, while the second most 
recognized was the National Constitutional Party with 1.0%. None o f the other 
parties exceeded 0.2% recognition. 
The study's results also revealed that the political performance o f political parties has 
been considered very weak. Only 17.7%) o f respondents saw the parties as successful 
in the political f ield, while the majority (64.7%) declared that they were unsuccessful. 
More importantly, about half o f political party members (46.8%) declared that the 
political performance o f the existing political parties was unsuccessful. 
Representative democracy can be achieved through strengthening political 
participation at the grassroots by all segments o f society, particularly through political 
parties which provide programmes and are held accountable to the public. The survey 
results showed that the majority o f respondents deemed the political parties 
unsuccessful, implying that they have failed to develop social policies and 
programmes which were felt to contribute to solving the economic and social 
problems o f citizens. Consequently they failed to gain the support o f citizens in 
parliamentary elections and had not provided comprehensive reform programmes 
qualifying them to gain seats in the Jordanian parliament. 
Each political party has the desire to obtain political power to control or influence the 
policies o f the government in order to achieve its principles and objectives in a 
pluralistic political system and with the peaceful rotation o f power among political 
parties through elections. Since the return o f political parties to the Jordanian arena 
after 1990, political parties have not been able to work seriously to provide 
comprehensive programmes. Therefore, they have not gained the confidence of the 
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Jordanians (with the exception o f the Muslim Brotherhood Party) that they would be 
able to participate effectively and form a government in Jordan. 51.5% of the 
respondents declared that the current political parties were not qualified to form a 
government. Moreover, 32.9% of political party members agreed that the current 
political parties were not qualified to form a government. 
Moreover, the political parties' calls to participate in power serve only one political 
party. From the thirty-three political parties at present, only one (the Muslim 
Brotherhood Party) would be able to form a government, according to the survey 
respondents. 64.1% of respondents who believed that some o f the current political 
parties might be able to form a government declared that the I A F was the only party 
able to provide a comprehensive programme. None o f the other six parties were 
named by more than 10% o f respondents. 
8.4.1.1.2 Legal Reasons 
The electoral system is considered to be one o f the most important pillars in building 
democracy and political stability in any state. In addition it is considered an important 
indicator o f the evolution o f democratic political l ife in any country. The electoral 
system has become the subject o f one o f the most heated debates in Jordan since 
multi-party competition for the elected legislature was initiated and political parties 
have had permission to gain limited access to the media. 
Jordan's election law has undergone important changes and amendments that have 
significantly affected the basic legislative functions o f representation, lawmaking, and 
oversight o f the essential elements and qualities o f democratic governance. These 
amendments, however, prompt a wide range of questions. The most important o f these 
is whether or not the electoral system is designed to exclude political parties f rom 
representation in parliament and thus inevitably leads to electoral support according to 
family and tribal ties at the expense o f political and ideological affiliation. 
Jordan started peace negotiations with Israel in 1992 and was preparing to sign a 
peace treaty which needed to be endorsed by parliament. As a result o f the opposition 
of Jordanian citizens to the peace treaty and normalization with Israel, the government 
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feared that these feelings might push Jordanian people to elect a parliament with a 
hard-line policy towards Israel, and that the election results might lead to success for 
those opposing peaceful resolution with the Jewish state. 
The government wanted to make sure that the deputies in the 1993 parliament would 
be more pliant on the peace process than the deputies o f the 1989 council had been. 
Consequently, a new electoral system was introduced for the 1993 parliamentary 
elections in the absence of parliament. The law was changed from a multiple voting 
system in which voters had as many votes as there were seats for their respective 
(multi-member) parliamentary districts, to a 'one-person one-vote' system. The main 
goal o f these amendments was to reduce the parliamentary presence o f a strong 
opposition to the peace treaty (which was signed in October, 1994), particularly o f 
Islamists in parliament. Accordingly, tribal leaders and pro-governmental candidates 
won a majority o f the seats in the 1993 parliament and endorsed the treaty as planned. 
Moreover, this treaty imposed on the successive governments to impose normalization 
with Israel which requires silence o f opposition voices against normalization. 
The survey results in this study showed that the current electoral system is not 
considered fair to political parties. 70.8% o f the respondents declared that the current 
law is not suitable for political parties and does not give the proper opportunity to 
political parties to be represented in parliament. Moreover, 90.7% o f political party 
members thought that the current law was unfair and that this constitutes a major 
obstacle to participating effectively in parliamentary elections. 
The election law undoubtedly constitutes a major obstacle preventing Jordanian 
political parties from reaching parliament. This is particularly true in a tribal society 
like Jordan. The current electoral law has led to the retreat of political factors in 
parliamentary election campaigns in favour o f tribal and personal allegiances. This is 
a setback for principles o f competition and participation in the electoral process. That 
is what happened in the 1993 parliamentary elections and the next elections, where 
the electoral system played a vital role whether in voter turnout which was low or in 
the reluctance o f some candidates, especially those who do not have tribal support 
f rom nominating themselves. For example, in the 1993 elections in spite o f the 
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participation of all political parties in this election, but its share of seats in Parliament 
did not exceed 30 seats out of a seat 80. 
In 1993 after the adoption of the new electoral law the number of Islamists deputies 
decreased to 18 deputies, then to 17 deputies out of 110 in the 2003 elections, and 
finally 7 out of 110 in the 2007 elections. This confirms that the single vote system 
had the desired effect for the government, contributing significantly to the reduction 
of the role and presence of political parties in parliament and strengthening the role of 
the various tribes and families. And what made it more complicated before any 
political party to succeed is the distribution of the parliamentary seats. These seats are 
divided between a large number of constituencies. As a result, the chances of success 
are associated with place and social relations rather than with partisan and political 
trends. 
8.4.1.1.3 Political Reasons 
The imposition of martial law in 1957 led to the disappearance of political 
organizations, and the dissolution of political parties. Their activities were prevented, 
members were arrested and partisan activities were criminalized. The negative impact 
of that period is still being felt, as Jordanians remain sceptical about and apathetic 
towards political parties. 
Furthermore, the relationship between political parties and the government can be 
described as suffering from lack of confidence. Both groups view each other with 
deep suspicion and fear. On the one hand, the government believes that political 
parties seem unconcerned with the public interest, often having organizational ties 
with parties outside of the country. On the other hand, the parties see the government 
as carrying out political programmes that are against the national interest, and that it 
will continue to do all it can to weaken political parties by ignoring their existence and 
opinions. 
This view is supported by the gradual decline in the democratic climate and the 
extensive restrictions on political parties which began by criminalizing certain types 
of peaceful expression, and preventing political parties from conducting 
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demonstrations, meetings, gatherings, and sit-ins. In addition to the marginalization of 
the political parties' role, the government does not encourage political parties or 
consult them in respect of political and economic issues important to the citizens and 
does not involve them in the formation of governments. Although to date 90 
governments have been formed since the establishment of the Jordanian state, only 
one of them was formed on the basis of parliamentary elections. 
More importantly, despite the importance of the partisan press, most Jordanian 
political parties do not have their own partisan newspapers. The press plays an 
important role in achieving objectives such as making citizens aware of the existence 
of political parties and their programmes, through which they can express their points 
of view about particular issues. As political propaganda during elections, this helps in 
creating political culture among the masses. Moreover, the importance of the partisan 
press for Jordanian political parties arises from the fact that government does not 
allow them to use the official media to present their programmes and policies. For all 
of these reasons the participation of political parties becomes weak, consequently, this 
has led Jordanian citizens to avoid them along with other political activities and even 
from having any contact with persons involved in political activities. 
8.4.1.1.4 Social and Cultural Reasons 
In terms of the relationship between political parties and society, the Jordanian 
governments have followed a policy of dealing directly with society and listening to 
its concerns, problems, where the tribes have been the most important channels for 
people to contact the authorities, be offered services and be helped to solve their 
problems. Meanwhile, citizens themselves have preferred dealing directly with the 
state. This has led to little direct contact with the political parties and weakened the 
communication between them and society in general. In addition, the parties 
themselves have failed to build a credible alternative to the tribe. 
Therefore, the overwhelming majority of survey respondents (82.3%) in this study 
considered tribalism an obstacle to political party members and activists reaching 
parliament. Voters often do not support political candidates as they believe that they 
oppose the government and therefore will be unable to provide services to members of 
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their tribes. In a conference held on 2-3 July, 2007 at the Centre for Strategic Studies 
at the University of Jordan, researchers presented the results of fieldwork visit to one 
of the Jordanian tribes (Al-Azzam tribe). The tribe's leader (Sheikh) declared that we 
will not support any political candidate who opposes the government, and we do not 
support political party members. Political candidates thus may hide their political 
affiliation and stand for their tribes rather than parties in order to be elected to 
parliament. 
Moreover, the parties' political, social, economic and cultural address no longer 
enjoys feasibility or credibility among Jordanians. Because the Jordanian Communist 
Party became weak after the fall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the 
communist system in Eastern Europe, the Ba'ath party whether the Syrian or the Iraqi 
do not have trust in Jordanian street as they fail to achieve freedom, democracy and 
political pluralism in Syria and Iraq. The other parties which are linked to Palestinian 
organizations such as the Democratic Front and the Popular Front were in 
disagreement with the government as a consequence of 1970 conflict between the 
Jordanian government and PLO. 
In term of Islamist parties, in addition to the scenario and technique to exclude 
Islamist from politics and prevent them from reaching representative councils for 
protecting the interests of the ruling elite and preventing change by placing carefully 
engineered legal hurdles in the way of any new political movement. The internal 
conflict and contradiction in I A F between doves or moderates and hawks or 
extremists which ended with control of extremists over the resolution sites led to 
weakening of the Muslim Brotherhood activities and weaken their role as a leader to 
the Jordanian opposition. Moreover, as a result of extremists control and Zaki Bani 
Irshid becomes the head of the I A F who is loyal and a strong ally to Hamas that led to 
their exaggerated focusing on Hamas agenda and ignoring of Jordanian citizen' 
problems. All of this has led to a decline in the popularity of the largest Jordanian 
political group (IAF) in Jordan. 
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8.5 Voting Behaviour and Motives in Parliamentary Elections 
Individuals differ in their perceptions and behaviours of the same events. Therefore, 
an important factor in the voter's political behaviour in an election is the way he 
perceives that election. He may see it as important or unimportant; he may think his 
vote does or does not count. Therefore, when voting takes place in parliamentary 
elections one important question is raised: why do voters vote? in other words, do 
voters vote according to their personal interests or for those of the community? 
Elections could not be separated from the goals and objectives of the electorate that 
determine the quality of the members of parliament. In Jordanian parliamentary 
elections, voters vote for candidates representing their interests reflected in, for 
example, party affiliation, national duty, tribal affiliation, and for personal benefit. 
8.5.1 Political Motives 
Many candidates stand in parliamentary elections as independents rather than under 
the banner of their political parties, as they then have a better chance of getting into 
parliament. Therefore few Jordanian citizens vote for political reasons. According to 
the survey results only, 2.7% of respondents who participated in the last elections 
declared that their participation reflected partisan commitment. The majority of 
respondents voted because they felt that participation was a duty and obligation 
towards the society in which they lived. 
8.5.2 Tribal and Social Relations 
The tribal nature of Jordanian society contributes significantly to the adoption of 
candidates with social and tribal ties reaching parliament. It is clear from the 
composition of the House of Representatives from 1989 to 2007 that the majority of 
elected deputies are not members of political parties, with the exception of the Islamic 
Action Front. Therefore, 91% of respondents confirmed this when they declared that 
voting behaviour in Jordan is directly linked with the primary tribal or familial 
affiliations of voters. 
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In the 2003 parliamentary elections the tribal and conservative candidates won 86 out 
of 110 seats, while the political parties failed to win any seat, with the exception of 
I A F who won 18 seats for the 30 represented candidates. Moreover, it has been noted 
that voter turnouts increased in the tribal more than urban areas. Besides, under the 
current one-person, one-vote election system and in a tribal society like Jordan, 
tribalism has played and continues to play a major role in parliamentary elections. 
8.5.3 Voting for Personal Benefit 
8.5.3.1 Voting for Services and Intermediation (Wasta) 
77.9% of survey respondents in the present study declared that the services dimension 
in the relationship between voters and candidates and the proximity of the latter to 
authorities and centres of power led voters to vote for particular candidates. Voters 
tend to cast their ballots for candidates whom think they will afford them services and 
intermediation (Wasta). Such voting patterns are not for issues or reasons of ideology 
or policy preferences. Many Jordanian voters vote for representatives who have good 
relationships with the authorities to enable them to obtain patronage, rather than those 
who reflect their political views. 
Therefore the electorate has come to view members of parliament as ways (wasta) to 
get jobs, or university seats. One voter who had asked his deputy wasta to get a job 
said "I came to seek a job from the deputy of our district. He told us that the 
government does not listen to them these days. I wonder why the deputies oppose the 
government. They should comply with and obey the government's policies so that we 
can take our rights, because it is up to the government to pass anything. Frankly 
speaking, I will not elect anyone unless the government approves of him because we 
want to survive". 4 9 9 
Thus, from a functional point of view, the 'service deputy' phenomenon results from 
pressure from the constituencies to provide services. This has turned parliament from 
being a legislative and monitoring device to a services provider. The 'service deputy' 
499 Alarab Alyawm Newspaper, April 13, 2000 cited in Basem Sakijha, and Sa'eda Kilani, Wasta in 
Jordan: The Declared Secret (2002), p. 59. 
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phenomenon has arisen for several reasons. The first and most important stems from 
the fact that most candidates in Jordan are independents and nominate themselves for 
elections personally rather than representing parties who have programmes and 
political agendas. Therefore, as they are unable to provide integrated economic and 
political programmes they offer services to meet voters' demands and needs. 
The second reason for the spread of wasta is due to the fact that the government does 
not provide services on a fair basis to all regions and citizens. Former MP Dr Odeh 
Kawas has said from my experience the reason people resort to Wasta is that they feel 
aggrieved. Moreover, Wasta has unfortunately become part of the culture of Jordanian 
society. 5 0 0 Lastly, the rise of the 'service deputy' phenomenon is also due to the 
electoral system itself. In a workshop organized by the Jerusalem Centre for Political 
Studies under the title 'Jordanian Political Parties and the Requirements of the New 
Law' the Secretary General of I A F party, Zaki Bani Irshaid, stated that "The 
weakness of the current parliament is due to the law of single vote, which conceals 
partisan political activity on behalf of the service deputy".501 
8.5.3.2 Votes Buying (economic factor) 
Another dangerous phenomenon that has surfaced in Jordanian parliamentary 
elections is the usage of 'political money' in securing victory for some candidates. 
The increased incidence of poverty and unemployment, and the poor living conditions 
of many Jordanian citizens, in addition to their frustration about the possibility of 
achieving minimal levels of reform, lead some voters to focus merely on what 
benefits they can get from the electoral process. 
In an article in Al-Arab Al-Yawm newspaper, Fahad Alkhitan wrote that, "there is no 
opportunity for competition among independent and national candidates in most 
districts because of tribal and other narrow affiliations and the rush of businessmen 
and rich candidates to buy votes from citizens, in an unprecedented vote-buying 
50%ttp://www.antymagazine.com/magazine2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=54& 
id=2 
5 0 1 http://www.alqudscenter.com/arabic/pages.php?local_type=122&local_details=l&idd=75 
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process that has never ever taken place in the country before". Moreover, Taher Al-
Edwan stated in the same newspaper that, "It has become clear to everybody that most 
parliamentarians in Jordan win parliamentary seats through the art of buying votes 
and raising the speculative price of votes".503 One voter declared that "I gave my vote 
in exchange for JD10. I voted and so did all my sisters and we went home with JD40 
in total".5 0 4 
The vote-buying process takes place in many forms, and the buyers of votes have 
developed various ways to cover up their vote-buying activities. Even with the 
enforcement of Article 20 of the Jordanian electoral law, which criminalizes such 
actions, vote-buyers have found ways to evade prosecution with the help of voters 
who are ready to sell their votes. Accordingly, vote-buying process sometimes occurs 
under the pretext that this money is used for charitable purposes, or in the form of 
payments of housing rent or water and electricity bills, as well as getting jobs. 
8.6 Women's Political Participation 
The Jordanian constitution does not distinguish between women and men in terms of 
rights and duties, and in addition, the 1974 election law grants the rights of women to 
vote in elections. However, equality in the constitution and election law does not 
reflect the reality of women's equality in the political sphere. 
Although the sample in the present study was drawn from the political elite in Jordan, 
79.6% of the respondents who participated in the 2003 parliamentary elections did not 
vote for women candidates. Most researchers have attributed the restricted access of 
women to political life, and therefore to parliament, to social and religious constraints. 
However, contrary to most previous results the present results revealed that the main 
obstacle limiting the ability of women to improve their position and become involved 
actively in political life is a lack of confidence in the ability of women, whether in 
political or public life generally. 
Al-Arab Alyawm Newspaper, September, 15 2007. 
' Al-Arab Alyawm Newspaper, May 27, 2007. 
1 Jordan Watch Friday, November 30, 2007. 
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8.6.1 Women's Electoral Support of Women 
The traditional and conservative culture prevailing in Jordanian society depends on 
values, customs, and traditions which identify a stereotypical image of women 
through socialization and cultural beliefs determining what is appropriate and 
inappropriate in the roles of men and women. In addition, gender culture and 
patriarchal dominance is supported by social and religious institutions which reinforce 
the traditional role of women. This results in many decisive manifestations of political 
participation in favour of men and the marginalization of women. Therefore, no 
woman candidate has ever been elected to represent a Jordanian tribe in the internal 
votes which they conduct to decide their candidates. Moreover, participation as 
candidates or voters in the tribe's internal elections is confined to men only. 
Although the number of registered women in the election records is sometimes close 
to or even higher than the number of men, women have always failed to win 
municipal or parliamentary seats apart from under the quota system. This means that 
women do not elect women candidates. From the survey 81.1 per cent of respondents 
said that women tended not to vote for women candidates in the 2003 elections. Most 
believed that women candidates are weak and do not have enough political experience 
to be elected to parliament. 
Women themselves do not elect women because their electoral decisions are still not 
independent, instead being subject to masculine authority and to the customs and 
traditions that promote the status of men and reduce or marginalize the public 
presence of women. Zeenat Algerari, a candidate for the 14 th parliament stated that the 
main reason that women refrain from supporting female candidates is the 
subordination of women to men, in addition to women's lack of self confidence that 
led to lack of confidence in women candidates.505 
http://ammonnews.net/arabicDemo/article.php?issue=&articleID=7467 (access at 12:30 pm). 
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8.6.2 Jordanian Women and Political Parties 
Despite the growing role of women in economic, social, and political life in Jordan, 
the extent of women's participation in political parties is still very low. Jordanian 
women are reluctant to join political parties or, if they do, they are marginalized. 
According to the Ministry of Interior's 2002 records, the proportion of women in 
political parties represents no more than 8% of the total number of members. 
Women's presence among the founding committees of various political parties also 
varies from 0.4% of the Jordanian Democratic Left Party to 51% in the Liberal Party. 
Moreover, 3 parties out of 31 parties had no women among their founding members. 
Among respondents in this study 79.7% of political party members did not vote for 
women candidates, and 56% of them explained their decision in terms of women not 
having enough experience in political and public life. Furthermore, most of the 
current political parties are not headed by women directly, nor deal with their issues 
seriously and effectively through their programs. Moreover, not all political parties 
support the parliamentary participation of women. In a survey conducted by the 
Jerusalem Centre about the status of women in Jordanian political parties, the results 
showed that only five out of twenty responding parties supported allocating seats in 
parliament to women in the quota system. This indicates that the goal of women's 
political participation is not a priority for most of the parties, even though most of the 
parties claim to deal with women's issues in order to win their votes. 
8.6.3 The Women's Quota System in Jordan 
In the quota system adopted in Jordan in early 2003, six parliamentary seats were 
reserved for women. In addition women are legally allowed to run in open 
competition for all seats. The system has come under criticism from various groups. 
Some support the allocation of a quota for women in the House of Representatives 
based on several considerations, and as a result of the benefits and the advantages 
achieved by this system that gives women access to the House of Deputies. At the 
same time, others object to the quota system as a result of the negative aspects 
involved. 
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37.8% of all survey respondents and 48.1% of female respondents in this study were 
in favour of allocating seats to women in parliament and considered the quota system 
to be fair to women. Those who were in favour of allocating seats to women in 
parliament gave various reasons. Firstly, on democratic justice, the arrival of women 
to parliament will devote the principle of real participation to all citizens in the 
political life. In addition they stressed the necessity of adopting such a system in order 
to push women forward since they make up about 50% of the population. 
Consequently women need to be included and represented in the political realm. 
Secondly, women know their problems and needs better than men, therefore, it seems 
logical to be represented to stand for their rights themselves. Moreover, Jordanian 
electoral law has adopted the comprehensive representation of all segments of the 
society including Christians, Chechens, Circassians, and Bedouins. Therefore, in this 
context it is only just that women should also be represented through a quota system. 
Finally, many modern electoral systems adopt quota systems or allocations of 
parliamentary seats for specific social groups. This may occur through electoral law 
forcing political parties to allocate a specific proportion of candidates to women in 
their electoral lists such as Germany (40%-45% of party lists), and in the USA (15.2% 
of party lists). 
On the other hand, 48.9% of respondents and 40.4% of female respondents in the 
survey thought the Quota system unfair to women. In Jordan many opponents of the 
quota system argue that it contradicts constitutional articles and basic democratic 
values which clearly stipulate that voters should be able to choose their 
representatives freely. The quota system is hence considered to discriminate between 
men and women because originally voting and nomination for elections followed 
principle of social justice and equality. Moreover, they argue that parliament "is not a 
cake to be divided between tribes, sects, ethnic groups, and women by means of 
quotas, but an organization that comprises elected representatives of the citizenry, 
who in turn represent parties".5 0 6 
Majed (2005). p. 21 
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It can be argued that adoption of a quota for women is necessary and justified for a 
certain period during a transitional phase until society comes to believe in women's 
political abilities. The quota system can be seen as a first step in order to demonstrate 
the efficiency of women in politics, so that in the future women could gain access to 
parliament through competition instead, which would depend on the ability of society 
to elect representatives without regard to race, ethnic identity, sectarianism, tribalism 
or gender. 
8.7 Evaluation of the Current Electoral Law 
As the electoral system translates the votes cast in a general election into seats in the 
legislature, the choice of electoral system can effectively determine who is elected and 
which party gains power. It also known that electoral systems can also be utilized for 
the development of narrow loyalties and affiliations, such as those based on tribalism, 
regionalism, and ethnicity. 
The Jordanian government issued five electoral laws and many amendments between 
1923 and 1986. As discussed before, most of these amendments were designed by 
political actors as tools to be used to promote the interest of their own supporters. 
Therefore, there is considerable apprehension about the adoption of other electoral 
system such as B V or PR. These could give more opportunities for the masses of 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin to control the Jordanian parliament and thus threaten 
the Jordanian identity, or Islamists' control which would increase the size of 
opposition representation in parliament that would hamper the government in passing 
some of the agreements and laws. 
The 1989 elections were held under the multi-vote system, and produced a parliament 
which manifested various aspects of pluralism. It included Islamist, nationalist, leftist, 
and conservative representatives. Therefore, the 1989 parliament played a prominent 
role in emphasizing the importance of democratization, the principle of parliamentary 
independence from the executive branch, its exercise of control and accountability 
over the performance of government, participation in the decision-making process, 
and issuance of new democratic legislations. The latter included the lifting of martial 
law and the legalization of political parties; cancelling legal immunity for any action 
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or decision of the government. In terms of political freedoms and citizens' rights, the 
1989 parliament restored jobs to people who had been dismissed for political reasons, 
released political detainees, and returned passports to tens of thousands of citizens 
which had been withdrawn for political reasons. 
Despite near-unanimous partisan and popular rejection and criticism of the current 
electoral system, the government insists on retaining the same system used since 
1993. According to this law the Chamber of Deputies is comprised of 110 seats spread 
over 45 electoral districts. Parliament includes six seats reserved for women, nine for 
Christians, and three each for the Circassian and Chechen minorities. Furthermore, 
most of the electoral districts are allocated one each. However, many political parties 
and activists, professional associations, and civil society institutions have boycotted 
parliamentary elections because they argue that such system promotes tribalism at the 
expense of modern civil society, which has led to a conservative, traditionalist-
dominated Chamber of Deputies since 1993. 
The adoption of SNTV has led to several negative repercussions, such as an 
atmosphere of tension and lack of political dialogue between the government and 
opposition, and an absence of political party deputies and activists in Jordanian 
parliaments. Consequently this has led to the poor performance of the Chambers of 
Deputies, as well as the domination of the executive authority over the legislature. In 
light of such parliaments the successive governments have issued various legislations 
and temporary laws ( such as the current electoral law, the Public Gatherings Law, 
and Press and Publications Law) which have increased restrictions on political 
freedoms and had a negative impact on the election process and levels of public 
participation in political life. Some even argue that 1993 -when the SNTV was 
introduced- was the beginning of the end of the political democratization process. 
All of these circumstances have led Jordanian citizens to feel that parliament and 
electoral participation will not lead to positive results in their daily lives, and that the 
ability of parliament to influence government policies is very limited. This impression 
has a negative impact on voter turnout in parliamentary elections. Figure 8.3 shows 
that voter turnouts in countries adopting SNTV are lower in comparison with other 
electoral systems. 
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Figure 8.3 Voter Turnout Categorized by Electoral System Type. 
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The two cases o f STV come out well ahead with a turnout rate o f 83%, while Jordan 
and Vanuatu are the only two countries using SNTV system and they both have voter 
turnouts o f only 54%. This suggests that electoral system choice may have some 
impact upon overall turnout rates. 
Reynolds and Reilly have argued that, "when designing an electoral system, it is best 
to start wi th a list o f criteria which sum up what you want to achieve, what you want 
to avoid and, in a broad sense, what you want your parliament and government to look 
l i k e " . 5 0 7 There are hundreds o f electoral systems currently in use in the world which 
fall into three broad families; the plurality-majority, the semi proportional, and 
proportional representation and each system has potential advantages as shown in 
table 8.1. 
The most suitable electoral system for Jordanian society would be one which builds 
trust between commentators, politicians, civi l society organizations, and, above all , 
among the citizens o f the country. Accordingly, the electoral system should: give 
voters choices to elect individual candidates and political parties; and provide an 
opportunity for popular independents to be elected while at the same time 
5 0 7 Reynolds, et. al. (1997), p. 9. 
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encouraging participation of political parties. No electoral system is perfect, each 
having its own properties, its own weaknesses, and its own strengths. However, the 
current electoral system (SNTV) provides more opportunity for independent 
candidates to be elected in Jordan, particularly since the Jordanian political parties are 
still weak as discussed and candidates are selected based on kinship or patronage. 
Therefore, the majority of survey respondents in this study suggested that two votes 
system (TVS) or mixed system is the most suitable system for Jordanian society. 
Under this proposal each voter has two votes: one for a district candidate, and one for 
a national list. The latter would mean a party list or at least several individuals 
working under one platform. This proposal would encourage political parties to merge 
into larger parties to form one list so as to gain more seats in parliament. 
Consequently this might lead political parties to be whittled down to three or four 
major parties. This system is praised by Jordanians for being simple to use and 
understand, and at the same time commensurate with the fact that political parties are 
weak, as it provides an appropriate opportunity for independent candidates. 
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Table 8.1: Comparison of Advantages of Electoral Systems 
rality-Majoritarian (PM) Proportional Representation (PR) Semi-Proportional 
imple method that also links 
•esentatives with particular 
graphic areas. 
Reduces the disparity between a party's 
share of the national vote and number of 
seats in parliament. 
Combines the positive elements of both 
the purely proportional and majoritarian 
systems 
ds to encourage the existence of two 
iree major parties with ideologies 
lean left and right. It is argued that 
creates a clearer choice for voters, 
lereas in a PR system, voters may be 
fused by a multitude of parties with 
ow interests.) 
Facilitates the participation of many 
political parties, representing a broad 
spectrum of interests and a variety of 
views. The argument is that this allows 
for greater voter choice (than in the PM 
system). 
The PM elements allow for direct 
representation, while the PR elements 
allow for some minority representation, 
more voter choice and party 
accountability (as described below). 
ause there are fewer and more 
nctly different parties, this system 
ourages coalition governments, 
wing for a stronger and more 
srent parliamentary opposition. Some 
le that such a system is more efficient 
i broad based coalitions in terms of 
sion making, both within the 
slature and between the executive and 
legislature. 
Because there are more participating 
parties than in the PM system, the 
likelihood of coalition governments is 
greater. This is considered a favorable 
development in some cases, because 
broad coalition governments must 
achieve consensus and therefore can 
foster stability in policy making. 
In theory, a this system should lead to a 
less fragmented party system than a pure 
system of proportional representation, 
but possibly a broader based government 
than in a PM system. 
inefits broadly-based political parties, 
must try to attract a majority of 
s in a given race by acting as 
irellas to different interests - rather 
encouraging smaller parties that 
tit exacerbate ethnic, religious or 
Dnal differences. 
Facilitates minority party representation. 
(Cited as potentially important in divided 
societies, whereby certain ethnic, 
regional or religious interests would 
otherwise be completely locked out of 
the political process by a dominant party 
or parties.) 
Small minority parties who have been 
unsuccessful in the plurality-majority 
elections may still be rewarded for their 
votes received by winning seats in the 
proportional allocation. Further, in highly 
divided societies a semi-proportional 
system would likely lead to less 
polarisation than in a PR system. 
264 
rovides for a stronger link between 
slators and their constituents, since 
slators represent particular 
graphic areas rather than just parties, 
s is a way to hold the members more 
ctly accountable to their constituents. 
I f candidates are elected based on the 
appeal of a party platform, rather than the 
popularity of a given candidate, the entire 
party can be held accountable for 
adhering to the platform. 
The PM elements allow for direct 
representation, while the PR elements 
allow for some minority representation 
and party accountability. 
ovides an opportunity for popular 
spendent candidates to be elected, 
icularly important in developing 
titries where parties are weak and 
iidates may be selected based on 
hip or patronage. 
Can encourage the election of women 
(and minorities). I f a party puts a woman 
on the electoral list, she may get elected 
based on the party's overall popularity. 
Women are less likely to get elected in 
some countries i f they are directly facing 
a male candidate in election. PR lists also 
allow parties to establish gender quotas 
for nominations. 
The system can allow for more women or 
minorities on the list portion of the 
system, while also allowing for 
independent candidates. 
Source: The Impact of Electoral Design on the Legislature, 
http://vvrww.undp.org/governance/docs/Parl-Pub-impact.htm 
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C H A P T E R NINE 
C O N C L U S I O N S AND R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 
9.1 Political participation in Jordan 
To diagnose correctly and address the challenges of and main obstacles in the way of 
real and effective participation in Jordan, this study has aimed to investigate the 
reality of political participation. This has been achieved through an evaluation of basic 
human rights, particularly political freedoms (freedoms of opinion, speech, press, and 
mass media); the participation of political parties and women; and of the electoral 
system. Therefore, this study derived from the findings and discussion some 
conclusions regarding the reality of political participation in Jordan. 
According to Maslow, human needs start with needs for survival, especially economic 
and security needs, or what Maslow called 'deficiency needs' or 'D-needs'. 
Therefore, higher needs in maslow's hierarchy only come into focus once all the 
lower needs are satisfied. Once an individual has moved past a level, needs in the 
lower level will no longer be prioritized. However, i f a lower set of needs is 
continually unmet, the individual wil l temporarily re-prioritize those needs until they 
are reasonably satisfied. Moreover, as discussed in the literature review in this study 
many scholars have found a positive relationship between growth in socioeconomic 
development and a stable political environment that helps to enhance political 
participation and therefore to promote democracy. 
• The most important conclusion to be drawn from the research findings in this 
study is that participation in parliamentary elections in Jordan has become a 
socio-economic rather than a political process. In addition Jordanian 
parliamentary elections have traditionally related to social representation 
rather than political transformation. The political liberalization since 1989 has 
had no profound impact in deepening democracy and increasing political 
participation in Jordan. After 18 years of democratic openness in Jordanian 
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society, economic needs still dominate in the Jordanian community as a result 
of the continuing effects of economic crises, and increased poverty and 
unemployment. This economic situation coincides with the internal congestion 
due to the drop in the climate of national reconciliation. There has also been 
disruption of dialogue between the government and the opposition, increasing 
restrictions on political freedoms. The weak performance of Jordanian 
parliaments has left a deep impression that the electoral participation of 
citizens will not lead to positive results in their daily lives. 
Thus, Jordanian citizens have a sense of political inefficacy and therefore they 
tend to not participate in politics because, as Peteman argued, people who 
have a sense of political efficacy are more likely to participate in politics than 
those in whom this feeling is lacking. As a result this led to the need for 
service deputies and to take advantage of the opportunity in the election 
campaigns that give preference to money by selling and buying votes which 
eliminate all opportunities for political candidates. 
As outlined in the literature review, there are two views on democracy and 
participation. The first view sees citizen participation as unimportant to 
democracy, and that it is limited to voting to choose the leadership and to 
produce governments. The second view supports the importance of citizen 
participation and considers it an essential element for democracy. According 
to the present analysis and discussion it is clear that views concerning citizen 
participation in the Jordanian political system are closer to the first view. The 
role of Jordanian citizen participation is limited only to electing 
representatives, and not to producing a government. Thus, it is argued that 
from the viewpoint of the political system, citizen participation is not regarded 
as of value in itself or as an essential element of democracy, and instead its 
role in Jordanian parliamentary elections is mainly an instrument aimed at 
showing that the state is moving towards democracy and political reform. 
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• According to the material discussed in chapter one, political participation 
refers to political activity by individual citizens. It can be either conventional 
(voting, writing letters, working in campaigns) or unconventional 
(demonstrations, protests, boycotts). It is obvious that the opportunities for 
Jordanian citizens to participate in political and policy processes have 
substantially decreased. Moreover, the dominant view held by Jordanian 
governments since 1992 is that the mass participation of citizens is 
undesirable. Therefore, it can be argued that although the most basic form of 
participation in Jordan is conventional, mainly involving voting, many 
Jordanian citizens do not even participate in this basic activity. Voter turnout 
in parliamentary elections has been declining for the last three elections. 
Meanwhile other forms of political participation are severely restricted. 
• Additionally, one of the clearest conclusions to be gleaned from the analysis in 
this study is that participants in Jordan can be categorized into three 
categories: 
» T h e first category includes participants who exercise their election rights in 
order to support tribal, ethnic, regional, and demographically-based candidates. 
This segment has a significant impact on the electoral process and includes the 
majority of participants. Furthermore, many members of political parties win seats 
in parliament by focusing on the demographical or tribal dimension and not on 
ideological positions. Data on the composition of the Jordanian parliament 
supports this argument, where tribal and pro-government candidates have swept 
the polls in all Jordan's parliamentary elections. 
» T h e second segment includes a minority of Jordanian citizens who exercise 
their political rights because they are interested and aware of events and issues 
happening around them. Therefore, they support candidates who have a real 
agenda to enhance democratic deliberation and participation in Jordan. This 
segment consists of some political activists, and members of various organizations 
and political parties. This fact can be demonstrated by the limited number of 
political and partisan MPs in parliament. 
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» T h e third segment includes passive citizens who are not interested in political 
events and activities happening around them. This large segment of the population 
suffers depressed economic conditions which have serious effects on their daily 
lives. Therefore, this segment refrains from participating in political life whether 
in parliamentary elections by voting or joining political parties. This fact can be 
realized from the low voter turnout in all Jordanian parliamentary elections and 
the limited number of members of political parties. 
• Brumberg argued that one of the most essential elements of democracy is the 
existence of a constitution to impose limits on executive power. Since 1993 
there have been no substantial political or legal reforms. Although the 
Jordanian constitution adopts the principle of the separation of powers to 
ensure freedom and prevent tyranny, this principle is not effectively applied 
and the constitution has been broken several times. Political power is still in 
the hands of the political system, which can dissolve parliament and delay 
elections. In a special report released by Freedom House entitled "Country 
background and analysis reports about human rights and freedom issues in 
Jordan", the report indicates that Jordanians cannot change their government 
democratically and Jordan is not an electoral democracy. "The King holds 
broad executive powers and may dissolve parliament and dismiss the cabinet 
at his discretion; the king appoints members of the cabinet, led by a prime 
minister".5 0 8 Moreover, the government has power to rule by issuing 
temporary laws despite these laws not meeting the conditions stipulated in the 
constitution. Between 1999 and 2004 more than 230 temporary laws were 
issued by the government, many of which were designed to consolidate their 
power and to impose new restrictions on political freedom. Moreover, 
Jordanian citizens enjoy little protection from arbitrary arrest, and suspects 
may be detained for up to 10 days without formal charge. 
• Political liberalization in Jordan has not led to successful democratization due 
to the absence of meaningful political participation. The meaningfulness of 
participation in the parliamentary elections is determined by how effective the 
For more details see http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm. 
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elected parliament is considered to be. Thus, citizens do not tend to participate 
in elections when parliament has no real influence on the formation of 
governments or on government policy. But it becomes more important when 
parliament has the power to control executive authority and makes decisions 
relevant to issues which affect people's daily lives. Although five 
parliamentary elections have been held since 1989, these cannot be considered 
a part of democratization because the executive is still the dominant law-
maker, and the powers of parliament are limited. According to Beverly Milton-
Edwards democratization signifies a move toward greater degrees of political 
participation in existing governmental systems. In essence, it enhances the 
collective freedom of the citizen, especially in terms of the public's ability to 
participate in and influence the government.509 
• It is also argued that the participation of political parties in political life and 
parliamentary elections reflects the political and social reality in which they 
work. The existence of political and intellectual vacuum in Jordanian society 
has contributed greatly to the strengthening of tribal and economic dimensions 
in parliamentary elections. In addition, the ways in which Jordanian citizens 
interpret the existence of political parties and the importance of their role in 
society is that they are still weak due to many reasons. The most important of 
these is irrelevance of political parties to the political, economic, social and 
cultural issues and problems experienced by Jordanian citizens. 
• It is also argued here that although the large number of parties in the Jordanian 
political arena is an unhealthy sign, political development cannot be achieved 
through legislation on parties, but rather through the development of electoral 
law and other laws which dispel the culture of fear and stimulate participation. 
By the last amendments to the political parties' law many parties will come 
out of the arena without leading to the emergence of large parties. Therefore, it 
is argued that political parties still have a long way to go to reach a significant 
Beverly, Contemporary Politics in the Middle East (2000), pp. 150-152. 
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level of political participation under such certain, performance, culture, 
constraints, and laws. 
• The current electoral system has contributed significantly to the reduction of 
the role and presence of political parties in elections, and has strengthened the 
role of the various tribes and families. What has made things more 
complicated is the distribution of parliamentary seats to a large number of 
constituencies, making the chances of success associated with place and social 
relations more than opportunities are given to partisan and political trends. 
Therefore, it is clear that the design of the current electoral system has not met 
most of the eight criteria that should be followed according to Reynolds and 
Reilly's criteria. On the contrary electoral systems have been designed by the 
way which designer think will work to their own advantage. 
• In relation to political culture in Jordan, it seems that there can be no real 
democratic system in Jordan without the establishment and consolidation of 
democratic values in the political culture of Jordanian citizens. As Ayubi 
stated, "Democracy is simply not a form of government; it is also a cultural 
and intellectual tradition". 5 1 0 This culture is the key element in the formulation 
of political relationships between the government and the population, because 
democracy is not just laws, political institutions and electoral processes, but 
first of all it is a set of values and principles which provide the cultural 
framework for a democratic system. 
• Despite the remarkable progress witnessed by Jordan at the end of the 1980s, 
the culture of fear in Jordanian society still poses a fundamental challenge to 
democratic participation. The fear of the security agencies and the 
consequences of criticizing governments in public and disagreeing with them 
based on perceptions and impressions generated among citizens. Additionally, 
the culture of fear makes the Jordanian citizens afraid of complaining about 
violations of their rights on one hand, and the lack of the government's 
response to cope with these complaints on the other hand. Hani Dahleh, the 
Ayubi, Overstating the Arab Slate (1995, p. 397. 
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chief of The Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR), said that the 
human rights situation in Jordan continues to decline. Furthermore, in its 
annual report about the human rights situation in Jordan in 2007, the 
organization accused the Jordanian authorities of failure to show adequate 
seriousness in dealing with human rights violations as reported by citizens. 
The report said that "the AOHR office in Amman received 122 complaints last 
year about violations mainly pertaining to bad treatment, torture at police 
stations and abuse of authority. This number of complaints is an indication that 
the violations of human rights in the country were on the rise in 2007 because 
complaints received in earlier years did not exceed 100". The AOHR chief 
added that "The government dealt only with four out of the 122 complaints we 
reported".5" 
• The present study also concludes that the subject political culture still prevails 
in Jordan. Democratic values do not represent a major component in the 
structure of the political culture of the majority of Jordanians, which has led to 
the prevalence of an apathetic political culture. On the other hand, negative 
values and abstention from participation are common among the majority, in 
addition to the sense of their inability to influence national events and 
developments. Moreover, as Sharbi argued, Arab societies are characterized 
by patriarchal values. Patriarchal culture still dominates the culture of 
Jordanian society. The social relations of kinship and the tribe are still 
dominant and constitute the main motives for Jordanians to participate in 
parliamentary elections. Furthermore, there is a culture of doubt and lack of 
confidence prevailing in society that the government has no serious intention 
to combat corruption or to achieve democracy, since the government has not 
adopted any substantive laws nor created institutions to tackle these issues. 
• Finally, regarding women's participation in Jordanian parliaments, although 
the quota system has brought women into Jordan's parliament, the presence of 
women there really only represents a facade of democracy and is purely 
5 1 1 For more details see The Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR) website www.aohr.org. 
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cosmetic, as the majority of citizens do not believe in the importance of the 
political role of women. 
9.2 Recommendations 
To deepen and consolidate political participation in general in Jordan, and electoral 
participation in particular, a number of recommendations can be made from the results 
of the study, which can be summarized as follows: 
1. Financial and administrative corruption must be combated, because it has 
adverse affects directly or indirectly on political participation. Policies should 
be drawn up to prevent the use of national wealth and public funds for 
personal interests. Moreover, the government should pay more attention to 
tackling combating practices of electoral bribes and vote-selling in favour of 
some candidates, which leads to the corruption of the entire electoral process. 
2. It is crucial to alleviate the economic problems that citizens are suffering from 
particularly in low wages, unemployment and the widespread poverty in the 
society. These problems constitute an obstacle to real political participation as 
the citizen cannot be active in the political arena while he is suffering from 
poverty and thinking and concentrating his attention to securing the basic 
needs of life. 
3. Restrictions on political freedoms should be relaxed particularly the freedoms 
of expression, association and assembly in order to achieve the goals of 
political reform. In addition the doctrine of separation of powers should be 
applied to protect individual rights and freedoms from abuse by the 
government. This means not only the separation of sovereign powers, but also 
of the exercise of that power. 
4. The government should support political parties and their activities in the 
political arena by consulting and involving them in the implementation of 
national policies, in addition to involving them in the formation of 
governments in order to achieve true democratic transformation. Political 
parties are the main tool of democratic transformation, and for promoting 
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political knowledge and an awareness of democratic empowerment across 
society. 
5. Jordanian political parties have to adopt practical and realistic national 
programs to participate in and contribute to political and economic life. 
Moreover, parties should be established through popular bases and not through 
individuals or groups pursuing personal interests, i f they are to gain credibility 
and play a role in institutionalising and developing political life and 
participation. 
6. Political parties should review their political and electoral performance and 
work to unify their perspectives about necessary reforms. This requires, above 
all, reducing the gap between themselves and the masses, which would depend 
on their responsiveness to people's needs and on the ability of their 
programmes to reflect the feelings of the people, their hopes, and their 
aspirations. 
7. After its application for more than 14 years, it is clear that the current electoral 
system has not improved the political experience. On the contrary it has been 
used to serve and support the social reality that prevailed in the society. 
Therefore, modifications to the current electoral system or the adoption of a 
completely new electoral system are essential requirements to ensure an 
equitable representation of the political forces and parties in society. It is 
suggested here that a mixed system could give voters two votes each, the first 
vote in an individual electoral district, and the second for a nationwide 
political list. Such a system could lead to the expansion of political 
participation and the development of political and democratic experiment. 
8. The electoral districts should be reviewed because their current boundaries are 
unfairly drawn, and have not succeeded in providing representation in 
proportion to population. 
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APPENDIX (A) 
COPPIES OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN ARABIC AND 
ENGLISH 
Demographic data 
1. Age: 
• 18-30 years 
• 51-60 years 
• 31-40 years 
• 61 and above 
• 41-50 years 
2. Gender: 
• Male • Female 
3. Religion: 
• Muslim • Christian • Other 
4. Place of birth: 
• Urban • Rural • Badiyah 
5. Marital status: 
• Married 
• Divorced 
• Single 
• Widowed 
6. Education: 
• Below secondary education • Diploma 
• Bachelors degree • Masters degree • PhD 
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For each of the items below, please tick where appropriate to show your agreement or 
disagreement with the following statement: 
To which extent do you agree that the following 8 ^ 
is guaranteed in Jordan? |j Jf 
1 Freedom of speech is guaranteed in Jordan 
2 Freedom to participate in political 
demonstrations 
3 Freedom to join political parties 
4 Equality of citizens rights regardless of their 
religion, ethnic origin, and tribal affiliation. 
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The Jordanian citizen can criticize and disagree 
Q2 with the government in public without being 
subject to security consequences. 
The Jordanian citizen can participate in the 
Q3 peaceful oppositional political activities without 
being subject to security consequences 
Q4) Have you ever been subject to security consequences due to criticizing the 
government? 
• Yes (Move to Q5) • No 
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Q5) What type of punishment that you have been subject to? 
• Custodial sentences 
• Physical punishment 
• Restriction or loss of civic and other rights 
• Others (please specify) 
• Refuse to answer 
.83 M 
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The internal issues are considered obstacles to 
Q6 
political participation. 
*The internal issues such as 
• Administrative and financial corruption 
• The economic status of Jordanian citizens 
• Lack of government seriousness to achieve democracy 
• Tribalism 
• The current electoral system 
• Other reasons (please specify) 
Q7) What is the most important obstacle to political participation in your point 
of view? 
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Q8 
The international and regional events are 
considered as obstacles to political participation 
* The International and regional events such as 
• The ongoing Palestinian -Israeli conflict 
• Present and ongoing conflicts and crises in Iraq 
• The September 11th 2001 attacks and the war against terrorism. 
• The unwillingness of certain parties or states to achieve stability in the region. 
• The unwillingness of certain parties or states to pursue true democracy in the 
Q9) What is the most important reason in your point of view? 
Q10) Do you belong to a political party? 
• Yes (please mention the name of the party) 
• No (move to questions 11,12,13) 
Q l l ) Do you intend to join a political party in the future? 
Q12) Which of the current political parties represent your political aspirations so 
that you might join? 
The name of the party 
region. 
• Yes 
• No 
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Q13) If you do not intend to join any political party can you please mention the 
main reasons behind your decision 
00 
e 8 
75 
Q14 
The current political parties in Jordan work in 
service of the people and society 
Q15 
The current political parties in Jordan work in 
the service of their leaderships 
Q16 
The performance of the current political parties 
is successful in the political field 
Q17 
Some of the current political parties are 
qualified to form a government 
Q18) If did you agree in question 17 could you please mention these parties 
Q19) Have you participated in the last parliamentary elections? 
• Yes (move to question 20) 
• No (move to question 21) 
Q20) What was the main reason behind your decision to vote? 
• National duty and constitutional right 
• Tribalism and social ties 
• To put the right person in the right position 
• To enhance democracy in Jordan 
• Others (please specify) 
308 
Q21) Why did you not participate in the last parliamentary elections? 
• I 'm not satisfied with the ability of the Parliamentary councils 
• I'm not satisfied with elections' results 
• I 'm not satisfied with the candidates available. 
• I 'm not interested 
• Others (please specify) 
Q22) Have you voted for women candidates in the last parliamentary elections? 
• Yes 
• No ( move to question 23) 
Q23) What was the main reason for not voting for women candidates (in your 
point of view?) 
• Social obstacles (community's culture and traditions such as, women stay home 
and raise children). 
• Religious dimension (religion urging women to be more conservative and 
calling for separating the sexes in the work place). 
• Lack of women experience in political affairs. 
• Women do not have enough experience in public affairs. 
• Tribal dimension (women could not get support from their tribes). 
• Others (please specify) 
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Tribalism is considered an obstacle to reach the 
Q24 political activists and parties' members to the 
parliament 
Voting behaviour in Jordan is directly linked 
Q25 with the primary affiliations (tribal or familial) 
of voters 
The service dimension in the relationship 
between voters and candidates and the 
Q26 proximity of the latter from the authorities and 
the centres of power lead voters to vote for one 
candidate over another 
The current electoral law (SNTV) is suitable for 
Q27 
the structure of Jordanian society 
The current electoral law (SNTV) is fair to 
Q28 
political parties in Jordan 
The current electoral law and the quota system 
are fair to women 
a < 
2 J 3 I 2 
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Q30) In your point of view what is the most suitable electoral system for 
Jordanian society. 
• One-vote System (SNTV) 
• Multi-vote system 
• Two votes system (TVS), one vote for the district and one vote for national 
candidate. 
• Proportional Representation 
• Other (please specify) 
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APPENDIX (B) 
LIST OF RESPONDENTS BY GROUP 
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List of respondents 
• Civil Society Organizations 
1. Political Party Members 
1. Islamic Action Front 
2. The Jordanian Arab Ba'ath party 
3. The Jordanian Communist Party 
4. The Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party 
5. Islamic Centrist Party 
6. The Jordanian people's Democratic Party (HASHD) 
7. Pan-Arab Democratic Popular Party 
8. Ansar" Arab Jordanian Party 
9. Citizen's Rights Movement 
10. Renaissance Party 
11. Communist Workers Party 
2. The Professional Associations' members 
• Jordan Medical Association 
• Jordan Solicitors Association 
• Nurses and midwifery council 
• Jordan Engineers Association 
3. Associations 
• The National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) 
• Law Group for Human Rights (MIZAN) tjj** <cy^> 
• Jordan Society Human Rights (J.S.H.R) u ^ V l J j i a J SyJjVl AJ*^JI 
• The Arab Women Association L P J ^ I ^ ^Luj*^ ^»*^ 
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4. Journalists 
1. Alrai (daily newspaper) 
2. Addustoux (daily newspaper) 
3. Al-Arab alyoum (daily newspaper) 
4. Alghad (daily newspaper) 
5. Al-Sabeel (partisan political weekly newspaper) 
6. Al-Watan (partisan weekly newspaper) 
7. Al-Badeel (partisan weekly newspaper) 
8. Al-Hilal (weekly newspaper) 
9. Al-Ahali (partisan political weekly newspaper) 
10. Al-Hadath (political weekly newspaper) 
11. Al-Mowjaha (weekly newspaper). 
12. The Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists 
13. Petra (Jordan News Agency) 
14. Al-Diyar (daily newspaper) 
15. Al-Watan (weekly newspaper) 
16. Al-Wihdeh (partisan weekly newspaper) 
5. Academics in Jordanian Universities 
1. Yarmouk University 
2. The University of Jordan 
3. Al-albeit University 
4. Jerash University 
5. Philadelphia University 
6. Muta University 
• Faculty of Law 
• Socio-Politics Department 
• Press and Media Department 
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